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EUROPEAN SECURITY POTENTIAL: THE EU AND NATO COOPERATION AND DECISIVE FACTORS
Final project for Master degree

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EUROPOS SAUGUMO POTENCIALAS: ES IR NATO BENDRADARBIAVIMAS IR JĮ LEMIANTYS VEIKSNIAI
Baigiamasis magistro projektas

Vadovas

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**Recenzentas**
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AKADEMINIO SĄŽININGUMO DEKLARACIJA

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Kaunas

Patvirtinu, kad mano, **Edvino Sausaičio**, baigiamasis projektas tema „Europos saugumo potencialas: ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimas ir jį lemiantys veiksniai", yra parašytas visiškai savarankiškai ir visi pateikti duomenys ar tyrimų rezultatai yra teisingi ir gauti sąžiningai. Šiame darbe nei viena dalis nėra plagijuota nuo jokių spausdintinių ar internetinių šaltinių, visos kitų šaltinių tiesioginės ir netiesioginės citatos nurodytos literatūros nuorodose. Įstatymų nenumatytų piniginių sumų už šį darbą niekam nesu mokėjęs.

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SANTRAUKA

Šio tyrimo tema yra ypač svarbi dėl keleto priežasčių, kurios kyla iš dabartinės geopolitinės saugumo situacijos. Tyrimas pateikiamas analizuojant ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimo faktorius, iššūkius ir galimybes. Šiandien ES ir NATO susiduria su sparčiai besikeičiančia saugumo padėtimi pasaulyje. Daugelis iššūkių tiesiogiai susiję su ES: Brexit, demografijos problemos, pabėgėlių krizė, populistinių politinių judėjimų kylimas, terorizmas ir Ukrainos krizė. Taip pat svarbu pabrėžti didelį disbalansą tarp NATO valstybių narių gynybos išlaidų: Europos šalių indėlis į gynybą yra per mažas. Dabartinė JAV vyriausybė su Donaldu Trumpu priešakyje labai skeptiškai vertina tokį Europos šalių požiūrį į saugumą. Ateitis tampa nenuspėjama ir stabilumo lygis mažėja, tačiau tiek ES, tiek NATO turi puikias galimybes dirbti kartu. ES turi priemonių, kurios gali padėti suvaldyti kibernetinius ir informacinius išpuolius, o NATO gali padėti ES užtikrinti saugumą Europoje. Narystė abiejose organizacijose suteikia puikias sąlygas bendradarbiauti įvairiose srityse, susijusiose su saugumu ir gynyba: krizių valdyme, kovoje su hibridinėmis grėsmėmis, partnerystė žvalgybos duomenų rinkime, bendradarbiavimas kibernetinio saugumo klausimais, gynybos planavimo procesų koordinavimas ir kt. Temos naujumo požiūriu svarbu pabrėžti du aspektus: pirma, tarporganizaciniai santykiai nėra giliai analizuota teorinė sritis, nes ji yra ganėtinai nauja tarptautinių santykių studijose; antra, ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimas yra būtina Europos saugumo sąlyga. Tyrime analizuojami ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimą lemiantys faktoriai, taip pat atidžiai stebimi dabartiniai klausimai ir būsimojo bendradarbiavimo perspektyvos. Tyrimo tikslas - ištirti lemiamus veiksnius ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimo srityje ir jų įtaką būsimai organizacijų partnerystei. Šiame magistrinio darbo projekte nagrinėjama problema - kokie yra esminiai ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimą lemiantys veiksniai? Tyrimo objektas yra ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimas. Tyrimo subjektas yra ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimą lemiantys veiksniai. Magistro darbe tikslui pasiekti iškelti keturi pagrindiniai uždaviniai: išanalizuoti tyrimo objektą per teorinę prieigą, identifikuoti ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimo veiksnius istorinėje perspektyvoje, nustatyti ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimą lemiančius veiksnius ir įvertinti ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimo perspektyvas. Tyrimo struktūrą sudaro trys pagrindinės dalys. Tyrimas prasideda teorine dalimi, kurioje pateikiama informacija apie tai, kaip veikia tarptautinės

organizacijos, išanalizuojami pagrindiniai ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimo aspektai. Antroji analitinė dalis yra padalinta į du pagrindinius skyrius. Pirmasis analitinis skyrius susideda iš trijų poskyrių. Kiekviename poskyryje atsispindi ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimo laikotarpis. Pirmasis laikotarpis yra 1998 - 2003 m., šis laikotarpis atspindi pirmąjį praktinį ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimą. Antrame poskyryje apibūdinami klausimai, kurie kilo ES ir NATO bendradarbiavime 2004 - 2013 m., didelis dėmesys skiriamas karinėms operacijoms. Paskutinis analizuojamas laikotarpis yra nuo 2014 m. iki dabartinių įvykių. Laikotarpis apima krizę Ukrainoje ir apibūdina ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimo pokyčius nuo krizės iki šiandien. Antrasis analitinės dalies skyrius suskirstytas į du poskyrius. Pirmajame poskyryje analizuojamas sprendimų priėmimo procesas ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimo srityje. Galiausiai, antrajame poskyryje aptariami galimi ES ir NATO bendradarbiavimo scenarijai.

SUMMARY

The topic of this research is particularly relevant because of number reasons in the current geopolitical situation. The research is conveyed through precise analysis of the EU and NATO cooperation factors, challenges and opportunities. Today, the EU and NATO are confronted with a rapidly changing global security environment. There are many issues close to Europe: Brexit, demographic issues, refugee crisis, rising populist political movements, terrorism and Ukraine crisis. It is also important to add high imbalance in NATO MS defense spending, where the European countries contribution is low. Current the US government with Donald Trump in front is very skeptical on such European countries approach to security. The future becomes unpredictable and stability level is decreasing, but both, the EU and NATO have excellent opportunities to work together. The EU has tools to help manage with cyber and informational attacks, while NATO is able to support the EU in ensuring European security. Membership in both organizations overlaps and therefore provides excellent conditions for cooperation in various areas related to security and defense: crisis management, combating hybrid threats, partnership on intelligence gathering, cooperation on cyber defense issues, coordination in defense planning processes and etc. In terms of novelty it is significant to emphasize that the research is characterized with two aspects. Firstly, inter-organizational relations are not deep theorized field because of its novelty in international relations studies. Secondly, cooperation between the EU and NATO is a prerequisite for European security. In the research it is analyzed the cooperation between the EU and NATO and its factors from a historical point of view, while keeping a close eye on current issues and prospects for future cooperation. The aim of the research is to investigate decisive factors in the EU-NATO cooperation field and their impact on future partnership. The problem examined in this final project – what are decisive factors in the EU-NATO cooperation? The research object is the EU-NATO cooperation and the research subject is decisive factors in the EU-NATO cooperation. Four primary objectives are established in the master's thesis: to analyze the phenomenon of research object through theoretical approach, to identify the EU-NATO cooperation factors through historical perspective, to clarify decisive factors in the EU-NATO cooperation field and to estimate the EU and NATO cooperation perspectives. Research structure

consists of the three main parts. The research starts with a theoretical part which provides a picture how the international organization works and identifies key factors in the EU – NATO cooperation field. The second, part is divided into two analytical parts. The first analytical part consists of three sections. Each section reflects the EU-NATO cooperation period. The first period is from 1998 to 2003, this time period reflects first practical cooperation between the EU and NATO. The second section deepens knowledge in issues which have arisen in the EU and NATO cooperation during the 2004 – 2013 period and cooperation in military operations over Berlin Plus arrangements. The last period which was analysed is from 2014 - until recent events. The period includes crisis in Ukraine and describes the changes in the EU-NATO cooperation until today. The second analytical part is divided into two sections. First section analyzes decision making process in the EU-NATO cooperation field. Finally, in the second section, possible scenarios for future cooperation between the EU and NATO are discussed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CARD - Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy

DSACEUR - NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

EC - European Commission

EDAP - European Defense Action Plan

EEC - European Economic Community

EP - European Parliament

EU - European Union

EUGS

 - European Union Global Strategy

EULEX - EU Rule of Law Mission

EUMC - European Union Military Committee

EUMS - European Union Military Staff

EUPOL - European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan

EUSS - European Union Security Strategy

GB - Great Britain

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

HHG - Helsinki Headline Goal

HR - High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

IFOR - Implementation Force

IO - International Organization

ISAF - International Security Assistance Force

KFOR - Kosovo Force

MS - Member States

NRF - NATO Response Force

OFA - Ohrid Framework Agreement

PESCO - Permanent Structured Cooperation

PSC - Political and Security Committee

SFOR - Stabilization Force

TEU - Treaty on European Union

TFEU - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UK – United Kingdom

UNMIK - United Nations Mission in Kosovo

US - United States

WEU - Western European Union

INTRODUCTION

The topic of this research is particularly relevant because of number reasons in the current geopolitical situation. First of all, there is rapidly changing global security environment in the world. That is a reason why in is necessary to understand the EU approach to its security through the prism of cooperation between the EU and NATO. The European Union (EU) Security Strategy of 2003 claimed: "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure and so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history" (*European Union Security Strategy* [EUSS], 2003). A completely different rhetoric is reflected in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) which was adopted in 2016: "in a complex, connected, and contested world, it is essential for the EU to ensure peace and security for its citizens and territory, as well as advance the prosperity of its people" (*European Union Global Strategy* [EUGS], 2016). These changes have been caused by the emergence of new threats from the East and the South: in the east, there is a conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and in the south there is the flow of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa.

It should be emphasized that demographic problems are emerging. The population of the EU citizens is decreasing and aging, while population in the poorest countries from which the largest refugee number flows into the EU is rising. Also, security environment changes were caused by internal conflicts, the threat of terrorism, the emergence of populist political movements in the governance of the EU Member States (MS). Security issues are becoming more relevant not only at the domestic level, but also at international level. Unfortunately, the future becomes unpredictable and stability level is decreasing. These challenges in the EU security field are directly linked to the prospects for EU-NATO cooperation. NATO has an interest in ensuring security in the Europe mainly because a large part of the NATO MS are also MS of the EU. Arising security challenges in the EU can be exploited as a new opportunity for closer cooperation between both organisation in order to manage with global security issues.

There are issues which are not directly related to the EU and NATO cooperation, but influencing it as well. The changing balance of power in the international system should be mentioned here. If in the past the United States (US) were a leader not only in security matters but also in the economic field, now US is giving its position in terms of economy to China. China probably will take over the role form the US. In such a situation the EU must review its policies in order to face new challenges.

It is important to emphasize that from 2007 to 2016 in China, Russia and India defense spending has been growing rapidly, while defense spending increase in the EU is slow. The EU political and economic instability does not lead to changes in the situation. Significant imbalance between NATO MS defense spending is emerging as well. In common, the EU MS devotes only one third of what the

US devotes to defense. Defense spending of 2016 in the US was 604.5 billion US dollars, UK - 52.5 billion, France - 47.2 billion, Germany - 38.3 billion. US spends in defense 3.6 percent of its GDP, while most of the EU countries spend just over 1 percent (International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 2015a). The current US government is constantly emphasizing this difference in defense share and calling for the European countries to increase their contributions. The US military significantly contributes to global security and places increasing emphasis on ensuring Asian region's stability, while less concerning on Europe. The US expresses its position that the EU should take care of its own security, because the US do not have the power to maintain world order alone. On the other hand, the EU needs NATO support in its security policy development field, this assistance can be achieved through closer cooperation between organizations.

