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SCENARIOS OF DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

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SUMMARY

As military conflicts and terrorism has become an increasingly frequent event, ensuring security is one of the essential priorities of the European Union (EU). Therefore, a security mechanism is necessary to ensure that threats are being monitored and managed. The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) provides such a mechanism. The CSDP covers areas of civil missions and military operations of the EU and is currently one of the CSDP most important and rapidly developing policies of the EU – the strategic purpose and the operational capabilities were shaped in less than a decade and will continue to develop in accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon and the changing security situation of the EU. The rapidly changing geopolitical environment in the field of security inside the EU's Member States and beyond the borders of the Union in the twenty-first century is affecting and shaping the development of the CSDP. However, uncertainty still exists: How will the EU's CSDP develop further? What benefits or losses may the CSDP integration bring to the EU? Will it be able to ensure peace and prosperity in the region and improve overall global stability? The attempts to provide possible future developments in the global geopolitical arena may determine the success or failure of the EU's CSDP.

A lot of discussions and debates are rising about the deeper integration of the CSDP but very little specific content is provided about the shape and direction of the integration. This thesis aims to identify the main historic aspects of the evolution and the current trends of the EU's CSDP development, examine the EU's CSDP institutional structure and legislation in order to foresight the future possibilities of development of the EU's CSDP. The increasing amount of debates regarding the future of the CSDP, the cooperation and integration processes in the EU are the main drivers, which are shaping the policy's development further. However, there is very little relevant academic and analytical studies performed in the field of the EU security policy formation after the treaty of Lisbon.

The thesis results offer foresight into the possible futures of the CSDP development, highlighting the importance of the futurology studies in the field of pre-policy making and provide the ground for future scientific discussions and debates. Specifically, the scenario development method offers the possibility to model scenarios of the future development of the CSDP. The modelled scenarios can

provide valuable foresight for the multiple development possibilities of the CSDP, allow to shape the CSDP in the required direction and allow to prepare for the foresighted events in advance. Preparing for multiple developments of the CSDP in the future is part of political strategic management and could lead to preferred results in the future. Foresighting can serve as a valuable instrument to analytical and policy making research in numerous fields of political science: starting with the analysis of behavior of domestic political actors, analysis of security and foreign policy, as well as international relations processes. Scenarios have long become a fundamental instrument of foresighting as they offer multiple possible developments of events compressed into several alternative visions, allowing to recognize the impact of the fundamental factors more clearly. Therefore, the scenario method is the most commonly used method in the research of international phenomena and processes of foreign policy strategizing.

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SANTRAUKA

Kariniams konfliktams ir terorizmui tampant vis dažnesne grėsme, saugumo ir gynybos užtikrinimas Europos Sąjungoje (ES) yra vienas iš esminių prioritetų. Tam, kad pavojai Europos saugumui būtų tinkamai stebimi ir suvaldomi, reikalingas veiksnus saugumo užtikrinimo mechanizmas. ES Bendra Saugumo ir Gynybos Politika (BSGP) būtent ir yra tas mechanizmas. BSGP apima ES civilines misijas ir karines operacijas ir yra viena iš svarbiausių ir labiausiai plėtojamų ES politikos krypčių – strateginiai tikslai ir veikimo pajėgumai šioje srityje buvo išvystyti mažiau nei per dešimtmetį ir bus toliau vystomi, atsižvelgiant į Lisabonos sutartyje numatytus kriterijus ir besikeičiančia ES saugumo situaciją. Sparčiai kintanti geopolitinė saugumo aplinka tiek ES viduje, tiek už ES sienų dvidešimt pirmajame amžiuje įtakoja ir keičia tai kaip vystosi ES BSGP. Tačiau išlieka neapibrėžtumas: Kaip BSGP vystysis ateityje? Kokios naudos ir kokių nuostolių BSGP integracija gali sukelti ES? Ar BSGP pajėgs užtikrinti taiką ir klestėjimą regione ir prisidėti prie globalinio saugumo stabilumo didinimo? Bandymai numatyti galimus BSGP ateities vystymosi kryptis globalios geopolitinės arenos kontekste gali pasitarnauti kaip vertingas žinių šaltinis, galintis užtikrinti padėti užtikrinti BSGP sėkmę.

Dėl tolimesnės ir gilesnės BSGP integracijos kyla daug diskusijų ir netyla debatai, bet konkrečių siūlymų, sprendimų ir informacijos apie tolimesnę vystymo kryptį pateikiama labai mažai. Šis magistro baigiamasis darbas siekia identifikuoti esminius istorinius Europos saugumo formavimosi aspektus bei šiandienos tendencijas, kurios įtakoja BSGP vystymąsi, išnagrinėti ES BSGP institucinę sąrangą ir įstatyminę bazę tam, kad būtų galima pristatyti numatomas BSGP vystymosi kryptis ateityje. Netylantys debatai BSGP ateities vystymo scenarijų temomis, bendradarbiavimo ir integracijos procesai ES viduje yra pagrindinės varomosios jėgos, kurios formuoja tolimesnę BSGP raidos kryptį ateityje. Tačiau Europos saugumo vystymo srityje yra atlikta labai mažai aktualių akademinių ir analitinių tyrimų po Lisabonos sutarties.

Šio baigiamojo darbo išvados pasiūlo numatomus BSGP ateities vystymosi scenarijus, pažymint futurologinių studijų svarbą politikos formavimo srityje ir suteikia pagrindą mokslinėms diskusijos ir

debatams ateityje šioje srityje. Scenarijų modeliavimo metodas futurologinių studijų srityje būtent ir suteikia tokią galimybę numatyti galimas BSGP vystymosi kryptis ateityje. Modeliuojami scenarijai gali numatyti vertingas, daugialypes įžvalgas, formuojant pageidaujamą BSGP vystymosi kryptį ateityje, numatant potencialiai įvyksiančius įvykius prieš jiems įvykstant. Pasirengimas galimiems daugialypiams BSGP vystymosi raidos scenarijams yra dalis strateginio politinio planavimo, kuris gali padėti pasiekti pageidaujamus rezultatus ateityje. Įvykių numatymas gali pasitarnauti kaip vertingas instrumentas tiek analitiniuose tyrimuose, tiek politikos formavimo tyrimuose, politikos mokslų srityje: pradedant nuo visaus politikos veikėjų elgsenos tyrimų, užsienio ir saugumo politikos tyrimų, taip pat ir tiriant tarptautinių santykių procesus. Scenarijų modeliavimas yra tapęs fundamentaliu numatymo instrumentu, leidžiančiu pažvelgti į daugialypes galimus ateities vystymosi vizijas, leidžia aiškiau numatyti galimus scenarijaus kintamųjų poveikius duotajam scenarijui. Todėl scenarijų modeliavimo metodas ir yra labiausiai vartojamas tiriant tarptautinius reiškinius bei apibrėžiant strateginius užsienio politikos procesus.

LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

AHP – analytical hierarchy process

BENELUX countries – Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg

CBA – Cost benefit analysis

CEPA – Center for European Policy Analysis

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIVCOM – Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

COREPER – Permanent Representatives Committee

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy (formerly ESDP)

DEA – data excess analysis

EC – European Commission

ECSC – Coal and Steel Community

EDA – European Defence Agency

EDC – European Defence Community

EEAS – European External Action Service

EEC – European Economic Community

EP – European Parliament

EPC – European Political Community

ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy (now CSDP)

ESS – European Security Strategy

EU – European Union

EU ISS – EU Institute for Security Studies

EU MS – EU Member State(s)

EUMC – European Military Committee

EURATOM – European Atomic Energy Community

EUSC – EU Satellite Centre

EU SITCEN – EU Situation Centre

EUFOR – European Force (Mission)

EUMC – EU Military Committee

FAC – Foreign Affairs Council

GAC – General Affairs Council

HR – High Representative

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IR – International Relations

ISS – Internal Security Strategy

JHA – Cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs

MS Member State

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OECD – The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PESCO – Permanent structured cooperation

PMG – Politico-Military Group

PSC – Political and Security Committee

RELEX – Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors

SATCEN – Satellite Centre

SEA – Single European Act

SC – Special Committee (Athena)

TEU – Treaty of the European Union

TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

TRIZ – creative problem solving methodology based on logic, data and research, not intuition

UN – United Nations (Organisation)

UK – United Kingdom

USA – United States of America

WEU – Western European Union

WWII – World War II

WMD – weapons of mass destruction

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INTRODUCTION

As military conflicts and terrorism has become an increasingly frequent event, ensuring security is one of the essential priorities of the European Union (EU). While some threats may last for a short period of time, other threats may become unmanageable and pose an existential threat to the entire EU, if they are left unattended. Therefore, a security mechanism is necessary to ensure that threats are being monitored and managed.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), is a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CSDP covers areas of civil missions and military operations of the EU. The CSDP was established and officially introduced into the EU legislative system due to the necessity of having a common policy and legal control over the permanent political and military framework, which is responsible for the civil missions and military operations of EU, both within and beyond the unions borders. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is based on the CSDP and the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into power since 2010, becoming the milestone that strengthened the European Parliaments (EP) political and budgetary formation authority in the security policy, set the institutional aspects of the policy in the treaty. Currently the CSDP is one of the most important and rapidly developing policies of the EU – the strategic purpose and the operational capabilities were shaped in less than a decade and will continue to develop in accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon and the changing security situation of the EU.

