| Abstract [eng] |
This study examines whether the 2022 tightening of sanctions against Russia and Belarus was associated with lower real GDP growth in European sanctioning economies. Most of the sanctions literature examines the impact on targeted states, whereas the macroeconomic costs for sanctioning economies have received far less systematic attention. Using annual panel data for 60 countries over 2016–2024, drawn from IMF, World Bank, and UN Comtrade databases, the analysis applies a difference-in-differences framework with country and year fixed effects, supported by parallel-trends diagnostics, placebo tests, and formal sensitivity analysis. The results indicate that, in the post-2022 period (2022–2024), real GDP growth in the sanctioning group was lower by approximately 1.47 percentage points relative to the control group; given a positive pre-treatment signal in 2021, this differential may represent an upper bound on the sanctions-related component. The negative differential was robustly stronger in more open economies. Within the sanctioning group, greater pre-2022 export dependence was associated with a more negative post-2022 growth change, whereas energy vulnerability showed no statistically significant heterogeneity. Overall, the findings indicate uneven short-run growth differentials associated with the sanctions episode, with stronger differentials in highly open economies. |