With regards to the development of the CSDP, the UK withdrawal from the EU can play an important role. Brexit has given an opportunity of revitalizing the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the EU-NATO cooperation. In order to develop the CSDP, unanimity is required between MS. Disagreements between the UK and France on the CSDP have already been the subject. Brexit may change the situation because after the UK's withdrawal from the EU problem of the CSDP has become even more striking.

The adoption of the EUGS followed by the European Commission's (EC) adoption of European Defense Action Plan (EDAP), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), and the European Defense Fund (EDF). However, the emerging opportunities for cooperation between the EU MS are not being properly exploited. There is a lack of trust between MS and different positions on current and potential security threats. Eastern countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia or Poland are most concerned about threats posted by Russia, while western and southern European countries perceive their vulnerabilities in the context of refugee crisis and terrorism.

Due to the lack of institutional partnership and political dispute between Cyprus and Turkey, cooperation between the two organizations is very complicated. Both, Cyprus and Turkey had a tendency to see the EU-NATO relations from a competitive point of view and this obviously did not encourage cooperation. On the other hand, NATO Secretary General and President of the EC signed a declaration on cooperation at the NATO summit in Warsaw in December of 2016 which draws attention to the unique advantages for both organizations in combating multiple threats.

The **problem** examined in the research – what are decisive factors in the EU-NATO cooperation?

The research **aim** is to investigate decisive factors in the EU-NATO cooperation field and their impact on future partnership.

The research **object** is the EU-NATO cooperation.

The research **subject** is decisive factors in the EU-NATO cooperation.

The main **objectives** of the research:

To analyze the phenomenon of research object through the theoretical approach;

To identify the EU-NATO cooperation factors through historical perspective;

To clarify decisive factors in the EU-NATO cooperation field;

To estimate the EU and NATO cooperation perspectives.

The **hypothesis** of the research: the complex decision making process of an international organization is the main determining factor in the EU and NATO cooperation field (factors list - appendix 1).

Research **methods** are an inductive case analysis, analysis of the primary and secondary sources, descriptive statistical data analysis.

The scientific **relevance** of the research is conveyed through precise analysis of the EU and NATO cooperation factors, challenges and opportunities. Today, the EU and NATO are confronted with a rapidly changing global security situation. There are many issues close to Europe: Brexit, demographic issues, refugee crisis, rising populist political movements, terrorism and Ukraine crisis. It is important to add high imbalance in NATO MS defense spending, where the European countries contribution is low. Current the US government with Donald Trump in front is very skeptical on such European countries approach to security. The future becomes unpredictable and stability level is decreasing, but both, the EU and NATO have excellent opportunities to work together. The EU has tools to help manage with cyber and informational attacks, while NATO is able to support the EU in ensuring European security. Membership in both organizations overlaps and therefore provides conditions for cooperation in various areas related to security and defense: crisis management, combating hybrid threats, partnership on intelligence gathering, cooperation on cyber defense issues, coordination in defense planning processes and etc.

Novelty of the research is characterized with two aspects. Firstly, inter-organizational relations are not deep theorized field because of its novelty in international relations studies. Secondly, cooperation between the EU and NATO is a prerequisite for European security. This research analyzes the cooperation between the EU and NATO factors from a historical point of view, while keeping a close eye on current issues and prospects for future cooperation.

Research **structure** consists of the three main parts. The research starts with a theoretical part which provides a picture how the international organization (IO) works and identifies key factors in the EU – NATO cooperation field. The second, part is divided into two analytical parts. The first analytical part consists of three sections. Each section reflects the EU-NATO cooperation period. The first period is from 1998 to 2003, this time period reflects first practical cooperation between the EU and NATO. The second section deepens knowledge in issues which have arisen in the EU and NATO cooperation during the 2004 – 2013 period and cooperation in military operations over Berlin Plus

arrangements. The last period which was analysed is from 2014 - until recent events. The period includes crisis in Ukraine and describes the changes in the EU-NATO cooperation until today. The second analytical part is divided into two sections. First section analyzes decision making process in the EU-NATO cooperation field. Finally, in the second section, possible scenarios for future cooperation between the EU and NATO are discussed.

1. THE CONCEPT OF RESEARCH THEORETICAL APPROACH

The theoretical part reflects the work done by various researchers, primarily in the field of IOs. Later, the interpretation of the EU policy formation is explained through the prism of the CSDP. Andrew Moravscik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory helped to understand how the CSDP is shaped. Finally, in the research the EU-NATO cooperation and ideas in this field are analyzed. At the end of the theoretical approach, factors that were identified in the analysis of various researchers' ideas are presented. These factors in the analytical part are confirmed or denied. Section is completed with a methodological concept.

1.1 Interpretations and aspects of international organizations

First of all, in order to access the research object, it is necessary to have deepened understanding of how IOs work in order to clearly determine key factors of the EU - NATO cooperation. After analysis of different approaches to IOs, it will be continued with the analysis of biased positions in the perspective of the EU-NATO cooperation.

It is important to understand the role of IOs in shaping international politics. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal argues that the IOs are important actors in the critical episodes of international politics with power in mediation, dispute resolutions, peacekeeping and etc. (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). IOs help in managing key areas from global health policy to the monetary policies around the world. IO can be defined as an institutional agreement between MS in order to achieve objectives according to systemic conditions, reflecting attributes, aspirations and concerns of its MS. According to Abbott and Snidal the growing interdependence between countries forces them to develop multilateral cooperation which one of the forms being the creation of IOs. International organizations work as a measure for countries to achieve their goals. Centralization and independence are identified as the key properties of IOs. International organizations as agents allow MS to create and implement its goals and enforce international commitments (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). MS uses IOs to manage their interactions and international conflicts. This is why IOs are more than instruments, but not individual actors - they are used for certain benefits.

J. Samuel Barkin argues that the IOs are not replacing sovereignty of MS in global governance, but are changing the way in which international relations works. Barkin add that the IOs enable cooperation among MS in a range of areas such as: dealing with humanitarian crises, international conflicts and etc. (Barkin, 2006). IOs are changing the expectations of MS about how international relations work by replacing a bilateral model with a multilateral. Also, IOs can affect international relations by facilitating cooperation between countries because of legitimated rules. But IOs do not

have the power that MS have, for example do not have independent means of force (Barkin, 2006). The lack of force power is clearly reflected in the EU, but it can be debated in terms of NATO. In any case, IOs are important actors in international politics. MS increases their foreign policy execution possibilities through IOs because they help to reach decisions. Moreover, IOs provide a particular format of membership, it means that MS has similar objectives, i.e. NATO MS seeks to ensure security. Similar goals lead to better conditions for cooperation inside the IO.

According to Kenneth Waltz, the pessimistic (neorealism) direction emphasizes the inability of IOs to handle vital global challenges. In line with this approach, IOs are treated as insignificant subjects in international relations. He argues that there is no hierarchy in the international system - it is dominated by anarchy. IOs and international law reflect the socialization of states, but dominant states dictate the rules of political games. The dominant states create IOs and regimes in order to realize their values and interests (Waltz, 1959, p. 1-14). It can be seen in both, the EU where leaders are Germany and France, and NATO where the rules are dictated by the US. But on the other side, Steve Smith and Ken Booth argue that IOs can be created without hegemonic dominance (Smith and Booth, 2000). In this case, a good example would be the EU, because there are no MS that are dominant in all areas, i.e. Germany is strongest economically, but not in defense.

According to Hans Morgenthau IO activities are more important in non-important policy fields, it encourages cooperation in the most non-controversial areas of politics where states' interests coincide. In the field of international security IOs significance is low, they are a tool for the policy of dominant states (Morgenthau, 1948). In this case, the focus should not be concentrated on the IOs, but on MS which uses IOs as an instrument. It can be stated that dominant states use IOs in order to reach their own interests. IOs are place where states can cooperate in many fields and allow a slight change in the established world order. But here is a key question – whether IOs have independent agency, i.e. autonomy to act? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to look at the IOs through the perspective of liberalism.

Clive Archer emphasizes a optimistic (liberalism) approach, where transnational solutions require transnational structures. IOs are considered to be institutions that can help to make common decisions in order to handle global issues. According to Archer international politics are more than maximisation of power or security. He argues that states are capable to cooperate despite the fact that the international system is anarchic (Archer, 1995). That is why IOs are important actors in the international arena and contributes to the global security situation. Liberalism contradicts the ideas of realism, with a greater emphasis on international or regional community relations. IOs can play an important role in preserving stability and prosperity in the world.

Jens Meierhenrich claims that states with low economy can be developed within the framework of an existing international economic system. Development is measured at the level of income, trade,

employment and earnings. Barriers are estimated by the lack of capital and skilled labor. Free trade, foreign investment and aid, according to liberalism, can solve these problems (Meierhenrich, 2012). This is perfectly reflected by the EU example where MS work together for economic well-being, while stronger MS helps to grow for weaker ones.

Hugo Grotius, a seventeenth century Dutch jurist argues that "countries, like individuals, are ultimately sociable. It means that states have a deeply rooted sense of obligation to create and respect rules of international society. This sense of obligation, according to Meierhenrich, arises from man's nature as a rational and social creature" (Meierhenrich, 2012). IOs can be regarded as a natural feature of society's development, as they are obligatory because of human nature to cooperate. In other words, people cooperate in order to develop countries and countries cooperate in order to develop IOs.

Meierhenrich believes that balanced internationalism is beneficial for international welfare (Meierhenrich, 2012). His ideas are closely linked to the ideas of the EU, which seek to ensure citizens' well-being and economic stability, but security is a sensitive issue. NATO plays a more important role here, so cooperation between these two organizations is a necessary factor in ensuring European security.

Realists are skeptical about IOs value in shaping of global politics. They recognizes an IOs not as main but as influential institutions especially in areas where decisions are not relevant, such as: contract enforcement, information gathering, monitoring and etc. On the other hand, liberalism recognizes IOs as crucial in shaping international politics, because they are the correct instrument to reach an international agreement.

As the EU-NATO cooperation is analyzed through the European security prism, it is necessary to consider how the EU contributes to the development of its security. Without the EU efforts, this inter-organizational cooperation between the EU and NATO is hardly imaginable.

1.2 Theoretical basis in the EU CSDP formation field

Looking through the EU efforts in order to ensure its security, it is significant to understand the CSDP formation. The EU is an IO that can be distinguished from others by its features. Development of the CSDP provides possibilities for cooperation with NATO. Therefore, it will be analyzed how the CSDP is formed through the theoretical prism. This study argues that the CSDP is most convincingly reflected in the ideas of Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory.

Moravcsik argues that key integration decisions and international cooperation are better explained through economic interests, negotiations, and institutional cooperation. Moravcsik argues that the EU's national integration priorities are driving force behind the EU integration. According to the author the main national government's goal is to protect geopolitical interests, such as national

security or sovereignty. Moravcsik distinguishes between two key levels of analysis in the EU integration processes - MS and the EU. At the EU level intergovernmental negotiations are taking place, in which each MS is seeking to reach decision that are more in line with its priorities, while political processes are taking place at MS level, during which national priorities are formed (Moravcsik, 1993). In terms of formation of the CSDP it is complicated to reach decisions, because MS in the EU first of all seeks its national benefits, but not to reach common objectives. It makes the decision making process complicated. Complexity impedes the prospect of cooperation with NATO due to lack of a unified policy. Moravcsik argues that the formation of MS national priorities begins with pressure from interest groups (Moravcsik, 1998). These interest groups may include various companies of MS operating outside the EU. It is important that third countries through these companies as interest groups can influence MS national interests and later, the EU decision making process.