Relevance of the thesis. As the CSDP is one of the most important and rapidly developed policies of the EU, it aims to increase the EU's potential as a global actor, expand its capabilities of improving the condition of regional security, stability and peace around the globe. Increasing the stability of global regions such as the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, will ensure not only the EU's security but global security and stability as well. By exercising its instruments, defined in the CSDP, the EU is also strengthening its Member States (MS) military capabilities and improving the competences of military personal by organizing international military exercises. At the same time this sends a clear signal to allies and whomever it may concern that the military forces of the EU MS are ready to respond to any immediate threats, which may try to compromise the EU's security. In parallel to military operations, the CSDP also focuses on civil missions in order to be ready to respond to natural or manmade disasters.

Furthermore, the EU is also cooperating with international organizations in an attempt to manage crises, engage in military operations, assist in training military personnel and provide recommendations for institutional reforms in third countries. The increasing amount of debates regarding the future of the CSDP, the cooperation and integration processes in the EU are the main drivers, which are shaping the policy further.

Scientific originality of the thesis. Uncertainty exists in the field of political science, whether it is possible to accurately foresight the possible developments of foreign and security policies in response to the rapidly shifting geopolitical situation in the world. There are opinions that predicting the development of these events is simply too subjective and cannot be reliably foreseen. However, in order to foresight the possible outcome of events and foresight future developments of policies, there are several prognostics methodologies produced in the field of futurology studies. These methodologies can be used for foresight and modelling of possible geopolitical scenarios and their influence in the formation of policies. Furthermore, the renewed discussion regarding the CSDP deeper integration and the security challenges for the EU allows for objective application of scenario building methods to foresight future scenario models.

The problem of the thesis. The rapidly changing geopolitical environment in the field of security inside the European Union Member States and beyond the borders of the Union in the twenty-first century is affecting and shaping the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. A lot of discussions and debates are rising about the deeper integration of the CSDP but very little specific content is provided about the shape and direction of the integration.

However, uncertainty still exists: How will the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy develop further? What benefits or losses will the CSDP integration bring to the MS? Will it be able to ensure peace and prosperity in the region and improve overall global stability? The attempts to provide possible future developments in the global geopolitical arena may determine the success or failure of the EU's CSDP.

The aim of the thesis. Investigate the historic facts and the current trends of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy development and propose the scenarios of development of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The object of the thesis. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union.

Tasks of the thesis:

1. to identify the main aspects of the evolution of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy development from the end of the World War II until the present day;
2. to examine the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy institutional structure and legislation;
3. to foresight the future possibilities of development of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy.

The research methodology of the thesis. Investigation of historical and scientific literature in order to evaluate the development of the geopolitical situation. Prediction of possible events, supported by Expert opinion and Scenario models of prognostics in the field of political sciences – futurology studies.

Scientific relevance of the thesis. The EU security and integration of MS military capabilities are the main subjects in the CSDP. However, there is very little relevant academic and analytical studies performed in the field of the EU security policy formation after the treaty of Lisbon. The thesis results will provide foresight into the possible futures of the CSDP development, highlighting the importance of the futurology studies in the field of pre-policy making and provide the ground for future scientific discussions and debates.

Practical relevance of the thesis. The scenario development method offers the possibility to model scenarios of the future development of the CSDP. The modelled scenarios can provide valuable foresight for the multiple development possibilities of the CSDP, allow to shape the CSDP in the required direction and allow to prepare for the foresighted events in advance.

Structure of the thesis. The structure consists of three interrelated parts:

1st part – EVOLUTION OF THE UROPEAN UNION COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY DEVELOPMENT: HISTORICAL VIEWPOINT an overview of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy development from the end of the World War II until the present day.

2nd part – SPECIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEGISLATION OF EUROPEAN UNION COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: assessment of the institutional structure and legislation of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

3rd part – DIRECTIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: unveiling the possible European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy future development scenarios, based on prognostics models in political sciences.

1 THE MAIN ASPECTS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: HISTORICAL VIEWPOINT

This chapter describes the historical viewpoint of the development of the European security. The chapter describes the time period starting from the end of the second World War until the adoption of the treaty of Lisbon. The chapter is divided into several segments to emphasize the different phases in the development of the security and defence processes in Europe such as the early evolution of security and defence in Europe and the formation of the Western European Union, the time period after the end of the Cold War and the time period of the greatest changes in the collective European security and defence with the introduction of the treaty of Maastricht and the treaty of Lisbon.

1.1 EARLY EVOLUTION OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN EUROPE

After the end of the Second World War in 1945 the biggest threat to security and stability in Europe was the fear of new power – the Soviet Union and the possible revanchist spirits of the defeated Nazi Germany. Escalated by these fears, wish for a secure and stabile future for the world and the necessity to clear the debris and rebuild the devastated Europe after the World War II (WWII) the Brussels Treaty[1] was signed in 1948. By signing the Brussels Treaty France, the United Kingdom and the BENELUX countries – Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg declared in the content of the treaty, that from here on the signing countries will cooperate in the fields of economic, social and cultural collaboration as well as collective defence (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

At the same time the two newly emerged superpowers after the end of the WWII – the Soviet Union and the United States of America (USA) had planned different scenarios of how the post WWII world order should be created, thus beginning the confrontation, which became known as the Cold War. Both superpower countries sought out to shape a Europe which would ensure their security in accordance with their developed scenarios. This struggle for influence divided Europe into the Western block, which was allied with the USA, and the Eastern bloc, which was in the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. The Western Europe countries sought further cooperation with each other and their ally – the USA, in order to ensure their safety. This cooperation was fruitful and in 1951 it gave birth to the European Coal and Steel Community[2] (ECSC) – a free-trade area. The six countries – Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany were the founding members, which signed the Treaty of Paris to establish the ECSC. To manage the ECSC the administrative agency was established in 1952:

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[1] Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/csdp_handbook_web.pdf
[2] The history of the ECSC: good times and bad (1970). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/54f09b32-1b0c-4060-afb3-5e475dcafda8/publishable_en.pdf

a High Authority to administrate, a Council of Ministers to legislate, a Common Assembly to formulate policy, and a Court of Justice to interpret the treaty and to resolve related disputes. The ECSC was designed to integrate the coal and steel industries so that the several key economic and military resources: coal, coke, steel, scrap, and iron ore in western Europe will not be monopolized by a single state (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

On March 25, 1957 the six ECSC members signed the Treaty of Rome. This treaty established the European Atomic Energy Community[3] (Euratom) which was designed to facilitate cooperation in atomic energy development, research and utilization and the European Economic Community (EEC) which later became the European Community[4] (EC) (Pecs, 2014). The EEC created a common market that introduced the abolishment of most trade barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labour, the prohibition of most public policies or private agreements that constrain market competition, a common agricultural policy and a common external trade policy. Hence, the Figure 1 shows the map of the EEC members and the dates of new joining member of the EEC which later became the EC. The UK joined the EC in 1973, Greece joined in 1981, Spain and Portugal joined in 1986 and the West Germany joined the EC in 1990 by uniting with the East Germany.

This unavoidably led to further political integration of the ECSC member states and in 1952 an attempt to establish the European Defence Community[5] (EDC) was made. The European powers along with the support of the USA sought to counter the overwhelming conventional military threat of the Soviet Union in Europe by forming a supranational European army and at the same time to integrate West German forces into a European army, thus avoiding the potential problem of West Germany rearmament. The idea was originally discussed at The Hague Conference in 1948. However, the treaty was not concluded in Paris in 1952 and as the tension between eastern and western Europe lessened the necessity for the EDC seemed also to diminish and the treaty was not ratified in 1954 by France. Although this early attempt to create a defensive type of organization in Europe failed the intent to create a European defence force still existed as France was not satisfied with how the USA dominated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) affairs. The other reason why the idea of the European army failed was that the UK refused to take participation in this project. The British reasoned that this project would lead to the federalization of Europe. The British deemed the federalization of Europe as diminishing the UK's position an international actor in the global arena and losing its status as a sovereign state (CVCE, 2016).