More consistently, Moravscik's theoretical axis consists of three stages - the formation of national priorities, intergovernmental negotiations and institutional choice. In the first stage, the economic and social actors in the MS are faced with the need for EU policies. These actors compete with each other in order to influence national interests of MS. In the second phase, the EU policy is under consideration in intergovernmental decisions, such as institutional reforms or budget agreements and etc. In third stage, agreements between governments are made (Moravcsik, 1998). Generally, Moravcsik argues that the EU policy formation object is formation of an MS political position which starting with internal politics, pressure from interest groups and ending with agreements between international governments. He believes interest groups determine MS policy at the EU level (Moravcsik, 1998). Decision making process in the EU becomes complicated, because the EU has different MS with different national priorities and strategies which are shaped by different interest groups. Moreover, these interest groups can be influenced by third countries.

With regards to the CSDP which has a complex decision-making procedure, cooperation between the EU and NATO cannot be analyzed without deep analysis of this policy development. In the research, the CSDP as an essential factor for the EU-NATO cooperation is analyzed in a coherent way. Moravcsik's ideas helped to understand how the CSDP is developed and what factors influence this policy formation.

Also, it is necessary to understand the factors in cooperation between the EU and NATO. It will be analyzed the ideas in the research object field in order to identify these factors.

1.3 Ideas and perspectives towards the EU and NATO cooperation

Theoretical analysis of ideas in the EU-NATO partnership field is significant for this study in order to identify the main cooperation factors.

First of all, it is very important to have a short analysis on the history of the EU-NATO cooperation. For a long time, there were no direct cooperation between the EU and NATO. Looking through a historical perspective, NATO was an important player in terms of the EU development. As Andréani Gilles, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grantstates argue, NATO was a necessary condition for the EU development in other fields than security and defense. The US, with its leadership in NATO committed itself to defend European nations and in such a way created security shield for European Economic Community (EEC), this is a reason why the EEC developed as a peaceful organization with main focus on economic welfare (Gilles, Bertram and Grant, 2001). In order to understand the factors of cooperation between the EU and NATO, it is significant to stress decision making process in the field of the CSDP as one of the key factors which blocks cooperation between both organizations. Therefore, NATO as a historical security guarantor is highlighted as a factor for cooperation between the two organizations as well.

Regarding to the general aspects of the EU-NATO cooperation it is worth to mention that according to Sten Rynning, when the EU's capabilities of the CSDP development are analyzed it is frequently argued that the EU is not capable to develop the CSDP because of its nature. He argues that the EU in order to become capable in military action would need to change the CSDP idea and transfer it to smaller and more flexible alliance (Rynning, 2003). This idea is worth of attention, because the EU has different levels of integration, a good example of it is the Monetary Union.

The EU's decision making procedure is orientated to the negotiations, but not on executive power optimizing. Necessary factor for coercive power is executive authority which can make decisions. The EU is a multilevel organization which requires the intergovernmental consensus based on decision making procedures and this is the reason why centralizing power in the CSDP is becoming complicated (Rynning, 2003). The EU, in order to create stronger CSDP needs to centralize power in order to ensure its security.

The sustainability of NATO might be overestimated. Helene Sjursen points out that the EU has too much of expectations on NATO, which is possible to fail because of multinational structure. The EU cooperation with NATO might link not to its usefulness but to common historical issues, common vision, loyalty and support to each other. In the example, NATO has no ability of sanctioning in terms of the norm-breaker, that the EU has (Sjursen, 2004). The need of mutual support and fact that both organizations can complement each other in many areas of interests in security and defense leads to closer cooperation.

It is significant to argue that the IO future is not dependent only on MS or its structure, functioning of IO dependent on the space to act left for it in the global arena by other IOs as well. According to Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore the issues that IOs have today is division of labour, assignment of duties and rights (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Appropriate division of labor is one of the key factors leading to closer cooperation. Stephen F. Larrabee argues that a division of labour between the EU and NATO in the military cooperation field lead the EU to dependency on the US and reduce ability to influence the US foreign policy. Jolyon Howorth argues that inadequate division of labour between the EU and NATO may make organizations less responsive, less flexible and moreover, this may be reflected in the decrease of ability for cooperation (Howorth, 2003). Inadequate division of labor arises whereby the two organizations can compete with each other. The pursuit of prestige emerges in competitive areas of interests and it has a significant influence of the EU-NATO cooperation. Neither the EU and nor NATO, does not want to give away areas of interests, functions or decision-making rights.

On the other hand, proper division of labor leads to closer cooperation. There are areas where the EU and NATO can complement each other, because are very different organizations. The EU is more capable of deepening relations between MS because of its supranational structures than NATO because of the negative opinion towards supra-nationalism by the US (Larrabee, 2004). NATO is a military alliance without aspirations to become political union or to cooperate in other areas than security. The EU and NATO have different areas of activity, but similar goals to ensure prosperity and peace.

According to Rob de Wijk the sustainability of NATO directly influenced by the development of the EU military capabilities. As defense spending increase in NATO MS national budgets is too low, the alternative to strengthen defense capabilities could be the CSDP development. The CSDP could be improved by a new approach to the decision making process. A centralized defense institution's establishment could facilitate decision making procedure (Wijk, 2004). Without supranational authority the EU MS could impede the cooperation. The supranational approach could be a solution in order to simplify the CSDP decision making process.

Alexander Marshall argues that inter-organizational relations matter. Great model is the EU-NATO cooperation which provides examples of a mutual shaping process. The EU would not be the international actor as it is now without the NATO interaction or support. NATO has been shaping the EU by providing security shield, because of which the EU developed as an economic and political union (Marshall, 2017). The EU in the security field is much less advanced than NATO, but its efforts in the CSDP development are crucially important for the continued sustainability of NATO because in the future NATO can not be able to carry entire security burden.

The other significant idea that is argued by Nicole Koenig is that the effectiveness of the EU-NATO cooperation is obstructed by different MS of organizations. Quarrels between NATO MS Turkey and EU MS Cyprus limited the scope of political dialogue. Also, Koenig argues that the EU needs to develop an independent CSDP. Stronger CSDP would support NATO with more effective EU capabilities in the security field and the US with increased sharing of the security ensurement burden (Koenig, 2010). The implementation of the EU Global Strategy is a way forward for a new access to the EU-NATO cooperation. Sven Biscop sees the EU Global Strategy as an opportunity for a closer the EU-NATO cooperation. (Bendiek, 2016). But on the other hand, Daniel Keohane states that the EUGS underlines that NATO remains the principal anchor of the EU security (Bendiek, 2016). Therefore, the EU can continue to maintain the linkage to NATO policy, but in any case cooperation between organizations should be deepened because the EUGS concentrates on reforms which lead to fundamental CSDP framework reconstruction and closer cooperation with NATO.

In an analysis of theoretical basis, it has been clarified that IOs play an important role in shaping international politics, but what influence has an inter-organizational relations is still difficult to answer. The EU is an organization with complex decision-making process in the CSDP field, while the CSDP is directly related to prospects of cooperation with NATO. In consideration of cooperation between the EU and NATO greater attention needs to be showed to development of the CSDP. However, cooperation between the EU and NATO are complicated and in certain areas this cooperation is encouraged or impede by certain factors. Theoretical basis helped to deepen knowledge in the research object field and allowed to identify the primary factors of cooperation between the EU and NATO:

1. Security shield for international organization. Historically, NATO committed itself to defend European nations and in such a way created security shield for EEC. Because of that, the EU developed as a peaceful organization with main focus on economic welfare. This impedes cooperation with NATO, which main focus has on defense.

2. Complixity of decision making process. The EU is a multilevel organization with complex governance and different positions on security in MS level. It impedes cooperation between the EU and NATO as well.

3. Division of labour. The EU and NATO can complement each other in many areas. The EU and NATO can boost the effectiveness in certain activities. A proper labour division leads to better collaboration between both organizations.

4. The pursuit of prestige. It also has an influence in terms of cooperation between the EU and NATO. Neither the EU and nor NATO, does not want to give away areas of interest, functions or decision-making rights.

5. Conflict between MS of organizations. The conflict between these two countries impedes the EU-NATO cooperation. Both, Cyprus and Turkey had a tendency to see the EU-NATO relations from a competitive point of view.

2. FACTORS IN THE EU-NATO COOPERATION: FROM HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE TO RECENT EVENTS

The EU and NATO relations in this section are analyzed in order to clarify factors of cooperation between both organizations. The section begins with three main periods of cooperation. The first period is from 1998 to 2003 and provides examples of first practical cooperation and allows clarification of certain processes that were taking place within the framework of EU-NATO cooperation. Subsequently, the period from 2004 to 2013 is analyzed and the focus here is on the EU-NATO military cooperation. The last period is from 2014, beginning of crisis in Ukraine, to recent realities and challenges such as Donald Trump rhetoric, Brexit and other issues which have an influence for cooperation between the EU and NATO. The section concludes with analysis of key agreements that are relevant in the field of the research object. The purpose of this section is to confirm factors which were clarified in the theoretical part and to identify other possible factors in the EU and NATO cooperation field.

2.1 Research methodology

Inductive case study method was selected because potential of success is most likely in this case. In the research, different factors that determine EU-NATO cooperation were identified. Because cooperation between the two organizations is very limited, the inductive case study is best suited to generate factors that are suitable for inter-organizational relations analysis. Analysis of the cooperation between the EU and NATO helped to generate these factors which are determining the inter-organizational cooperation.

In this study, historical and recent documents, statistical data, interviews and speeches were utilized as primary sources. Documents were selected in accordance with the research and the EU-NATO cooperation dynamics. Main agreements between the EU and NATO were analyzed and the importance of the agreements was evaluated in accordance to the research object.

Secondary sources were used in the study: articles, journals, annual reviews and books. Secondary data for this study was acquired from a variety of online databases of journals, books and other such sources. Analysis of secondary sources was the main source of research material. Sampling on secondary sources was based on the results of the google scholar search engine, with the use of the keywords relevant to the study object and with making a brief review to evaluate the suitability of the source for further analysis.

Last, descriptive statistical data analysis method has been used to justify the factors that determine the EU-NATO cooperation, thus giving them more value. Statistical data were taken from

open sources: eurostat and etc. Statistical data were used in order to substantiate the factors of the EU and NATO cooperation.

The study was conducted in three parts: theoretical part ant two analytical parts. Factors which where identified in theoretical part were examined in the analytical part in order to purify the essential factors that determine the EU-NATO cooperation. Analytical part is divided into two main parts. The first part consists of three sections. Each section reflects the EU-NATO cooperation period. The first period is from 1998 to 2003, this time period reflects first practical cooperation between the EU and NATO. The second section describes issues which have arisen in the EU and NATO cooperation in military operations over Berlin Plus arrangements during the 2004 – 2013. The last period which was analyzed is from 2014 - until recent events. Period includes crisis in Ukraine and describes the changes in the EU-NATO cooperation until today. The second analytical part is divided into two sections. First section analyzes decision making process in the EU-NATO cooperation field. Finally, in the second section possible scenarios for future cooperation between the EU and NATO are discussed.