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[3] The European Atomic Energy The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (2014). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/skrining/eksplanatorni/prezentacije/pg15_21/15_21_13.pdf
[4] European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges "How Borderless" Is Europe? Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://jmonnet.btk.pte.hu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/jm_2014_vfinalfinal.pdf
[5] The failure of the European Defence Community (EDC). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/1c8aa583-8ec5-41c4-9ad8-73674ea7f4a7/bd191c42-0f53-4ec0-a60a-c53c72c747c2

Later only in 1970 a step forward to a common Europe foreign and security policy was taken when the ministers of foreign affairs of the EC members agreed to a European Political Community[6] (EPC) – a system for cooperation based on a consensus, thus enabling the members of the EC to share information and coordinate foreign policy and if possible, take a cooperated approach. In 1981 the ministers of foreign affairs of the members of the EC agreed for the first time to start considering the European security questions which were left aside in the context of the EPC. Following, in 1986 members of the EC approved the Single European Act[7] (SEA) which committed its member countries to a timetable for their economic merger and the establishment of a single European currency and common foreign and domestic policies (James, 2005).

Summarizing the early evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of Europe conclusions can be drawn that the CSDP of the EU has been developing since the first attempt to establish the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952. However, the attempt ended in failure due to internal power struggles between France, the UK and the USA. The breakthrough in the field of common foreign and security policy was made in 1970 with the decision to establish the European Political Community (EPC) following the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. These events have been the starting point in the modern Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU.

Western European Union

The common defence policy for Europe dates back to 1948 when the UK, France, and the Benelux countries signed the Treaty of Brussels. Among many other agreements a mutual defence idea and the foundations of creating the Western European Union[8] (WEU) was included. The WEU was the only European security organization alongside with NATO which remained until the late 1990's as the forum for consultations and dialogue on security and defence in Europe. The WEU was a defensive alliance composed of ten Member States – Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Founded in 1948 and modified in 1954 after the failed attempt to create the EDC the WEU provided the framework for the creation of a European defence policy. However, after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon all functions of the WEU have effectively been integrated into the EU and the WEU expired in 2011. After the modification of the Brussels treaty in 1954 the WEU included Italy and Western Germany into the collective defence agreement. The primary purpose of the WEU organization was to offer mutual military assistance in case of external

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[6] The European Political Community (EPC). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/6550430e-98c0-4441-8a60-ec7c001c357b
[7] James, W. (2005). Single European Act. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.eu-facts.org.uk/content/files/EUF16_Single-European-Act.pdf
[8] van Rens, E. J. M (2008). Military Cooperation in Europe: From World War Two to the foundation of the Western European Union (WEU). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://dp-history.wikispaces.com/file/view/Military+Cooperation+in+Europe.pdf

aggression. The agreement also provided a strong basis for the development of European defence cooperation. In case of an armed attack on a signature state of the Brussels agreement in Europe the solidarity and military assistance clause (Article V) in the amended Brussels Treaty obliged the other members of the treaty to provide their full military power in order to assist the other members which has suffered an armed military aggression (Bailes and Messervy-Whitting, 2011)[9].

ARTICLE V (Of the Brussels Treaty, signed on 17 March 1948 and amended by the Paris Agreements signed on 23 October 1954).

"If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power" (WEU, 1954).

ARTICLE 51 (Of the Charter of the United Nations).

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security" (NATO, 2009)[10].

Therefore, in accordance with the amended Brussels treaty and the Charter of the United Nations the core objectives[11] of the WEU were defined as follows:

- To create a firm basis for European economic recovery in Western Europe.
- To offer mutual assistance to member countries in resisting any policy of external aggression.
- To promote unity and encourage positive integration in Europe.

Figure 1 describes how European countries were associated with the WEU and its collective defence system. The WEU consisted of the signing countries – Members, not members of the EU, but

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[9] Bailes, A., Messervy-Whitting, G. (2011). Death of an institution: The end for Western European Union, a future for European defence? Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://aei.pitt.edu/32322/1/ep46.pdf
[10] NATO (2009). Article 51of the Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_16937.htm
[11] European Union. Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-safety/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-_en

Associated members via NATO, Observers – members of the EU but not members of NATO, and Associate partners which were neither members of the EU or NATO. Western European Union (WEU) partners and associates:

- **Members.**
- **Associate members.**
- **Observers.**
- **Associate partners.**

Figure 1. Map of the Western European Union Members, Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners (1948-2003)[12]

However, the situation changed dramatically after the EU growth spurt in 2004 when 10 new members were accepted into the union. In 2004 ten new countries with a combined population of almost 75 million joined the EU. The new members of the EU – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. In the present day 2016, the EU consists of 28 member states and NATO currently holds 28 members as well (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003)[13].

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[12] Map of the Western European Union Members, Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners (1948-2003). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from
http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/b0be5e09-41b9-4301-ad6e-525109f103ea/b51f8868-0740-4e54-95a9-70f54a83f278/Resources#87450530-5acc-4b04-b749-12a17815ab3a_en&overlay
[13] Moravcsik, A.,Vachudova, M. A. (2003). National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/eeps.pdf

NATO and the EU currently have 22 member countries in common cooperating in collective defence (NATO, 2016)[14].

Following the amendments of the Brussels treaty, in 1961-1962 France proposed the Fouchet plan[15]. The plan was aimed towards a common foreign policy and a common defence policy of the union. Other goals included the development of the "common heritage" of the Member States and "the protection of the values on which their civilization rests" – cooperate in the common cultural matters, as well as cooperate in common political and economic affairs. The plan also proposed three institutions of the Union: a "Council", a "European Parliament" and a "European Political Commission" (Teasdale, 2013). However, the Fouchet plan encountered internal power struggles from some of the member states of the union. While the Netherlands and Belgium sought the participation of the UK in this project France was against it, as France had plans to become the leader of the union and in the region and dominate in the EC politics. At the same time, it was feared that the new plan will cause new problems in the field of economic cooperation in the EEC (Weil, 1965).

The political cooperation in the field of foreign policy in 1969 was continued to be restrained by disagreements between France and other Member States as France aimed to carry out its own European foreign and security policy. The following year the Luxembourg summit was held. In response to calls by Heads of State and Government for a study of possible ways of moving forward on the political level the "Davignon report". This was the starting point for European Political Cooperation (EPC) although it was only formally incorporated in the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987[16]. The essence of EPC was consultation among the Member States on foreign policy issues. The EPC successfully reflected the trends of the political affairs in the global arena and meetings of Foreign Ministers and the Political Committee were held more frequently. At the same time a group of "European correspondents" was set up to monitor EPC in each MS. The significance of the EPC further increased with the establishment of the European Council in 1974 which contributed to better coordination of EPC because of the role it gave to Heads of State and Government in defining the general orientation of Community policy.

Soon after with the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran the Member States realized the impotence of the European Community in the international arena. In 1981 the London Report was adopted in order to strengthen the EPC. The new approach required consultations in advance by MS of each other and the European Commission on all foreign policy matters affecting all MS. The following year the Genscher-Colombo initiative proposed a "European Act" draft and led

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[14] NATO. Relations with the European Union (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm
[15] Teasdale, A. (2013). The Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle's Intergovernmental Design for Europe. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://penguincompaniontoeu.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Teasdale-Fouchet-Plan-July-2013.pdf
[16] European political Cooperation (EPC) (1988). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://aei.pitt.edu/45409/1/European.Political.Cooperation.pdf

to the Stuttgart "Solemn Declaration on European Union" in 1983. In 1985 the Dooge Committee Report, containing proposals concerning foreign policy in particular concerning security and cooperation in the armaments sector lead to the Single European Act (SEA). Ultimately, the provisions introduced by the SEA did not go as far as the Dooge Committee proposed, however, institutional basis for EPC was established: the group of European correspondents and a Secretariat working under the direct authority of the Presidency (EPC, 1988; Murphy, 2003)[17]. These events were the basis of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which replaced the EPC and entered into force with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. This was the turning point of the EU's foreign policy reorienting the EU towards becoming an influential actor in the global arena.

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999. The treaty emphasizes that the WEU is an integral part of the development of the EU empowering the EU to act. The purpose of the Amsterdam treaty was to reform the EU institutions in preparation for the arrival of future member countries. The Amsterdam treaty can be considered as a step forward regarding the CFSP institutionalization as it created the post of High Representative for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The High Representative was responsible for contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions and acting on behalf of the Council when appropriate by conducting political dialogue with third parties. As a legal document the Treaty of Amsterdam has as main objective to modify certain regulations of the Treaty of the European Union, the constituent treaties of the European Communities (Paris and Rome) and of some acts related to them. According to the Amsterdam treaty the EU's CFSP should not take over the commitments of NATO in the field of collective defence and should only cover the Petersberg tasks (European Union, 2016)[18].