Finally, the prospects for the EU-NATO cooperation in the future were modeled. The EU-NATO cooperation determining factors are assigned to a certain scenario. Factors are assigned to scenarios according to their nature, depending on whether they are positive, negative or neutral in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

2.2 1998–2003: from Saint Malo to Berlin Plus

For a long time the EU and NATO were closely interrelated but did not have any factual expressions of cooperation. Only the Summit of St. Malo in 1998 can be called as first practical example of cooperation, because France and the UK issued a joint statement confirming the EU's commitment to the practical establishment of the CSDP[1].

In terms of the CSDP it is necessary to concern that its development is in essence, still in very early phase. The beginning of this policy development should be considered only in 1998, when the principal consensus between France and the UK was reached. The St. Malo agreement was subsequently accepted by all the EU MS that in face of the changed nature of threats to European security realized that they should acquire and develop its own military capabilities (*Franco–British St. Malo Declaration*, 1998). The question is what factors led the EU to the agreement of the St. Malo Summit?

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[1] The initial title was European Security Stand Defence Policy (ESDP), which changed to CSDP with the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in December 2009. The CSDP abbreviation is used throughout this research to refer to both CSDP and ESDP.

In St. Malo, British and French political leaders, Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac signed a declaration aimed at establishment of the CSDP which included establishment plans of the EU military forces capable to act independently. Later, in 1999, the European Council stated: "the EU shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding common European policy on security and defense. The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO" (*Cologne European Council*, 1999). These statements by the European Council confirm the EU determination at that time to establish its defense capabilities. When the declaration was announced, the CSDP was launched and laid the foundation for further the EU-NATO cooperation in the future. However, St. Malo agreement was relatively late and determined by specific historical circumstances. Even four decades after the Second World War, the EEC was altogether exempt from security and defense. The process of the EU integration covered economic and single market, but not, the security and defense field, such conditions was ensured by NATO. Such conditions were lasting throughout Cold War period, including a few exceptional cases such as the 1952 attempt to establish a European Defense Community. This confirms Gilles, Bertram and Grant statement that NATO with security shield for the EU has stalled the EU's integration in the field of security and defense (Gilles, Bertram and Grant, 2001). It should be highlighted that NATO dominance in defense is factor which impedes the EU integration in the CSDP field. NATO dominance has created conditions that led the EU MS to do almost nothing in order to ensure European security. This factor is also relevant today because the CSDP development is complicated and the EU still entrusts its security to NATO. Anyway, with agreement of St. Malo the EU made the first practical step to its security ensurement and laid the foundations for the prospect of the EU-NATO cooperation.

Subsequently, the end of the Cold War brought many significant changes to this well-established order. These changes even triggered a certain confusion in the EU security policy which has been as impeding factor to necessary decisions in the CSDP field for almost an over a decade. On the one hand, between 1990 and 1991, during the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, all the MS unambiguously agreed that now with the change in the international situation and the nature of the threats, the EU as an economic power should no longer eliminate security issues and leave them solely NATO responsibility. However, there was uncertainty to which level the EU will be involved in terms of ensuring its own and international security and how this will transform the EU relations with NATO. No one doubted that NATO as a transatlantic link between the US and the EU has to be maintained, but what should be the new relationship between NATO and the EU, which was planning to engage in security issues, was also unclear. The opinions of the EU MS in terms of cooperation with

NATO and the CSDP development differed considerably (Bailes and Whitin, 2011). This showed the lack of mutual MS position in which direction the CSDP should be developed and what to support, the independent CSDP or NATO. This clash between MS became one of the key factors that impede the EU integration in the CSDP.

France position after the end of the Cold War was that the regional integration and crisis management should not be NATO's, but the EU's responsibility. The EU should develop the necessary military capabilities[2]. Opposing to France position MS were the UK, the Netherlands, and a group of other MS. According to these MS, the EU is not able to replace NATO, because NATO has been and is the only truly acting security and defense structure. Moreover, it would undermine the transatlantic relationship by pushing the US to no longer participate in European security matters. This situation, for many MS seemed to be totally unacceptable (Bailes and Whitin, 2011). Therefore, it can be clarified the significant factor that in this case is impeding integration of the CSDP. It is division of MS positions: some stand for NATO, while others for further development of the CSDP. This division has remained until this day and confirms the fact that NATO dominance impedes the integration of the CSDP. So in terms of more general factors – the presence of one effective organization in a particular policy area impedes the development of the other, even when it takes up only complementary functions.

In approach to St. Malo agreement, it should be mentioned that compromise after the Maastricht treaty was to keep the CSDP issue open and with the inclusion of the less significant defense organization - the Western European Union (WEU). The Maastricht Treaty states that "the Union asks the WEU, which is an integral part of the Union's development, to draw up and implement defensive Union decisions and actions" (*The Maastricht Treaty*, 1992). Accordingly, in June 1992, the WEU Council in Petersberg adopted a declaration, which states that the WEU would be responsible at the request of the EU for carrying out humanitarian and rescue operations, crisis management and peacekeeping missions. However, the further development of the events and especially the lessons of the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo significantly reduced the distance between diverging positions of the EU MS. On the one hand, France has recognized that NATO remains a very important pillar of the EU's security, because without its intervention there would be no succeed in suppressing conflicts in the Western Balkans. In the other hand, the UK has agreed that the EU needs independent, rather than NATO-led military capabilities. This convergence of the EU MS positions led to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (entered into force in 1999), which states that the EU assumes responsibility for the fulfillment of the Petersberg tasks.

Security was ensured by NATO, but the situation in the Western Balkans gave rise to the change in the positions of the EU MS. After the Maastricht Treaty, ineffective WEU and whole the CSDP

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[2] The EU ineffectiveness at the time contributed to the development of CFSP, which led to CSDP.

began to change. The St. Malo agreement led to positive changes in the EU security field. The chaos caused by the end of the Cold War and the changing security situation in the Europe has changed the EU's strategic security position (Bailes and Whitin, 2011). The Saint-Malo agreement is important because a significant turning point in the CSDP was reached. But on the other hand, this shows that the EU MS becomes concerned in the European security only when the threats are facing, but not otherwise, when there are no security issues. It could be distinguished another factor which is directly related to the EU-NATO cooperation - the increase of security issues. The increase of security issues in the EU or its area of responsibility - increases the EU's integration level in the security field. History showed that the EU integration without cooperation with NATO would not be successful, so the security challenges that arise are conducive to EU-NATO cooperation. To conclude the St. Malo agreement, it is significant to emphasize that the CSDP became possible because of the agreement between the UK and France, which have largest defense capabilities in the EU. The UK and France realized that nothing will happen unless agreement in the security field would be reached. This led to further practical cooperation between the EU and NATO.

Year after signing the St. Malo agreement the other political consensus in the EU took place. The Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) was approved in December 1999. The European Council in Helsinki achieved a strong military capability goal that the EU ultimately has to establish the military capacity which could operate independently on the basis of credible military capabilities. At the Helsinki Summit, the EU MS set the objectives in the military field and the main objective was to be able deploy up to 15 brigades or military forces up to 60,000 persons by 2003 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2009). In spite of significant weaknesses, later the EU announced these military capacities as capable to act. HHG were set in order to implement Petersberg tasks which include: humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and post-conflict stabilization tasks. The EU MS have also created political and military structures, including the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff (Bendiek, 2016). It is important to note that through the HHG, the EU has not only created a military institutional framework, but also provided a basis for the futher development of the CSDP. The Helsinki Headline Goal was later expanded to a new Headline Goals 2010 (Drent, 2017). The HHG can be seen as a consequence of St. Malo agreement which has emerged in the perspective of the EU-NATO cooperation. The HHG has become a major breakthrough in the prospect of EU-NATO cooperation and practical example for future agreements.

The HHG set out the specific objectives that the EU committed to accomplish and these objectives have fostered closer cooperation between the EU and NATO. The HHG can be considered as a product of the St. Malo agreement which has emerged from the perspective of the EU-NATO

cooperation. The EU has taken steps in the contribution of its security development and cooperation between the two organizations has gained momentum.

Later, in 2000 the EU Treaty of Nice was signed. Treaty of Nice consists of amendments that reflected operational development of the CSDP and highlighted it as an independent EU policy. The European Council approved the decision making structures for the CFSP and the CSDP, including the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) (EUGS, 2016). This treaty defined the CSDP operational and strengthened the institutional level. It allowed acceleration in terms of HHG implementation. The CSDP was launched and discussions about the distribution of the EU and NATO roles have gained momentum.

It was realized that the EU needs significant tools for independent action. In December of 2002, the EU and NATO leaders decided to adopt the Berlin Plus (NATO, 2009). The Berlin Plus arrangements has enabled EU to use NATO military capabilities and resources without restricting the EU decision making autonomy, thus avoiding unnecessary duplication and competition between organizations. The Berlin Plus arrangements are the EU and NATO agreement on security which allowed the EU to use NATO capabilities for crisis management operations. These, the EU operations under the Berlin Plus arrangements have to be chaired by the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). In principle, the idea was that the EU and NATO should not overlap with each other in area of interests, but rather coordinate the actions, consult and work together in a more effective way (Howorth, 2017). Neither NATO, nor the EU has its own military capabilities, it is owned by the both organizations MS. Twenty one MS is in common, but the EU and NATO ambitions differ. NATO is able to conduct high intensity combat operations far from Europe, while the EU by definition and capabilities is projected for crisis management in the European Neighborhood, so both organizations should not duplicate each other. It is recognizable that the EU and NATO are more likely to cooperate in the fields were both organizations can complement each other. This cooperation can be impeded when it comes in the field of interests both organizations overlaps each other. Here it can be proven division of labour as factor in the EU-NATO cooperation. If both organizations cooperate in field where can operate independently from each other, the efficiency of their activities decreases due to competition. If the EU and NATO cooperates where can complement each other, the efficiency of the activity increases and cooperation becomes deeper.

In conclusion, the CSDP has never been about building a European army or supporting NATO with territorial security. The CSDP developed in recognition that most of the EU security challenges are facing is crisis management field: conflict prevention, economic stability and democracy ensurement, peacekeeping and etc. NATO remained the main guarantor in ensuring European security, but the Berlin Plus arrangements enabled cooperation between the EU and NATO in military operations field and provided possibility for the EU to use NATO capabilities.

1998 - 2003 period can be called beginning of practical cooperation between the EU and NATO. In this section four factors in the EU-NATO cooperation field were identified:

1. Security shield for international organization. This factor is relevant and today because the EU MS still concentrates on NATO in terms of security issues. With the St. Malo agreement the EU took the first practical steps to assure its security and laid the foundations for the EU-NATO cooperation.

2. Different MS strategic view on security. The EU MS has a different vision in the direction of the CSDP development and what to support, the independent CSDP or NATO. This collision of MS is one of the key factors which impede the EU integration in the CSDP field and blocks cooperation with NATO.

3. Emerging security issues. The increase of security issues in the EU or its area of responsibility - increases the integration level in the CSDP field. History showed that integration in the CSDP without NATO support would not be successful, because of that the security challenges that arise are conducive to EU-NATO cooperation.

4. Division of labour. Appropriate division of labour leads to better cooperation. If the EU and NATO collaborate in field where both can operate independently, the efficiency of activities decreases due to competition factor. If the cooperation is in the field where both organizations can complement each other, the efficiency of the activity increases and cooperation becomes deeper.

2.3 2004–2013: the EU and NATO cooperation in military operations

During the next period of cooperation military operations in which the EU and NATO have made a major contribution are analyzed. Also, further development of cooperation reflected in the Treaty of Lisbon, which played a significant role in the development of the CSDP.

Despite the promising start during 2004 – 2013 the EU and NATO created very limited tangible results in terms of cooperation because of structural barriers. The main obstacle, especially at the operational level, has caused by disagreements between Cyprus and Turkey due to the unsolved conflict over Northern Cyprus. Both countries had a tendency to see the EU-NATO relations from a competitive point of view, and this obviously did not encouraged cooperation. Since joining the EU in 2004, Cyprus has blocked Turkey's accession negotiations and blocked its participation in EU-led missions. At the same time, Turkey blocked the EU's access to the use of NATO forces and facilities, Turkey prevented Cyprus from joining official the EU-NATO meetings. Consequently, meetings between NATO and the EU took place rarely and on a narrow agenda (Monterey, 2017). This confirms the position expressed by Nicole Koenig that the effective the EU-NATO cooperation is obstructed by different members of organizations (Koenig, 2010). Quarrels between Turkey and Cyprus limited the

scope of political dialogue. Also, it is important to state, that this situation with Turkey and Cyprus, practically turned the Berlin Plus arrangements into inactive and prevented more ambitious strategic cooperation. The disagreements between two countries are continuing and today, that is why the Turkey-Cyprus case needs to be distinguished as one of the most significant factors, which blocks the EU-NATO cooperation.

Despite the controversy between Turkey and Cyprus, this period can be seen as positive because Berlin Plus arrangements have been used in two operations: "Concordia" in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and "Althea" in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

One of the most successful examples of cooperation between the EU and NATO was the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). The OFA goal was to prevent a war in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In 2001, because of the rise of the ethnic conflict between the country's security forces and armed Albanian rebels, the EU and NATO coordinated the negotiations that ended with the OFA. In the same month, NATO launched its 30 days operation "Essential Harvest". The goal was disarmament of ethnic Albanian rebels and destruction of weapons collected from them. Subsequently, a three-month "Amber Fox" operation was started, operation goal was to protect international observers which were supervising the implementation of the peace agreement in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In order to avoid possible worsening of the situation, NATO agreed to continue to provide assistance in the framework of the "Allied Harmony" operation, which took place from 2002 to 2003. At the end of March in 2003, the EU launched its first in history peacekeeping operation "Concordia" which was at the same time the first step in implementing the Berlin Plus arrangements (Smith, 2013). The EU carried out the "Concordia" operation until December of 2003. It was followed by operation "Proxima" which was lasting until 2015. During operation "Proxima", the EU police authorities worked with their counterparts in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as provided help to rebuild the country's interior ministry and offered assistance in integrated border security managing sphere (NATO, 2017). The first practical example of the EU-NATO partnership has become missions in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mutual procedural obligations also were reflected. Only if NATO MS agree unanimously in a particular conflict, the EU can send its forces and use NATO resources.

It is necessary to emphasize that conflict which began in 2001 in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, has become a pretext not only for the first expression of deeper the EU-NATO cooperation, but also for the first joint military mission of the EU MS. The "Essential Harvest" and "Amber Fox" operations carried out by NATO have helped to successfully reassure the intensified battles and ensure further stability in the country. In 2003, it was decided to transfer command of the military operation to the EU. As a result of the above mentioned Turkey – Cyprus disagreements, the deployment of NATO assets was delayed for five months because of Turkey's rejection. Nonetheless,

a mission aimed at maintaining a secure and stable environment, enabling the Macedonian authorities to fulfill their obligations, i.e. to increase the autonomy of the Albanians in order to avoid further ethnic disagreements, has been successful (Smith, 2013). Cooperation in this mission has provided the basis for further development of this practice. The EU-NATO cooperation in military operations took place despite disagreements between Turkey and Cyprus. The EU participated only on operations that do not require large military resources and much effort to control the situation. The EU intervened in areas where NATO had almost completed its work. Such a cooperation model could be applied today, but the EU should pay more attention to the development of its military capabilities in order to contribute in the crisis management.

Another, positive cooperation example is mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina which started in December of 2004. NATO completed its 9 year operations of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and handed it over to the EU, which immediately launched its 6,000 troops operation "Althea". Like the operations in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the NATO DSACEUR was appointed commander of the political and security committee of the EU (NATO, 2017a). NATO, later with the EU, helped to cope with vast part of Bosnia and Herzegovina difficulties. This mission demonstrated that the EU has been able to lead magnitude military operations, of course not without the help of NATO. In order to consolidate cooperation, NATO and the EU should focus on strengthening its main military capabilities, increase of interoperability, planning, technology and equipment (NATO, 2017a). This mission, as well as mission in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, can be seen as a positive example of cooperation between the EU and NATO.

In 2004, the EU's plan for the formation of national and multinational Battlegroups has become the most important aspect of the CSDP development. At this moment, each Battlegroup consists of 1500 soldiers. In theory, two Battlegroups of joint forces are ready at any moment to respond to the crisis in any part of the world. But much remains to be done in areas such as civilian and military coordination, in order for the Battlegroups to reach the highest potential. Therefore, realizing that the activities of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the EU Battlegroups may begin to duplicate, NATO and the EU have made efforts to ensure that these forces complement each other. However, current acquisition and equipment programs do not meet the demands of modern multinational forces. NATO and the EU should share complementary roles in this area so cooperation between these organizations could ensure the most rational use of resources (Zrínyi, 2007). It can be stated that the division of labour between the EU and NATO in crisis management field took shape. The EU and NATO began to complement each other in security matters, thus ensuring security in the Europe.

The division of labour was visible also in the two operations which were conducted simultaneously: in Kosovo and Afghanistan. NATO has been leading a peacekeeping force in Kosovo

(KFOR) since 1999. The EU has contributed only with civilian personnel to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and made a decision to take over the police component from UNMIK. The EU Rule of Law Mission (EURLEX) in Kosovo has been the largest civilian mission ever launched under the CSDP. EURLEX was started in December of 2008, it goal was to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law field, specifically police, judiciary and customs. It is significant to mention that the EURLEX works closely with KFOR in the field (NATO, 2017a). This example demonstrates that the cooperation of the EU and NATO is deeper where division of labour is shared. In this case, the EU has not used the opportunities provided by Berlin Plus and confined only with the EU Rule of Law Mission. This shows a decrease in the cooperation between organizations. This decrease depends on the following factors of cooperation between the EU and NATO: Turkey-Cyprus conflict and different MS strategic view on security.

The EU and NATO have showed importance in terms of peace and stability implementation in Afghanistan. The NATO launched International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which mission is to help to create a stable and secure environment in which the Afghanistan government could build democratic institutions, extend the rule of law and reconstruct the country. NATO welcomed the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) in 2007 (NATO, 2017a). The Afghanistan case only reaffirms decrease in the EU-NATO cooperation and ineffectiveness of the Berlin Plus arrangements, as the EU limited only with a police mission.

With accordance to the lessons of the Balkans and fact that the sphere of new operations is global, the cooperation between the EU and NATO should be brought to a new level. NATO, in terms of ISAF, opened its doors to political dialogue, consultation and partnership with such significance to far away countries from the Euro-Atlantic area such as Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan. The EU is increasingly becoming an international player in military and civilian crisis management, rule of law enforcement and other fields. The EU's geography includes the Balkans, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East (Pop, 2007). It demonstrates that the EU is trying to show an initiative in the field of military operations.

Figure 1. Active the EU operations and missions per year.

Source: Global Governance Programme, 2017

Data in figure 1 shows the EU active military operations and civilian missions between 2003 and 2017. The trend of active operations in each year shows an increasing engagement of the EU through military operations and civilian missions worldwide (*Global Governance Programme*, 2017). There are much more civilian than military operations in the EU. It is reflected in differences of 2017 statistics on active EU operations and missions per year when 16 civilian missions and only 6 military operations were conducted in 2017, while the number of military operations since 2003 has increased only from 2 to 6 operations. This shows that the EU is trying to show efforts in ensuring security.

The EU Security Strategy (EUSS) which was adopted in 2003 indicated that the EU was developing an exceptional vision of security. It downgraded the importance of military in the security field, suggesting to overview military capabilities as part of wider measures, and considered military aggression against any MS as improbable. The EU concentrated on issues such as human rights, social and economic development, a sustainable climate and energy policies (EUSS, 2013). The EC, understood the development of the CSDP with a certain suspicion and feared that it would threaten the EU ideology and nature. The EU's position on conflict prevention was firstly to approach through dialogue and partnership. Such an approach was based on the conviction that these norms and values were attractive and largely uncontested. At the same time, Russia, largest and strategically most important neighbor has been slowly withdrawing from the direction of liberal reforms promoted by the EU. In the EU Security Strategy the EU and Russia relations are barely mentioned. It demonstrates that the EU reduced its efforts in terms of taking care of its security. As was mentioned before, security was left under NATO responsibility with only complementary role of the EU.

The Lisbon treaty signed in 2009 became a great opportunity to strengthen the weakened cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty has brought new dynamics in field of the CSDP: the adoption of new institution, the emergence of the position of the HR and the possibilities for cooperation under the PESCO. One of the most important breakthroughs under PESCO is the possibility of linking the CSDP to the EU financial instruments. But, in spite of important structural changes and creation of new institutions, the development of the CSDP has stagnated once again. The main reasons for this situation were in particularly, that the EU MS relied on national interests and feared of sovereignty transfer to the EU institutions in the area of the CSDP. Secondly, the prospect of further development has hurt by disagreements between France which is in favor for closer cooperation, and the UK which is opposed to it (Kaski, 2011). This situation is perfectly explained by Moravscik's theoretical approach. Therefore, two factors which block the EU-NATO cooperation can be distinguished from this situation: MS tends to seek their national interests, despite the possibility to reach common decisions and fear of sovereignty transfer. By eliminating these factors, cooperation between the EU and NATO would become closer.

Another problem is fact that competition between the EU and NATO have often occurred. Such competition should be ended and any duplication of effort should be stopped. Instead, there is a need to develop a sustainable dialogue on the harmonization of military transformation and to ensure smooth cooperation on defense planning and capacity development. At the same time, the security of the EU and NATO can be implemented more effectively in terms of division of labour. NATO, with enormous military and human resources and the EU, with a desire for peace and willingness to prove that is one of the key actors on the international stage. But there is a big problem here, the desire to appear and to show that you are not inferior leads to competition, unless it is talked about strengthening of the CSDP (Howorth, 2003). This strengthening would allow the EU to move away from NATO and of course, to feel better against the US, also it should take greater account for the EU positions in international relations.