1.2 EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War and the conflicts in the Balkans brought about the necessity for Member States to strengthen the EU's CFSP. The Treaty of Amsterdam created the post of High Representative for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The High Representative was responsible for contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and acting on behalf of the Council when appropriate by conducting political dialogue with third parties (TEU Art. 26). NATO's Secretary-General Javier Solana of Spain was appointed as the High Representative at the Cologne Summit in 1999, and served until 2009 (European Union, 2016)[19].

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[17] Murphy, D. T. (2003). The System of European Political Cooperation: A Brief Explanation. Richmond University. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b93d/75f7d8526ccfa2dd538d437d12244aff2e0d.pdf
[18] European Union (2016). Treaty of Amsterdam. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-safety/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-_en#The+Treaty+of+Amsterdam
[19] The Cologne European Council (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-safety/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-_en#The+Cologne+European+Council

ARTICLE 26 (ex Article 13 TEU) (The Treaty on European Union).

"1. The European Council shall identify the Union's strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications. It shall adopt the necessary decisions.

If international developments so require, the President of the European Council shall convene an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in order to define the strategic lines of the Union's policy in the face of such developments.

2. The Council shall frame the common foreign and security policy and take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing it on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council.

The Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.

3. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative and by the Member States, using national and Union resources" (TEU, 2012)[20].

Following the course of the Treaty of Amsterdam the Treaty of Lisbon expanded the post to High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and combined it with the post of Vice-President of the European Commission. The Treaty of Amsterdam also indicated the possibility of developing a future common defence policy for the EU. The inclusion of what would eventually become the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) under the CFSP was designed to enable the Union to adopt a coherent approach when addressing security challenges. The treaty subsequently states that "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy […] which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide" (TEU Art.17). In addition, the Treaty also defined the range of military tasks – as incorporated from the WEU's Petersberg tasks which the EU could undertake: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks involving combat forces in crisis management; including peace-making (The Petersberg Tasks, 2016)[21].

Following the 1999 head meetings of the EU in Cologne and Helsinki, it was decided that the EU shall take over the functions of the WEU. The Member States reaffirmed the Union's willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces of up to 50 000 – 60 000 soldiers. What is more important, that the "Berlin Plus agreement"[22] gave the EU under certain

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[20] Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union (2012). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
[21] The Petersberg Tasks (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-safety/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-_en#The+Petersberg+Tasks
[22] EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus (2003). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf

conditions access to NATO assets and capabilities. The next step in 2000 WEU Ministers summit in Marseille was the preparation to close the WEU and discontinuing the WEU 21 and WEU 28 cooperation dialogs with the Members, Associated members, Associated partners of the WEU collective defence agreement. What is also important that in the same year the conclusions of the Nice summit included the takeover of the WEU Satellite Centre "SatCen" and the WEU Institute for Security Studies which are part of the key instruments that drive the EU's CSFP. In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon finalized the transition of the WEU functions to the EU and in 2011 the WEU ceased to exist as the EU took over all of its responsibilities (Bailes and Messervy-Whiting 2011)[23].

It became clear that the EU needed to take responsibility as an international actor in the fields of conflict prevention and crisis management. It was necessary to shape the EU's strategic tasks regarding its position and course of action in response to newly rising conflicts and crises in the region. And one of the most important questions was the role of NATO in the EU's security strategy. The opinions differed regarding NATO's participation in the affairs of EU. According to Former NATO Chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen the US led NATO should take its role as the "World's policeman" (Rasmussen, 2016)[24]. In this case NATO would ensure peace and would drive Europe towards disarmament and demilitarization. The other opinion presented by Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was that the EU should consider the idea of the collective army of Europe with its autonomous military forces. Subsequently, the EU would be operating independently from NATO. Once again, France expressed their support for the independent military forces of Europe (Global Research, 2016)[25].

The Balkan conflict in 1991 became a stage for the EU to establish its authority as a peacekeeper crisis manager after the first military actions have started in Slovenia. The EU with the authorization from the United Nations entered with its military forces into the conflict zone. Mostly consisting of the military forces of the UK and France the EU's effort did not bear fruit as it was unable to conclude a ceasefire in the conflict. At the same time the positions of France and the UK differed regarding which side to support in the conflict. Also, the UK was unwilling to participate in the operation as a member of the EU but rather as a member of NATO. This once again showed the divided stance of the Union regarding the crisis in the Balkans. Failed negotiations and the hesitation from Washington led to the bloodiest conflict after the end of the WWII in Europe. This was a blow to the democracy, power of negotiations and humanism which was preached by the EU. It was clear that an effective collective defence is not possible without the possibility to actually use the military forces to ensure the security

[23] Bailes, A., Messervy-Whiting, G. (2011). The Demise of the Western European Union: Lessons for European Defence. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/100511_bailes_0.pdf
[24] Former NATO Chief: The United States Should Be the World's "Policeman" (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.politico.eu/article/former-nato-chief-donald-trump-is-a-global-risk-united-states-america-anders-fogh-rasmussen/
[25] Former British Prime Minister Blair Joins Call for a European Army (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.globalresearch.ca/former-british-prime-minister-blair-joins-call-for-a-european-army/5505224

of the EU. As Jean-Yves Haines stated, a conclusion can be made that efforts by single Member States could not expect to resolve such conflicts. A collective approach is required (Haines, 2003)[26].

Summarising this difficult time period, the failed effort of the EU to regulate the Balkan crisis led to reviewing of internal disagreements of the Member States as well as reconsidering the position of the USA as the security provider in Europe. Many political scientists and experts evaluated the EU's CSDP as well as other foreign policies as a complete failure and a mistake and discussions regarding NATO's status in Europe and participation in the conflict were brought up again.

Changes in the European security and defence

The shifting geopolitical situation after the Cold War led the European Community (EC) to the effort of seeking a role as an international player in the global arena and developing new forms of political cooperation. In the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was replaced with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP). The new Treaty enabled closer cooperation in the field of foreign policy and security policy between the Member States. The Treaty ensured the formation of the EU's Common Security and Defuse Policy (CSDP) and cooperation between the Member States envisioned Member States to coordinate their national politics with the EU's common goals and policies. Also, provided a legal instrument in order to achieve common EU's goals by exercising every available diplomatic, political and financial resources in the EU's disposition (Hoebink, 2004; European Union, 2016)[27].

The Maastricht Treaty review summit in 1996 – 1997 came to a conclusion in the CFSP regarding the relations between the EU and NATO. These conclusions were named as the Petersberg tasks and declared that the essential element of ensuring the EU's security and defence is the formation of the defensive capabilities. The Petersberg Tasks declarations were integrated into the EU treaties.

The Petersberg tasks were first agreed upon in 1992 by the Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers. Article II.4 of the ministerial declaration outlined the following 3 purposes for which military units could be deployed (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016):

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks.
- Peacekeeping tasks.
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.

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[26] Haines, J. Y. (2003). From Laeken to Copenhagen – European Defence: Core Documents. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai57e.pdf
[27] Treaty of Maastricht on European Union (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Axy0026

Since the amended EU Treaty the Petersberg tasks formed an integral part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which was formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and defined the extent of military actions and functions that the EU can exercise in crisis management operations. The Petersberg Tasks became (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016):

- Defined the type of military action that the EU can undertake in crisis management operations;
- Include humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping, and peace-making.
- Expanded by the Treaty of Lisbon;

The Petersberg tasks were incorporated into Article 17 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) through the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997. However, the breakthrough in the grounds of political cooperation was only established in Saint Malo summit in 1998. France and the UK came to an agreement which supported the EU's role as a global player on the international arena as well as the intent to establish the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the formation of the EU's independent military capabilities (Rutten, 2001). Later, due to the shifting security situation the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (TEU Art. 42) further expanded the Petersberg Tasks to include (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016):

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks.
- Conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks.
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.
- Joint disarmament operations.
- Military advice and assistance tasks.
- Post-conflict stabilization tasks.

The Cologne summit in 1999 gave start to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) later to become known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It was decided to agree upon the Saint Malo summit goals to form the European military forces in order to respond and manage crises independently, establish a management mechanism which can effectively deploy the EU's forces (Rutten, 2001).

In the 1999 Helsinki summit it was decided upon that EU's military forces should be up to 50 000 - 60 000 soldiers, which can be deployed within 60 days to begin a military operation. However, the military personnel remained under the control of Member State national level (Rutten, 2001; Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

In the summit of Nice in 2000 it was decided to incorporate the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU. Permanent ESDP institutions, such as the Political and Security Committee the European

Union Military Committee and the EU military headquarters. The relations between the EU, NATO and third countries in the field of security and defence have been declared. Then, in Belgium 2001 the EU's ESDP has been announced as operational (Rutten, 2001).