In conclusion, looking through the joint missions that have already been completed, it is visible that these organizations share tasks. NATO has the resources and experience to manage with an intensified conflicts, the EU wants and can take control on their hands when the work is almost done. Nevertheless, the division of labor between the EU and NATO is not acceptable it the political level, because it is understood as limiting the decision making autonomy of both organizations. The EU and NATO overlap each in terms of functions. NATO does not have civilian crisis management capabilities, and that is why only in this area the EU has the ability to make autonomous decisions. Elsewhere, NATO limits the EU decision making power. However, historical consistency showed that military conflicts in Europe lead to cooperation between the EU and NATO in the security field. The EU-NATO cooperation should become the main condition to a strong Euro-Atlantic community.

Factors in the EU-NATO cooperation during the 2003-2013 period of time:

1. Conflict between MS of organizations. Quarrels between NATO MS Turkey and the EU MS Cyprus limited the scope of political dialogue. Situation with Turkey and Cyprus turned the Berlin Plus arrangements into inactive and prevented more ambitious strategic cooperation. It should be emphasized that disagreements between two countries continues and today.

2. Emerging security issues. Security issues in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina led the EU MS to rethink its approach to the changing security situation. These changes have led to closer relations with NATO.

3. Division of labour. The EU and NATO began to complement each other in the field of security issue management.

4. Different MS strategic view on security. The EU MS have different vision on the direction of the CSDP development and what to support, independent the CSDP or NATO.

5. MS national interests. MS of both organizations tends to pursue their national interests, despite of showing efforts to reach common decisions.

6. Fear of sovereignty transfer. By eliminating this factor, cooperation between the EU and NATO would become closer, because the EU would have an opportunity to institutionalize the CSDP.

7. The pursuit of prestige. The negative impact of this factor appears in terms of cooperation because of competition between the EU and NATO which often occurs. Such competition emerges in areas where both organizations overlap each other in the same field of activity.

2.4 The EU-NATO cooperation: from beginning of crisis in Ukraine to recent events

In this section, the main aspects of the EU-NATO cooperation are analyzed from the beginning of crisis in Ukraine to recent events. The main factors of cooperation are identified in this section as well. The section covers topics such as Donald Trump rhetoric on the EU in terms of defense, potential impact of Brexit on the security of the EU. The section concludes with analysis of key agreements which are directly related to the EU-NATO cooperation.

NATO cooperates on common issues: crisis management, capability development, cyber defense, political consultations, hybrid threats, capacity building, maritime security and etc. The EU and NATO share common strategic interests and closer cooperation between the EU and NATO is significant in the development of an international comprehensive approach to crisis management which requires the effective application of both military capacity and civilian means (NATO, 2017b). Cooperation between the EU and NATO is essential because of the same global threats that both organizations faces. It is important to emphasize that security of the EU and NATO is interdependent.

The EU and NATO have twenty one MS in common, that is why the EU and NATO can mobilize tools and use resources in order to deal with the same challenges. The EU-NATO cooperation constitutes an integral pillar of the EU's work aimed at strengthening the CSDP, which includes the implementation of the EUGS. Stronger the EU and stronger NATO are mutually reinforcing (European External Action Service [EEAS]). But other challenges as Brexit and complex decision making process in both organizations, especially in the EU cause or could cause stagnation or push to deepen the EU-NATO cooperation.

The conflict in Ukraine over the past few years is one of the main topics to discuss. Since the crisis in Ukraine, the EU and NATO regularly exchange information on their decisions with regard to Russia (NATO, 2017b). The impact of this conflict on the EU-NATO cooperation is clearly understandable, so substantial external threat to Western security could be regarded as quite an important cooperation inducing factor. The EU needs to strengthen its CSDP. Now the EU MS are faced with the need for a coherent and long-term strategy that will lead not only to a sustainable security environment but also to closer relations with NATO. The EU was not prepared to manage such crisis as Ukraine's and because of that the EU MS have suffered a certain shock that led to rethinking of security policy. On the other hand, NATO has become even more important for the EU in the face of the threat, but NATO does not have the same means as the EU has, i.e. sanctioning. The EU has shown a unified policy on sanctions against Russia, but this unified policy is still not reflected in the development of the CSDP. However, the EU has once again shown that is concerned about its security only when a threat arises. Crisis in Ukraine has provided a solid basis for developing closer cooperation between the EU and NATO which is reflected in the main agreements in this field.

2.4.1 Main agreements in the EU-NATO cooperation field

In order to understand NATO position in terms of cooperation with the EU, it is significant to understand the NATO Strategic Concept which was adopted in 2010. The Strategic Concept is a very clear NATO's tasks, principles, values and strategic objectives for the next decade until 2020. In strategy, NATO is described as "a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law" (NATO Strategic Concept, 2010). Strategy presents three essential tasks for NATO: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. Also, the strategy stresses solidarity, the importance of transatlantic consultation and the need to engage in a continuous process of reform. It can be stated that NATO leaves space for cooperation with the EU as well. Strategy affirms how NATO aims to promote international security through cooperation. Strategy states that NATO will show open door policy for all the EU MS (NATO Strategic Concept, 2010). Therefore, it can be argued that NATO does not create artificial bariers in

terms of cooperation with the EU. NATO, despite Turkey and Cyprus case, is ready for genuine cooperation with the EU. This preparation is reflected in the Warsaw Summit.

In July 8-9 of 2016, very important NATO Summit in Warsaw was held where the EU and NATO adopted a joint declaration. This declaration outlined the EU and NATO strategic cooperation for common challenges (NATO, 2017a). NATO demonstrated unity in respond to the threats that alliance is facing today. More importantly, the joint declaration between the EU and NATO was adopted (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland [MFA Poland], 2016). This joint declaration was approved in December 7, 2016. The EU and NATO approved more than 40 measures for the EU-NATO cooperation which includes: hybrid threats, cyber defense and making their common neighbourhood more stable and secure (NATO, 2017a). The EU and NATO common strategic view and conviction that the US integration into the EU security field is significant are the main reasons for the Warsaw Summit. The declaration ground was Berlin Plus arrangements which basis are to strengthen the EU and NATO cooperation in crisis management field and the EU ability to use NATO resources. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated "neither organization has the full range of tools to address new challenges alone, but working together we are a formidable force for good" (NATO, 2016a). To conclude, this agreement is most important in terms of the EU and NATO cooperation in recent event, because both sides decided how the two organizations will cooperate and work together. It is also important that the Berlin Plus arrangements have been strengthened, making this agreement even a historic breakthrough in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation. Because both organizations faced with the common substantial threats, they decided to complement each other, this confirms the fact that a proper division of labor leads to closer cooperation. The EU has been concerned about its security after the crisis in Ukraine, as well as in the face of newly emerging threats, the EU Global Strategy reflects this concerns.

The EUGS, which was established in order to develop the CSDP, takes large part on concentration to the EU and NATO cooperation perspective. The Strategy provides a deeper transatlantic bond but NATO remains the primary framework, because defense planning and capacity development is conducted in full coherence with NATO (MFA Poland, 2016). The EUGS is a long-term plan of actions to reach the goals which have been foreseen (EUGS, 2016). But on the other hand, the EUGS is missing main strategy features, does not have an objective, time limit, the method and etc. This strategy can be measured ambiguously. Firstly, as an attempt to develop the CSDP which would enhance the EU-NATO cooperation, but on the other hand, the EUGS leaves a lot of questions on to how these goals will be achieved. This ambiguity could result in that the EU MS will still choose NATO as a security guarantee. There is a common vision but no instruments to implement it and this leads to the absence of common position between the EU MS.

The EUGS raised five priorities for external action:

1. Security and Defense - the CSDP is to improve the EU's security. Terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change and energy security are the main fields. Also, in defense field, the strategy provides cyber security and strategic communications development (EUGS, 2016). Terrorism, hybrid threats - the EU and NATO could complement each other in these areas and that is why the EU should seek for closer cooperation. Climate change and energy security should be reflected in pursuit of prestige factor, because the EU strives to remain a global example in these areas, and because of that cooperation in this field is complicated.

2. Building resilience, taking an integrated approach in the EU and creating the EU a more responsive in terms of external measures. The EU seeks to strengthen the resilience of the MS by supporting good governance, institutions, and working closely with civil societies (EUGS, 2016). This priority is not directly related to the EU-NATO cooperation, but it can be argued that any EU institutional achievement leads to closer relations between organizations. It would be easier to make decisions if institutions were established.

3. The EU seeks to strengthen the internal and external nexus. Strengthening the internal or external nexus requires promoting a more joined-up EU. Issues such as counterterrorism, extremism, migration, sustainable development and cyber security can only be addressed by joining-up the EU policies and institutions (EUGS, 2016). This priority is more internal but not directly linked to the strengthening of the EU-NATO cooperation.

4. The EU seeks to update existing strategies and prepare new ones. In a more complex world, the EU needs to combine traditional diplomacy, security and defense policy with being engaged in effective climate diplomacy, energy diplomacy, economic diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy (EUGS, 2016). This could lead the EU towards a unified policy which would solve many of the problems that arise in the EU-NATO cooperation field. In terms of the decision making process, the EU needs to institutionalize the CSDP, so that it would be more effective in ensuring security.

5. Enhancing public diplomacy - in a more interdependent world, it is important for the EU to have a clear and united vision and targets (EUGS, 2016). This priority has no direct links on EU-NATO cooperation as well.

The EU is concerned about its own security and this is reflected in the EU Global Strategy which state: "when it comes to collective defense, NATO remains the primary framework for most MS, as Europeans, we must take greater responsibility for our security. While NATO exists to defend its MS — most of which are European — from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organized to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary" (EUGS, 2016). With the EUGS EU seeks to implement fundamental reform on the CSDP, but it will be a difficult task because there is no consensus between the MS on this area. The EU puts high expectations on the EUGS because it is a long-term project. On the other hand, the

EUGS is very abstract. The strategy states that the EU will reach five priorities but there are no tools to reach it. Otherwise, Brexit, crisis in Ukraine, Donald Trump rhetoric, migrant crisis and changing global security environment can be seen as an opportunity for the CSDP implementation. The fact that the EU concerns about the CSDP development only when is faced with security issues is justified.

Also, it can be stated that the EUGS underlines that NATO remains the principal anchor of the EU security (Bendiek, 2016). This statement is opposed to the CSDP development because it could cause further division on the EU MS positions in terms of security. The EUGS concentrates on reforms, which leads to a fundamental the CSDP reconstruction and closer cooperation with NATO. The EUGS has been given a security orientation for the EU, but simultaneously, seeks to tie itself more closely with NATO (Bendiek, 2016). Such ambiguity of the strategy reflects lack of decisiveness in the EU MS positions on which way to go, to remain in the hands of NATO or to develop the CSDP as a counterweight to NATO. In the rapidly changing security environment, there are a number of factors, both, internal and external that can lead to a higher or lower level of cooperation between the EU and NATO. In order to explain these factors current events that are crucial for cooperation between the EU and NATO are analyzed.

2.4.2 Donald Trump rhetoric towards the EU and NATO

It is very important that the new US president Donald Trump demonstrates clear rhetoric on various global issues. Trump and his rhetoric towards the EU-NATO cooperation is a determining factor in the behavior of the EU. Trump rhetoric expresses that there is a huge imbalance in the defense spending between NATO MS, European nations account only one third of NATO defense budget.

Figure 2. Top 15 defence budgets in 2016.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015b).