In the Copenhagen summit of 2002 verified the strategic partnership agreements between the EU and NATO, thus enabling the EU to access NATO's collective military and intelligence resources. In 2003 it was also agreed to form of 5 000 police officers as a civilian branch of the ESDP which would be able to in the EU's civilian operations and to establish the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom). A month later, the EU declared for the first time that it is ready to carry out the Petersberg Tasks, however, with the certain condition of the limited resources available at that time. Immediately after this declaration in 2003 the EU started the first independent military operation code named "Artemis"[28] in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Hoebink, 2004).

In the same year, EU's Member States adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) proposed by Javier Solana. According to this strategy, Member states acquired a new goal in the military area. The "Headline Goal 2010" was introduced. The tasks of this new goal was to define the exact further development of the capabilities of the EU military forces until the year 2010 in order to independently participate in international crises management. However, the deadline of the goal was extended after the year 2010 (Council of the European Union, 2003). In 2004 the European Defence Agency was established which along with the European Union Military Committee are the main institutions of the development of the EU's military forces. At the same year the EU battlegroup conception was established and since 2005 these battlegroups are standing by ready for duty (Barcikowska, 2013).

In parallel to the military counterpart the civilian branch of the ESDP is being developed as well. In 2004 the plan for civilian crises management has been accepted which defined the further development of the civilian branch of the ESDP. Similarly, to the military "Headline Goal 2010" the civilian version of it the "Civilian Headline Goal 2008" has been set. The document was updated in 2007 with the new goals of forming the EU's civilian crises management capabilities (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon has been signed. After signing the Treaty, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) became the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2013 current situation and future development of the EU's CSDP was the main subject in most of the EU Council Minister's agendas (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

To summarize, the tense geopolitical situation after the Cold War and the failure to manage the crisis in the Balkans revealed that the EU's security policy was still weak at that time, thus the necessity to strengthen and further develop this field has emerged. This led to the signing of the Treaty of

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[28] ARTEMIS/DRC (2003). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/artemis-drc/index_en.htm

Maastricht in 1992 and the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the formation of the Petersberg Tasks and the permanent establishment of the EU's High Representative position of the CFSP by the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Followed by the summit in Cologne in 1999 the European Security and Defence Policy was created. Then in 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) was introduced. After signing the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was rename to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The treaties of Maastricht and Lisbon were the turning point of the EU's foreign policy as well as the collective defence policy.

Maastricht treaty

The Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992 and came into force from 1-st November 1993. This was the official starting point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU as it transitioned from the European Political Community (EPC). According to the fifth chapter of the Treaty of Maastricht "Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy" the Treaty obliges the EU to carry out the Common Foreign and Security Policy with the main goals as the defence of independence and integrity of the Union, peace preservation, strengthening of international security, protection of democracy and human rights, fostering of common values and interests (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

Article J.l (of the Treaty of Maastricht)

"1. The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.

2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;

- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;

- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;

- to promote international cooperation;

- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

3. The Union shall pursue these objectives:

by establishing systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy, in accordance with Article J.2;

- by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common"

The geopolitical time period of the emergence of the EU's new Common Foreign and Security Policy was especially difficult and tense. The end of the long lasting Cold War between the Soviet Union and the western world, the fall of the Berlin wall and the Unification of Germany, the fall of the Soviet Union and the democratization processes of the ex-soviet states, the Gulf War and the war in the Balkan region (Long, 1995). With so many developments in such a short period of time Europe had to other choice but to seek cooperation with each other in the face of crises occurring in the neighbouring regions. If left unattended the widespread crises would have had a much greater impact on the security, economy and political development of the European states. During the Cold War NATO was acknowledged as the only security alternative in the region against the threat of the Soviet Union. However, after the end of the Cold War there were speculations of internal fragmentations in the policies of the European Community (EC) which later became the European Union (EU) especially in the field of foreign policy and security. It became necessary to review the current policies and seek for new compromises and forms of cooperation in the rapidly changing geopolitical situation. Yet the position of the continuation of intergovernmental cooperation was strongly supported which ultimately led to the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

In the Treaty of Maastricht the European Community (EC) the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA) became the three Pillars of the EU. As described in Figure 3 the EC operated in the principal of community while the CFSP and the JHA were based on cooperation on the intergovernmental level and decisions had to be concluded by consensus. The aim is to allow these three Pillars to develop within a unified framework (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

Figure 2. The three pillars of the European Union, Treaty on European Union (Maastricht treaty, 1992)[29]

The article J.4 of the Treat of Maastricht stated that all issues, regarding the common security and defence policy will be the responsibility of the CFSP and obliged the Western European Union (WEU) to implement the concluded decisions regarding the defence policy, thus incorporating the WEU into the structure of the EU. However, at the same time the implemented decisions must not interfere with the Member State national security interests as well as commitments for NATO.

Article J.4 (of the Treaty of Maastricht)

"1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.

4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then."

The Treaty of Maastricht is considered as the first document which sets the goal of a CSDP for the EU. The three main groups of reason can be distinguished which are responsible for the formation of the common policy and institutionalization (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016):

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[29] The three pillars of the European Union (Maastricht, 7 February 1992). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_three_pillars_of_the_european_union_maastricht_7_february_1992-en-37b4b8c8-0f00-4c1c-bec8-bcdf4b26807d.html

1. The tense geopolitical and newly risen challenges after the end of the Cold War.
2. The dynamics of the integration processes. The necessity of political integration of the Member States, after the successful economic integration, as the foreign policy and security policy of the Union were held back and lacked an integral approach to their development. The development of the CFSP became based on intergovernmental cooperation and was incorporated into the three Pillars of the EU.
3. Misbalance between the EU's economic power and weak political position in the international arena. The shrinking influence of the USA in European political processes and the necessity to ensure security in case of a conflict demanded the EU's role to become a global one. This could only be dome through cooperation because France, Germany or the UK on their own could not rise to the occasion.

To summarize, the Treaty of Maastricht became the milestone document, which officially began the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU set the CFSP as a main priority on its agenda, thus rapidly driving the development of the foreign and security policies. However, the further development required even more changes to be made which came into life as the Treaty of Lisbon.

Lisbon treaty

The Treaty of Lisbon has been signed in 2007 amending the existing treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009 and ended a period of political and institutional crisis in the European Union which had opened in 2005 when the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was rejected in two referenda by the French and Dutch voters. The new Treaty included many changes which were aimed at ensuring that the EU's decisions in the future would be more consistent, effective and strengthening the EU's international role (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

The Treaty of Lisbon amended some provisions regarding the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) became Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the amended Treaty the CSDP was pointed as an independent section "Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy" in "TITLE V" (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016; European Union, 2016).

One of the most important innovations in the CSDP was the permanent structured cooperation which allowed for closer cooperation in the field of the security and defence policy for those Member States which have fulfilled the current requirements and wish to cooperate in missions and drive the CSDP further. This permanent structured cooperation provides the opportunity to create a group for the Member States in order to develop more advanced defensive capabilities and participate in multilateral initiatives in the EU's Battlegroups, European Defence Agency (EDA) and other institutions. Although

the permanent structured cooperation still lacked a more precise definition to actually be of use to the Member States. Another important innovation in the Treaty of Lisbon was the mutual defence provision. According to the Article 42 section 7 of the Treaty the EU's Member States are obliged to provide all assistance possible in order to assist the Member States, which has fallen victim to military aggression (Kaczynski, et al, 2010; Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016; Treaty of Lisbon, 2008).

Article 42 part 7 (of the Treaty of Lisbon)

"7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation."

However, at the same time the new mutual defence does not replace or cancel the effect of the mutual defence liabilities of NATO. The Article 5 on mutual defence in the NATO treaty still applies along with the new obligations of the Treaty of Lisbon which are aimed at protecting the Member States of the EU that are not a part of NATO (NATO, 2009)[30]. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon declares the Solidarity Clause in the Article 222 which states that other Member States of the may provide assistance to a Member State which has fallen victim to a terrorist attack or in the event of a natural or man-made disaster if the Member State requests such assistance.

SOLIDARITY CLAUSE

Article 222 (of the Treaty of Lisbon)

"1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or manmade disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

(a) – prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;

– protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;

– assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;

(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

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[30] NATO (2009). The North Atlantic Treaty (1949). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf

2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council. <…>"

The CSDP in the Treaty of Lisbon became the basis for cooperation by which the EU may conduct missions of peace keeping and ensuring international security in third countries, based on both civil and military means. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the ESDP allowed for the following missions (Rehrl and Glume, 2015; Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016):

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- Conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks;
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making;

After the Treaty of Lisbon came into power the list of mission has been expanded with the following operations (Rehrl and Glume, 2015; Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016):

- Joint disarmament operations;
- Military advice and assistance tasks;
- Post-conflict stabilization tasks.

The Council defines the objectives and the general terms of the missions. According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council may entrust a mission to a group of Member States which are willing to undertake the mission and have the necessary civil and military capabilities in order to accomplish the mission. The Member States undertaking the mission are obliged to inform the Council on the progress of the mission and operate in accordance with the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Treaty also allows multilateral forces to participate in the implementation of the EU's CSDP. The forces for a mission are created with the Member States by forming a military alliance. The main Battlegroups of the EU are as follows (Barcikowska, 2013)[31]:

- Eurofor – consisting of Spain, France, Italy and Portugal ground forces;
- Eurocorps – consisting of Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, and Luxembourg ground forces;
- Euromarfor – consisting of Spain, France, Italy and Portugal naval forces;
- European Air Group (EAG) – consisting of Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK air forces.

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[31] Barcikowska, A. (2013). EU Battlegroups – ready to go? Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_40_EU_Battlegroups.pdf

The CSDP has not changed significantly since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009. The main achievements of the Treaty are the incorporation of the ES institutions into the European External Action Service (EEAS) clearly defined status of the European Defence Agency (EDA), headquarters and institutional aspects as declared in the Article 45 part 2 of the Treaty on European Union. However, the CSDP had suffered setbacks due to hesitation to begin the operation in Mali and failure to begin operations in Libya and Lebanon, therefore the EU Battlegroups have not been deployed. Furthermore, the permanent EU military headquarters have not been established either. However, the EP has initiated an assessment of the CSDP and urges the Council as well as the Member States to implement the CSDP more efficiently (Kurpas, 2007).

To summarize, the end of the Cold War and the tense geopolitical situation in the region had a great influence in the formation of the EU's CSDP. The necessity for security in the face of military conflicts and threats let to the signing of the two most important documents – The Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Lisbon – that established the EU itself and its foreign and security policies. The Treaty of Lisbon implements many changes which expand the development possibilities of the CSDP and pushes the policies development further. The Treaty allowed for the development of the institutional structure, greatly expanded cooperation in the interinstitutional as well as in the intergovernmental level. The Treaty emphasizes that the future development of the CSDP must be more consistent and effective. The treaty enabled the EU to participate in a larger range of missions and operations also the participation of multilateral countries in missions and operations. However, as the geopolitical situation rapidly develops so must the CSDP in order to respond to newly rising challenges and threats in the region and beyond.

2 SPECIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEGISLATION OF EUROPEAN UNION COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

This chapter is divided in the introduction and two following subchapters. The introduction presents the main concepts of the European Security Strategy to better reveal the common threats to the European security. The first subchapter describes the main features of the legislation of the behind the CSDP of the EU and the second subchapter describes the main features of the institutional structure of the CSDP.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted by the European Council in 2003. It provides the conceptual framework for the CFSP, including the plans and the obligations that later became the CSDP. The EU MS called for a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion in the EU. Therefore, the MS requested the then High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to draft such a strategy. The proposed plan for the security strategy was named "A Secure Europe in a Better World" [32]. In its essence, the European Security Strategy was a comprehensive document, which analyses and defines the EU's security environment, identifies the key security challenges and the following political consequences for the EU (Council of the European Union, 2003). The strategy of European security is laid out in the ESS document since 2003. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and organised crime, cyber security, energy security, climate change were described as the key threats and challenges (Council of the European Union, 2003). Since then, over 25 missions were deployment in various locations. The MS working together under the CSDP mechanisms have cooperated in civil missions and military operations from peacekeeping to border patrol. The CSDP has emerged as an important part of the EU's foreign policy. It ensures not only security by mission deployment what is more important, it also encourages cooperation between MS in developing military capabilities and defence-industrial programmes (Fiott, 2012; Fiott 2013). However, the CSDP does not cover all military policy in the EU. Individual Member States such as France and the United Kingdom have their national policies as well as cooperation with NATO. Therefore, the development of the CSDP is more complicated than policy making only between the EU MS. The document defines the five key threats to the EU's integrity (European Union, 2016; Malksoo, 2016)[33]:

1. Terrorism.
2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
3. Regional conflicts.
4. State failure.
5. Organized crime.

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[32] A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (2003). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf

[33] Malksoo, M. (2016). From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: externalpolicy, internal purpose.

As the ESS was launched in the background of the September 11 terrorist attack and the US invasion of Iraq a review of the ESS in 2008 only confirmed the validity of the ESS tasks and the need to be "more capable, more coherent and more active" in order for the EU to reach its full potential. According to the ESS, the EU aims for preventive engagement to avoid new conflicts/crises. Building up stability and security in the EU's neighbourhood (Balkans, Southern Caucasus, and the Mediterranean) is a key priority as well as strengthening the international rules-based order. Furthermore, the ESS acknowledges the interdependence of various global security challenges and the necessity to respond to them as quickly as possible.

The importance of international cooperation and EU partnerships is also emphasized, as the threats cannot be tackled by the Union alone. Cooperation is emphasized with international organizations such as NATO, the UN as the threats of the 21-st century have grown beyond regional scope and have become a global challenge. Thus, must be addressed with a global approach. Along with the well-known military and civil threats other threats such as cyber security, energy security and the global climate change are emphasized (Selchow, 2016)[34].

With the intent of focusing on organized crime, terrorism, cybercrime, border security and disasters, the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) was proposed. The European Council endorsed the ISS in 2010. The strategy defines the challenges, principles and guidelines for dealing with security threats relating to organized crime, terrorism and natural and man-made disasters in order to prevent organized crime and to strengthen the capabilities in order to respond in time to crises and disasters. The ISS sets five strategic objectives for the most urgent challenges in order to make the EU more secure (European Union, 2016; Selchow, 2016)[35]:

1. Disrupt international criminal networks.
2. Prevent terrorism and address radicalization and recruitment.
3. Raise levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace.
4. Strengthen security through border management.
5. Increase Europe's resilience to crises and disasters.

As well as identifying the key threats the ISS offers guidelines for creation of internal security mechanisms in the EU in order to ensure the protection of people, democratic values and freedom. The treaty of Lisbon and the Stockholm programme[36] provides the necessary means to take coordinated

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[34] Selchow, S. (2016). The Construction of "European Security" in The European Union in a changing global environment: A Systematic Analysis.

[35] EU internal security strategy (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ajl0050

[36] The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens (2009). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/eu-policy/stockholm-programme-open-and-secure-europe-serving-and-protecting-citizens-0_en

action in order to ensure a just, free and secure EU. Therefore, the ISS is the tool for the Member States in order to provide security, the fundamental rights and freedoms and respect of its citizens (Selchow, 2016).

To summarise, the security threats to the EU are constantly developing and changing. The European Security Strategy (ESS) was developed in the background of the September 11 and the US invasion of Iraq crises. The ESS document defines the threats to the EU and its citizens. In order to be able to respond to these threats, the EU's security strategy must be constantly reviewed and updated as well. The security threats are not only those, which are clearly visible such as terrorism and war but others that are not so well thought of, such as natural or manmade disasters, organized crime, cybercrime and attack on human rights. The European Security Strategy provides the mechanism to respond to all of these situations and the possibility to either prevent or manage the situations.

2.1 THE MAIN FEATURES OF COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY LEGISLATION

The CSDP is an integral and inseparable part of the EU's CFSP. The CSDP is defined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). The formation of the CFSP and CSDP framework policies are defined in the "Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy" of the TEU, Articles 42 – 46, protocols No. 1, 10, 11 and declarations No. 13, 14 (Wessel, 2015)[37]. According to the Article 41, it is stated that the general provisions on the budget expenditures of the CFSP and the CSDP. Thus, the expenditures can be charged from the EU budget or from the MS budgets, according to the MS national product scale, unless the Council will unanimously decide otherwise.

Article 41 (ex Article 28 TEU) (of the Treaty on European Union)

1. "Administrative expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise for the institutions shall be charged to the Union budget."

2. "Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. In cases where expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise."

The European Parliament's (EP) functions in the formation of the CFSP and the CSDP are stated in the TEU Article 36. The EP can pose questions and recommendations for the to the HR regarding the policy formation. Furthermore, since the Treaty of Lisbon, the EP gained more significance in the formation of the CSDP in the areas of research and development, industry and space politics.

Article 36 (of the Treaty on European Union)

"The European Parliament may address questions or make recommendations to the Council or the High Representative. <…>".