As it is shown in figure 2, the largest share in defense is from the US. In 2016 defense spending in the US was 604.5 billion US dollars, UK - 52.5 billion, France - 47.2 billion, Germany - 38.3 billion (IISS, 2015b). The EU MS spending on defense is very low with accordance to the US, this difference lead to rigorous rhetoric from the US side against NATO MS from which most of are the EU MS.

Figure 3. Percent GDP military defense spending in 2016.

Source: Defense One (2016)

Figure 4. EU budget in 2017.

Source: Europa.eu (2017)

As it is reflected in figure 3, the US spent 3.6 percent of its GDP in 2015, while most of the EU MS spent just over 1 percent to defense. Even more, as it is visible in figure 4 that in 2017 the EU allocated only 3 percent to the security field. Donald Trump is constantly emphasizing this difference in terms of share on defense and calling for the European countries to increase their contributions. Trump rhetoric confirmed that the EU should demonstrate concerns toward security. The US military significantly contributes to global security and this is the reason why the US therefore places increasing emphasis on ensuring Asian region's stability, and less concerning on European issues. The US expresses position that the European nations should not only increase their contribution to the NATO budget, but also ensure its security by own capabilities. NATO is committed to ensure global security, not the EU. The EU should contribute more to its security in the future because will avoid disagreements with the US, because of that Trump rhetoric can be seen as a positive factor in the development of the CSDP and moreover, in the EU-NATO cooperation.

The problem is not only the fact that European countries spend relatively little on defense, but also the EU MS use defense money inefficiently: they invest heavily in new technologies (Eurostat, 2017). However, the biggest challenge is thatn the EU MS do everything in own way. Evidence visible

in diversity in the defense systems of the EU: there are 17 different types of tanks in the EU while in the US only 1, the EU have 29 types of warships while the US have only 4, the EU have 20 combat aircraft types while the US have only 6. This leads to insufficient interaction, duplication and reduce in the competitiveness of the EU. In economic terms, the cost of non-cooperation in the defense field for the EU MS amounts up to 26 billion euro per year (Karampekios, Oikonomou and Carayannis, 2017). Adoption of the EUGS followed by the EC's adoption of the EDAP, the CARD and the EDF provided the possibility to change security environment and limited resources. This will not solve the EU ineffectiveness in the CSDP, but the search for a solution can be accelerated by the fact that the US as economic world leader will be overtaken.


Figure 5. Economic primacy.

Source: World Economic Forum (2016).

As showed in table no. 5, both the "IMF and the World Bank now rate China as the world's largest economy based on Purchasing Power Parity, a measure that adjusts GDP's for differences in prices. This means that because money stretches further in China than it would in the US, China's GDP is adjusted upwards. And it will not be too long before China's economy surpasses the US by other measures, too. The Centre for Economics and Business Research predicts it will happen in 2029" (Willige, 2016). The changing balance of power in the international system should lead the EU to review of its policies in order to face new challenges.

The US deals with many global security issues, its role as a world policeman is decreasing. The US is paying more attention to regions other than Europe. To conclude, it can be stated that Trump rhetoric opened a new window of opportunity to revitalize the CSDP and the EU-NATO cooperation.

2.4.3 Brexit as the EU-NATO cooperation factor

The next factor of the EU-NATO cooperation which was analyzed is changes in EU membership. The UK is the EU MS that played one of a key roles in the CSDP formation.


Figure 6. Percent of gas coming from Russia.

Source: Business Insider (2014).

UK is the strongest military power (figure 2) in the EU and is not dependent on Russia in economic or energy sector (figure 6), that is a reason why the UK were able to promote the development of the CSDP. But on the other hand the UK maintains special relations with the US. The UK believes that the US as the strongest world country will help to cope with the crisis management in the future. The UK has never been supportive of the European project idea and it is reflected by 46 years membership in the EU (Biscop, 2012). In the past, Great Britain (GB) was vetoed to join EEC by Charles de Gaulle because of close relations with the US. Later, GB was accepted as EEC MS, but GB looked to the EEC only trough economic benefits. The UK always demonstrated highly inconsistent policy on the CSDP security and defense field.

The UK launched various programs and initiatives, but it also blocked other initiatives. One positive example of cooperation was St. Malo agreement. Historicaly, the UK was not able to decide and find the right solution on which way to go: to remain loyal to the US or to develop the CSDP capabilities with the EU. It is visible that the UK was always giving priority to NATO, not to the CSDP. But, since the Maastricht Treaty the US has spoken about the implementation of the CSDP. It can be said that the US has entered into negotiations with the EU MS in order to push the EU to collective security development. The US is not capable to maintain security issues alone because it is too big burden. At present, the US position is even more favorable in terms of the CSDP development than ever before, because the US is less concerned with European security and demonstrates bigger interest to the Pacific and Asia region (Lobe, 2013). The EU MS must make it clear that the US will not be able to ensure the EU's security all the time, which means that NATO cannot be a guarantee of security for the EU as well. Brexit will leave not only a gap that needs to be filled, but also new opportunities for the CSDP implementation. Brexit focused attention on what might be future for economic relationship between the UK and the EU, but what will be the future for the CSDP development? How the EU and NATO will cooperate after Brexit?

It should be emphasized that the UK supported the EU position with bigger influence in foreign affairs, because the UK was the strongest military power in the EU and the second economy as well. Integration between the EU MS and enlargement policy was leading to a peaceful and united Europe, but Brexit case emerged new threats for the EU, because it could cause a "domino" effect. It is a reason why the EU should pay even more attention to its security (*The UK in a Changing Europe*, 2017).

More important, the decisions of the CSDP are taken unanimously, if decisions are made at all. Without the UK, it would be possible to find a consensus between the EU MS, because the UK had a lot of influence in the EU decision making process and often negatively affected the development of this policy. Brexit as a factor for the EU-NATO cooperation is positive, because will encourage the development of the CSDP and will deepen cooperation with NATO. The UK is strongest the EU military power so the withdrawal of the UK leaves the security gap that the EU will have to fill.

Identified factors in the EU-NATO cooperation from 2014 until today:

1. Emerging security issues. The Ukraine crisis, the threat of terrorism, refugee crisis and other issues led the EU to the strengthening of the CSDP and closer cooperation with NATO, as the EU has no resources alone to deal with the challenges that arise.

2. Division of labour. The EU and NATO began to complement each other in the field of security issue management. It is confirmed in the EU Global Strategy and Warsaw Summit agreement where division of labour is reflected.

3. Different MS strategic view on security. This factor is also reflected in the EUGS, which can be valuated ambiguously. First of all, strategy can be argued as an attempt to develop the CSDP, which would enhance the EU-NATO cooperation, but on the other hand, the EUGS leaves a lot of uncertainties in terms of how strategic goals will be achieved. And moreover, as a consequence of executive instruments absence will maintain the EU MS support for NATO as a security guarantee in Europe. This situation would maintain the level of cooperation between the two organizations as it is today and deepen the absence of a common position between the EU MS.

4. The pursuit of prestige. This factor in the recent security situation is reflected only in the areas such as climate change or energy security, where the EU is striving to remain a global example for the rest of the world. Cooperation between the EU and NATO in these areas is unlikely.

5. Importance of powerful political personalities. The US expresses position that the European nations should not only contribute more to the NATO budget, but also take care of its security, because NATO goal is to ensure global security, not the only European. The EU should contribute more to its security in the future because of the US government pressure. Trump rhetoric can be seen as positive factor in terms of the EU cooperation with NATO.

6. Changes in membership. The UK withdrawal from the EU as a factor for cooperation between the EU and NATO is positive. Brexit should encourage the development of the CSDP and ensure deeper the EU cooperation with NATO, because withdrawal of the UK will leave the security gap that the EU will have to fill.

In order to summarize this section it is significant to emphasize that practical cooperation between the EU and NATO began from the St. Malo agreement. This cooperation has been developed and resulted in the Berlin Plus arrangements which allowed the EU to take part in the first military missions in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cooperation between the EU and NATO remained complicated until the start of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, when the European nations in the face of threat began to change their positions towards European security. Subsequently, rapidly changing security environment in the world led the EU and NATO to reach the Warsaw Summit, where agreement between the two organizations was adopted. The Warsaw Summit also reflects the division of labor between both organizations. In its turn, the EU has issued the Global Strategy which goal is to implement the CSDP and strengthen its ties with NATO. Rhetoric of Donald Trump, Brexit and other issues leads to the circumstances that the EU should strengthen its CSDP, and consequently, its relations with NATO.

3. THE EU AND NATO: COOPERATION FACTORS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVE

This part consists of three sections. First section defines NATO, the EU CSDP and the EU-NATO decision making issues. The process of decision making in the the EU-NATO cooperation field required deepened analysis in order to better understand the research subject. Subsequently, evaluation of the factors determining the EU-NATO cooperation is provided. Finally, with accordance to factors, possible scenarios for future cooperation between the EU and NATO are discussed.

3.1 Decision making issues in the EU-NATO cooperation field

NATO decisions are made by consensus after discussion and consultation among MS. Decision making by consensus is a fundamental principle which is the basis for NATO decision making. Decision making by consensus means that there is no voting, there are consultations and discussions which take place until a decision that is acceptable to all MS are reached. NATO, in terms of the decision making procedure has three main institutions: NATO Council as its highest decision making body, the Military Committee as the Council's highest military advisory body and the Strategic Commanders as the highest military executing authority (NATO, 2016b). NATO decision making process is simpler than in the CSDP, therefore it can be argued that NATO decision making process is favorable to the development of cooperation with the EU, but as long as there is a united position on cooperation issues. NATO's decision making procedure is based on consensus, but there is a dominanting member (US), which in essence enforces to reach consensus.

It should be emphasized that in the CSDP decision making process, there is a principle of unanimity. Complicated decision making process in the CSDP impedes the EU and NATO cooperation. This decision making process is complicated because of different MS strategic security vision. Different foreign policies and interests of the MS are blocking the CSDP development. The decision making process in the CSDP is different from the other EU legislative policy making procedures, because of its special competence. The CSDP decision making process has specific institutional features, such as the limited participation of the EC and the European Parliament (EP). The CSDP is defined and implemented by the European Council which consists of the Heads of States or Governments and the Council which consist of a representative of each the EU MS at ministerial level. In the CSDP, the EC does not have the right to initiate legal act, power of initiation is given to the HR and to the MS (*Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, 2007). The CSDP decision making procedure is complicated and separated from other EU procedures. It is difficult to find a consensus in the CSDP field between MS because of different strategic secutiry vision. The CSDP is

the main instrument in terms of cooperation with NATO, and difficult decision making process is impeding development of the EU and NATO cooperation. It needs to be emphasized that the CSDP development can be defined as main factor of the EU-NATO cooperation. The EU-NATO cooperation is directly dependent on the level of the CSDF development. If the CSDP will be developed more, the level of cooperation between the EU-NATO will be increased as well.

A brief analysis will cover the EU-NATO decision making process. The EU and NATO meetings are a basis in terms of decision making. Meetings between the EU and NATO take place at foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defense advisor's level. The EU and NATO have regular staff-to-staff talks at all levels between International Staff and International Military Staff from NATO side and the EU External Action Service, the EU Defense Agency, the EC and the EP from the EU side (NATO, 2017b). In the EU and NATO cooperation level, decisions are made mostly in the meetings and summits, where high level officials are discussing on issues. An example of such negotiations could be the Warsaw Summit. As a matter of fact, in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation, there is no legal decision making process, because decisions are reached through bilateral agreements between both organizations through meetings and discussions. It is not a difficult process to reach an agreement, because both organizations have similar security objectives. It is more difficult to reach an agreement inside the organization where the decision making processes are much more complicated. It can be stated that the main factor in the whole mechanism of the EU-NATO cooperation is the complexity of the CSDP decision making procedure.

3.2 Future perspectives of the EU and NATO cooperation

In terms of the EU-NATO cooperation there are three most likely scenarios: "keeping as it is", a "multi-speed" and the "Defense Union" (Graduates Democracy, 2017). The development of these scenarios examines what would happen in each cooperation direction. The EU-NATO cooperation determining factors are attributed to a certain scenario. This helped to evaluate which scenario is most likely in the EU-NATO cooperation perspective. The most likely scenario is the one which is supported by most of the newly emerging factors in the EU-NATO cooperation field, because these factors have the highest value in terms of recent geopolitical situation. The EU-NATO cooperation will be most affected by those newly emerged factors. Factors are assigned to scenarios according to their nature, depending on whether they are impeding, promoting or neutral in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

The "keeping as it is" scenario would keep current the EU-NATO cooperation level of integration. In the EU only bilateral agreements between the MS on defense could be implemented, that means the CSDP would maintain the same development level, because the EU's decision making

process would be as it is today – ineffective. This would guarantee stagnation in the EU and NATO cooperation. The EU MS with different foreign and security policies would not reach a decision, as well as today's decisions most often are not reached. Factors that can lead to this scenario are:

1. Security shield for international organization – one group of the EU MS will remain convinced that only NATO can ensure European security, other will support the CSDP development.

2. Different MS strategic view on security – due to different approaches to the CSDP, the EU MS will not reach a unified position.

3. Complixity of decision making process – in the CSDP field, the EU MS will not transfer its power to the institutional level and the decision making process of this policy will remain complicated.

4. Conflict between MS of organizations – Turkey and Cyprus will continue to use the EU and NATO as instruments to solve their disagreements. This factor will impede further the EU-NATO cooperation.

The scenario is likely because if the EU will not come up with decisions on how to strengthen the CSDP, everything should stay in the way it is now.

 Other one is the "Defense Union" scenario which would consider the importance of NATO as an organization and would lead to deeper cooperation in terms of the CSDP. In this scenario the EU would establish specific policy measures, such as an EU counterterrorism agency, common EU border, the EU coast guard, the MS would give more competences to the EU institutional level as well. This would create the EU "Defense Union" which would be a solution for the EU and NATO cooperation, because both organizations would support deeper relations idea in terms of division of labour. This scenario is probable if the EU will be able to cope with the issue of internal fragmentation. Factors that can lead to this scenario are:

1. Division of labour – the EU will be able to unite in the area of the CSDP only through the proper division of labor with NATO, and only by receiving NATO support for development of the CSDP.

2. The pursuit of prestige – in the proper division of labor, the EU could concentrate on global warming and other security problems in which strives to maintain a leader's position, but only in that areas which are not duplicating with NATO activities.

The scenario is not likely because requires a very high integration level of the EU MS in the CSDP field.

A "multi-speed" scenario for the EU-NATO cooperation means that one group of the EU MS will integrate more in the CSDP field than others. The EU MS which will integrate will be able to create the EU defence alliance. This would be a same model for integration as the Monetary Union. The EU defence alliance would be alternative for NATO, but would be created as a loyal partner of this organization. The EU faces many issues and those issues are very similar or common to NATO's.

This is the main reason why the EU and NATO should cooperate in the future. Factors that can lead to this scenario are:

1. Emerging security issues – the EU will concern about its security and will rethink its CSDP decision making process, this will lead to closer relations with NATO.

2. Importance of powerful political personalities – the EU MS will realize that they should not only contribute more to NATO budget, but also will accept the fact that security issues should be taken care of by own resources.

3. Changes in membership – the UK withdrawal from the EU will leave a security gap which has to be filled. This can be done in two ways: developing the CSDP and achieving genuine cooperation with NATO.

This scenario for the EU-NATO cooperation is most likely because the EU has to find a solution on how to ensure European security. Those MS which impede the CSDP decisions will remain on the sideline, while the rest of MS will develop close cooperation, both, with each other and with NATO.

To sum up, it must be emphasized that the complexity of the CSDP decision making process has been clarified and this complexity is a key main factor which is impeding the cooperation between the EU and NATO. Also, evaluation of the decisive factors provided the results of factors which are valid in assessing the EU-NATO cooperation. Finally, scenarios for the future cooperation between the EU and NATO were provided as well. The most likely is a "multi-speed" scenario, which can be concluded with that the prospects for cooperation between the EU and NATO can be viewed as positive. Although, it is unlikely that the EU will become a unified organization in the future, but certain groups of the EU MS will be able to start development of deeper cooperation in the CSDP field. This development should lead to closer relations with NATO and more sustainable European security.

CONCLUSIONS

Practical cooperation between the EU and NATO began from the St. Malo agreement. Cooperation was developed and as a result of which the Berlin Plus arrangements were reached. These arrangements allowed the EU to take part in the first military missions in former the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cooperation between the EU and NATO remained complicated until the start of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, when the EU began to change its security approach in the face of threats. Subsequently, the rapidly changing global security environment led the EU and NATO to reach the Warsaw Summit in which 40 measures in cooperation field were adopted. These measures reflect the division of labor between both organizations. The EU has adopted the Global Strategy, which goal is to strengthen the CSDP and cooperation with NATO. The refugee crisis, rhetoric of Donald Trump, Brexit and other issues led to a situation that the EU is concerned about its security and is ready for changes in order to be able to deal with today's security issues. These concerns could lead to deeper cooperation with NATO because of possible the CSDP strengthening.

Information which was analyzed during the research helped to prove nine factors that determine the cooperation between the EU and NATO:

1. Security shield for international organization. Historically NATO committed itself to defend European nations and in such a way created security shield for the EEC. Because of that, the EU developed as a peaceful organization with main focus on economic welfare. This factor is relevant and today, as the CSDP development is ineffective, while the EU MS still concentrates on NATO in terms of security issues. With the St. Malo agreement the EU took the first practical steps to assure its security and laid the foundations for the EU-NATO cooperation. However, NATO dominance in the security field impedes the integration of the EU in the area of the CSDP. But on the other hand, NATO strengthened its position in terms of the EU and therefore contributes more to promoting the development of the CSDP. This factor can be considered as negative in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

2. Complexity of decision making process. The EU is a multilevel organization with complex governance and different positions on security issues at both institutional and MS levels. This is the reason why it is difficult to reach a decision in the CSDP field. The EU must concern about the CSDP decision making process, which is the main factor in EU-NATO cooperation field. This factor can be considered as negative in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

3. Division of labour. Both organizations can complement each other in many areas, as well as can complicate the effectiveness of the specific activities. If both organizations collaborate in a field where both can operate independently, the efficiency of activities decreases due to competition factor.

If the cooperation is in the field where the two organizations can complement each other, the efficiency of activities increases and cooperation becomes deeper. The EU and NATO began to complement each other in the field of security issues management. It is confirmed through the EU Global Strategy adoption and Warsaw Summit agreement between the EU and NATO. This factor can be considered as positive in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

4. The pursuit of prestige. It also has an influence in terms of cooperation, because, neither the EU, nor NATO, does not want to give away areas of interest, functions or decision-making rights or appear to be weaker than other. The negative impact of this factor appears in terms of competition between the EU and NATO which often occurs. Such competition emerges in areas where both organizations overlap each other in the same field of activity. This factor in a recent security environment can only be applied in such areas as climate change and energy security, where the EU is striving to remain a global example. Cooperation between the EU and NATO in these areas are unlikely. This factor can be considered as neutral in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

5. Conflict between MS of organizations. The conflict between these two countries has always been as an impeding factor for the EU-NATO cooperation. Quarrels between NATO MS Turkey and EU MS Cyprus limited the scope of political dialogue. Situation with Turkey and Cyprus turned the Berlin Plus arrangements into inactive and prevented more ambitious strategic cooperation. It should be emphasized that the disagreements between the two countries continues today. This factor can be considered as negative in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

6. Different the MS positions on security. The EU MS has a different vision on the CSDP development direction and what to support, an independent the CSDP or NATO. This collision of MS is one of the key factors which impede the EU integration in the CSDP field. This factor is also reflected in the EUGS, which can be valuated ambiguously. First of all, strategy can be argued as an attempt to develop the CSDP, which would enhance the EU-NATO cooperation, but on the other hand, the EUGS leaves a lot of uncertainties in terms of how strategic goals will be achieved. And moreover, as a consequence of executive instruments absence, part of the EU MS will maintain position on NATO as a security guarantee in Europe. This situation would maintain the level of cooperation between the two organizations as it is today and deepen the absence of a common position between the EU MS. This factor can be considered as negative in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

7. Emerging security issues. Increase of security issues in the EU or its area of responsibility - increases the integration level in the CSDP field. History has shown that integration in the CSDP without NATO support would not be successful. Because of that, security challenges that arise in the EU are conducive to the EU-NATO cooperation. Security issues in former the Yugoslav Republic of mnbvsecurity environment. Subsequently, crisis in Ukraine, the threat of terrorism, refugee crisis and other issues leads to strengthening of the CSDP and closer cooperation with NATO, because the EU

has no resources to deal with the challenges it faces alone. This factor can be considered as positive in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

8. Importance of powerful political personalities. The US expresses position that the European nations should not only contribute more to the NATO budget, but also take care of its security. NATO aim is to ensure global security, not only the European. The EU should contribute more to its security in the future because of the US government pressure. Trump rhetoric can be seen as encouraging development of the CSDP. This factor can be considered as positive in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

9. Changes in membership. The UK withdrawal from the EU should encourage the development of the CSDP and ensure deeper cooperation with NATO, because Brexit leaves the security gap that the EU will have to fill. This factor can be considered as positive in terms of the EU-NATO cooperation.

Factor analysis has helped identify the most likely scenario of cooperation between the EU and NATO in the context of the CSDP development - a "multi-speed" scenario. In this scenario, the group of the EU MS will integrate more in the CSDP field than others and these MS will be able to create the EU defense alliance. This alliance would be the same integration model as the Monetary Union. This scenario for the EU-NATO cooperation is most probable, because the EU must find a solution for new security issues management in the rapidly changing global environment. The EU defense alliance would develop close cooperation with NATO.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the EU probably will not become a unified organization, but the certain EU MS groups should develop deeper cooperation in the CSDP field which will lead to closer relations with NATO. Finally, even in the worst scenario there are no indications that the cooperation between the EU and NATO should be decreased. At worst, it will remain at the same level as it is today - slowly progressing.

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Appendix 1 – Decisive factors of the EU and NATO cooperation

1. Complixity of international organization decision making process.
2. Security shield for international organization.
3. Division of labour.
4. The pursuit of prestige.
5. Conflict between MS of organizations.
6. Different the MS positions on security.
7. Emerging security issues.
8. Importance of powerful political personalities.
9. Changes in membership