The European Council with the Commission sets the EU's policy agenda for the CFSP and CSDP, defines the EU's overall political direction and priorities. Decisions are based on unanimity with the exclusion of exceptional cases (where decisions are adopted by majority vote) of the European Defence Agency (EDA) – TEU Article 45, and the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) – TEU Article 46. The High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is the chief

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[37] Wessel, R. A. (2015). The legal dimension of European foreign policy. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.utwente.nl/en/bms/pa/research/wessel/wessel103.pdf

coordination and representative of the CFSP and the CSDP and is one of the vice-presidents of the European Commission. The HR is also responsible for the EU's external diplomacy and external actions and works with the Commission and the EP in order to ensure close cooperation between institutions. In other words, the European Commission is the decision making institution while the EP and the commission are the decision shaping institutions and the HR ensures coordination and coherent work and communication between institutions.

Article 18 (of the Treaty on European Union)

"The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy <…>".

"The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action <…>".

Article 36 (of the Treaty on European Union)

"The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy <…>".

To summarize, the provisions describing the mechanism of the formation and management of the foreign and security policies are declared in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). The European Council and the Commission are responsible for the formation of the direction and the politics of the policies. The European Parliament is able to shape the policies by providing suggestions and proposals and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy delivers the proposals for the decisions to be made in the areas of the CFSP and CSDP to the European Council. The High Representative is also a Vice President in the Commission and works to ensure coordination, coherent work and communication between institutions. The European Council, Commission, European Parliament and the High Representative are the key institutions in the EU's foreign and security policy making, shaping and legislation.

2.2 THE MAIN FEATURES OF COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

The EU institutional structure is complex due to its multilateral nature. The main objective of the EU's CSDP is ensuring a secure and prosperous Europe. In order to achieve security for the EU it is necessary to have a well-developed institutional structure which would ensure the realization of security policies.

The European Council together with the Foreign Affairs Council provides the necessary drive for the decision making of the CSDP and has the authority over the CSDP structures. In other words, the Council directs the politics of the policy making and the sets priorities for the EU. However, the European Council does not exercise legislative functions. In addition, unanimity of decision-making at all levels required. The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States together with its President and the President of the Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy takes part in its work (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is responsible for presenting new proposals regarding the foreign and security policies. The High Representative is also the vice president of the European Commission. The European Council, the High Representative and the European Commission together for the EU's policies and ensure that the policies are properly executed. In accordance with Articles 18 and 27 of the TEU the HR has the following responsibilities (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016):

- Conducts the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy.
- Contributes by her proposals to the development of that policy, which she will carry out as mandated by the Council, and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted in this field.
- Presides over the Foreign Affairs Council; is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. She ensures the consistency of the Union's external action. She is responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action.
- Represents the Union in matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and expresses the Union's position in international organizations and at international conferences.
- Exercises authority over the European External Action Service and over the Union delegations in third countries and at international organizations.

The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) shapes the policy regarding the Union's external action based on the of strategic guidelines defined by the European Council and ensures that the Union's actions are

consistent in the development of the policy. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. Also the High Representative contributes through proposals towards the preparation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and assures successful implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

The Commission is fully associated with CFSP. It has the right to present initiatives on any question regarding the CFSP. It participates in decision-shaping, excluding the decision-making, but including at the Political and Security Committee which is the pillar of CFSP. It is always present in political dialogue meetings with third countries. Crisis management is one of the keystones of the CFSP. The CSDP which is an integral and inseparable part of CFSP covers a range of crisis management functions also known as the "Petersberg tasks" in the Amsterdam Treaty. They include humanitarian and rescue operations, peace-keeping and military operations in crisis management including peace-making as well as civilian missions. Many topics such as terrorism, sanctions policy, human rights and democracy which come up in CFSP directly affect Community policies. The Commission has specific tasks in all of these areas and in some areas it even has its own instruments a range of various projects in the context of the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights and electoral assistance, observation and monitoring. The Commission tasks include overseeing of the civilian missions and ensuring that civilian activities which follow a military crisis operation. The Commission has an important role in managing the CFSP budget. The budget cannot be used to finance EU's military operations, but the money for the CFSP can be used for financing of civilian crisis management missions and it indirectly provides useful assistance to these operations (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

The role of the EP in the formation of the CFSP and the CSDP is that of political scrutiny and budgetary authority. The EP also focuses on the close relationship formations of the High Representative which is also the Vice President of the Commission as the High Representative has a central role reaching across the EU institutions and to the Member States in ensuring the consistent and effective formulation of EU foreign, security and defence policies. According to Article 36 of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative has the responsibility to work with the EP. The EP holds meetings two times per six months with the MS parliaments in order to discuss matters of the development of CSDP as well as the CFSP. The EP is also responsible for preparing reports regarding the performance of the CFSP and the CSDP. To ensure that the CSDP is developing consistently and in cohesion with the Member States interests an important innovation was included in the Treaty of Lisbon. According to the Treaty,

the role of National Parliaments and in particular in Protocol Number 1 (in particular Articles 9 and 10) of the Treaty (van Genderen, W. 2015)[38].

The Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and the Political and Security Committee prepare the work of the Council. COREPER prepares the work of the Council as a whole, while the Political and Security Committee (PSC) deals with political and security issues (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is the main pillar of the CFSP and CSDP. The PSC works at the ambassadorial level meetings as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. The main functions of the PSC are monitoring the international situation, and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The PSC ensures a consistent EU response to a crisis by making sure the political control and strategic direction is in cohesion with the policies in times of crisis (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

The European Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body within the Council. It consists of the Chief of Defence officials of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent Military Representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military related matters within the EU. The EUMC is supported by the EU Military Staff (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) in parallel with the EUMC and PMG provides advices to the PSC. The CIVCOM committee provides information, recommendations and gives its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

The Politico-Military Group (PMG) is responsible for the politico-military matters of the CSDP. PMG formulates recommendations and advices for the PSC on the politico-military aspects of crisis management (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

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[38] van Genderen, W. (2015). In-depth analysis: The Lisbon Treaty's provisions on CFSP/CSDP State of implementation. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/570446/EXPO_IDA(2015)570446_EN.pdf

Figure 3. Institutional structures in the field of CFSP and CSDP (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016)

Another group which was not mentioned in Figure 3 is the Working Group of Foreign Relations Counsellors (Relex Group). The Relex Group deals with all horizontal aspects in particular the institutional, legal and budgetary issues and monitors funding of military operations – the ATHENA mechanism (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

The European External Action Service (EEAS) was established with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. The EEAS is under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and serves as a foreign ministry and diplomatic corps for the EU implementing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and other areas of the EU's external representation where appropriate. The EEAS manages the EU's response to crises has intelligence capabilities and cooperates with the Commission. The EEAS helps the High Representative to ensure the consistency and coordination of the Union's external action and prepare policy proposals and implement them after approval from the Council. The EEAS also assists the President of the European Council and the President as well as the Members of the Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations and works to ensure close cooperation with the Member States (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016).

The European Defence Agency (EDA) holds a significant role in EU's military capability development. In 2006 the project "Long-Term Vision" which defines the long-term technological developments of the nature of the EU's future operations was approved by the EU Defence Ministers. The EDA Capability Development Plan has the following aims (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2016):

• Identifying possibilities for co-operation between Member States.
• Encouraging harmonization of national defence planning, and finally.
• Rendering the Long-Term Vision operational.

The EDA is making a significant contribution to the strengthening of European military capabilities. It encouraged Member States to increase their cooperation. In addition, to ensure the consistency between the EU's capability development with NATO resources and to provide a forum to discuss proposed specific goals, commitments and priorities, a joint EU-NATO Capability Group was established. Therefore, both The EU and NATO draw conclusions from the group's discussions in the future development of respective goals and capabilities.

To summarise, the formation of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy depends on the policy making decisions of the European Council, which is supported by the High Representative as the intermediary between the institutions of the EU. The European Parliament holds the obligation for the budgetary formation of the CSDP and together with the Commission are responsible for the policy shaping. The Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Military Committee (EUMC), Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), Politico-Military Group (PMG), European External Action Service (EEAS), European Defence Agency (EDA) are the main supporting institutions for the CSDP.

3 DIRECTIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

This chapter is divided into two subchapters. The first subchapter describes the scenario modelling methodology which was used to model the scenarios of the development of the CSDP. The second subchapter describes the variables which have the most influence in the formation of the scenario modelling and the three different scenarios modelled in accordance with different direction of the development of the events based on the variables.

3.1 METHODOLOGY

Collective security in Europe was one of the main tasks on the agenda throughout the years since the end of World War II. The newly risen threats of the Soviet Union, fear of revanchist moods within the defeated Germany and the Cold War between the US and Soviet superpowers led to the formation of a common security and defence policy. However, as time went on, the geopolitical situation was changing as well and new threats were developing in unpredictable ways. Thus, having insight that can predict or forecast the possible developments or outcomes of political events or policies would be a valuable asset for Europe.

Future studies or futurology can be dates back as early as the beginning of the XX century. One of the first works in the field of futurology, which is considered as the birth of futurology was released by a British scientist Herbert George Wells in 1901 "Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought". The work consisted of detailed analysis of the possible technological advancements in the XX century and the possible reactions on the social and political levels. Later H. G. Wells advocated the formation of a new field of studies − futurology (W. W. Warren, H. G. Wells and the Genesis of Future Studies, 1983).

However, futurology did not gain recognition until the end of World War II the development of the atomic bomb and the necessity to predict possible developments of new weapons in future. The defence department of the US requested the RAND[39] corporation, which was established in 1946 to engage in prognostics research. Ted Gordon of the RAND corporation formulated a great deal of the methods of futurology, which are used even today. The Delphi method was developed the in the 1950s to forecast the impact of technology on warfare, however, the method was widely adopted and is used in the present. In the seventies the RAND corporation started to publicize some of the prognostics research and emphasized on adopting in social sciences and technology development.

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[39] RAND Corporation is an American non-profit global policy think tank originally formed by Douglas Aircraft Company to offer research and analysis to the United States Armed Forces. The RAND Corporation helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis.

Bertrand de Jouvenel, a French philosopher, political economist and futurologist formulated the "futuribles" conception in futurology studies (de Jouvenel, 1963). In addition, B de Jouvenel established a futurist association "Futuribles International" and published the magazine "Futuribles". Since then futurology studies and forecasting have expanded into many directions (Groff and Smoker, 2007):

- Forecasting of political processes.
- Forecasting of economic processes.
- Social forecasting.
- Forecasting of environmental changes.
- Technology forecasting.
- Teaching and education forecasting.
- New scientific paradigms.
- Changing cultural paradigms.
- Global spiritual, religion, consciousness traditions and tendencies.

Andrzej P. Wierzbicki and Yoshiteru Nakamori stress points against futurology studies on the factual and ideological level. Predicting or forecasting geopolitical processes is not possible due to their unpredictable nature and the theoretical methods being too subjective "Arguments against futurology can be classified in two layers: factual and ideological, Factual arguments can be summarized simply: all predictions have errors in them, thus speculating about the future is futile", "Ideological arguments usually state that it is wrong to predict the future, particularly if it is done by a government or governmental agency, because this implies totalitarian tendencies; any such prediction is bound to represent some vested interest". (Wierzbicki and Nakamori, 2006). However, already in 1969 Pierre Piganiol argues that in contrast to these assumptions that predicting the future policies and strategies of countries is important and possible "Futurology and prospective study were born of the realization that changes had come about since the beginning of the century as a result of technical progress, which was itself closely linked to the development of science. The first point that became clear had to do with the need to predict as exactly as possible what new knowledge, giving rise to new technology, would appear and when" (Piganiol, 1969). There are several theoretical models developed to enable scientists and experts alike to be able to effectively forecast future events on the basis of historical and empirical data. Such prediction or "prognostics" models are being developed in the field of Futures studies or futurology – the study field of postulating possible, probable and preferable futures and the worldviews and myths that underlie them. Futures studies seeks to understand what is likely to happen, what could influence the possible outcomes and what could plausibly change. Part of the discipline seeks a systematic and

pattern-based understanding of past and present, and to determine the likelihood of future events and trends.

According to professor Heikki Patomaki of World Politics at the University of Helsinki the ideological ground of prognostics methods is based on the studies in the field of futurology. The professor emphasizes the following assumptions of futures studies (Patomaki, 2009):

- Projection of future states – an integral part of social behaviour. If social studies wish to stay relevant it is necessary not only the past or current processes, but the perspectives of future processes as well.

- The normative theory is the closest approach to the studies of futurology. This theory is concentrated above all in studying the difference between the real state and the possible ideal state. At the same time, the normative theory raises the question: what needs to be changed in order to achieve the nearest possible state to the desired ideal state. Therefore, the various causation assessment is the integral part of future studies as well as all social studies.

- The transition from the real state to the ideal state model – the process of emancipation. The need for emancipation should be considered as having influence on the behaviour of the social study subject. The purpose of social studies is to promote the process of emancipation while scientific models, analytical constructs can raise the objective to transform, reshape or adjust a social practice or model.

- The reality models acknowledged by scientific theories are only a part of a complex reality, which also consists of hidden opportunities and unrevealed forces. These trends are also a part of the currently existing social mechanisms and structures. Actions and practices of social subject's shape and transform these social mechanisms and structures.

- There is the need to understand the reveal the hidden forces in social and political models. The necessity to identify the variables, which could allow those hidden forces to be revealed. This assumption states that prognostics is not possible without the correlation with existing theories. In other words, prognostics models rely on existing models.

Prognostics models can be considered as an extension to assumptions of futurology, which actualizes these assumptions. In its essence prognostics or forecasting is the assessment of the current state of an object and the possible future developments of the object and the assessment of the possible alternatives of these developments. The term "forecasting" in prognostics seeks to assess and define the causality between events, which are the basis for forecasting the possible developments within a certain scope of probability. In the last decade the interest in futures studies is on the rise. More and more political decisions on the national and international levels are being made in accordance with prognostics research reports. The significance of valuable insight has become increasingly important, thus in the

Lisbon strategy in 2000 the EU set aims to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge economy. Furthermore, one of the best known research projects the "Millennium project"[40], unites about 1700 scientists, politicians and business planners from over 50 countries for the "State of the Future" report, which contains global political, economic and social trends. Another well-known implementation of futurology is the CIA study of "Global trends" (2000 and 2015) and "Mapping the Global Future" (2004), which contain the most plausible international system challenges and security scenarios. In 2004 the European Commission Research centre organized a seminar of EU's and US scientists (Technology Future Analysis Methods Working Group, 2004). During this seminar the scientists defined 48 analytical models of prognostics, which were divided into 13 groups displayed in Table 1.

Table 1. Prognostics and future technology analysis methods, defined by the Technology Futures Analysis Methods Working Group.

Method group	Methods
Creativity promoting techniques	TRIZ (creative problem solving methodology based on logic, data and research, not intuition), future seminars, visionism.
Monitoring and analysis	Technology monitoring, "tech mining".
Descriptive analysis	Bibliometric, effects list, future state index, multidimensional perspective evaluation
Matrixes	Analogies, morphological analysis, cross-impact analysis
Statistical analysis	Risk analysis, correlations
Trend analysis	Growth curve modelling, driving indicators, long ware model
Expert opinion	Surveys, Delphi, focus groups, participation / involvement methods
Modelling and simulation	Innovative system description, complex adaptive systems modelling, chaotic process / regime modelling, technology diffusion analysis, input-output modelling, agent-based modelling
Logical / causal analysis	Requirement analysis, institutional analysis, stakeholder analysis, social impact assessment, mitigation strategy preparation, sustainable development analysis, policy realization assessment, relevance trees, "wheel of future"
Route / map mapping	backcasting, technology / product road mapping, science mapping
Scenarios	Scenario management, scenarios based on quantitative data.
Evaluation / decision making assistance / economic analysis	Cost benefit analysis (CBA), analytical hierarchy process (AHP), data excess analysis (DEA), multi criteria decision analysis
Combinations	Scenario simulation (games), trend effect analysis

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[40] The Millennium Project. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://millennium-project.org/millennium/overview.html

Expert evaluation and opinion about the future scenarios can provide valuable insight because they are based on the logic and experience gained in a defined area. Although expert opinion is considered as a least scientific method, because it is often based on subjective and intuitive evaluations and presumptions this method is still often used in practice. Scenarios as a method of prognostics is gaining popularity in political sciences especially in the field of international relations. Prognostics is recognized as a mandatory extension of any analysis as researchers try to evaluate the possible variants of scenarios that one or the other decision can lead to. According to study literature, academic article databases, EU Joint Research Centre, European Foresight Monitoring Network and The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Futures Group databases it can be stated that scenarios are the most widely used method of prognostics for analysis of political and international processes (List, 2005).

A scenario is logical, consistent hypothesis defining the possible future development of a process, event, having causality and consequences (Ratcliffe, 1999). The purpose of scenario building is to prepare for every possible and most accurate outcome of events defined in the scenarios. Scenario building differs from other methods of prognostics because it offers multiple models of alternative futures. (Wilson, 2000). The process of scenario building includes a multidirectional approach. Depending on the combination of the set amount of variables this method can produce multiple scenarios. The scenario building method can be used as an analytical tool to systemize and structure trends of the research object and allow the subject to model responsive actions. Phillip van Notten with colleagues presented the most comprehensive scenario characteristics, variables and factors, which can be used to construct scenarios and grouped them as shown in Table 2 (Notten, 2003).

Table 2. A typology of scenario characteristics by P. W. van Notten et all. An Updated Scenario Typology.

Broad "macro" characteristics	Detailed "micro" characteristics
The goals of scenario studies	The function of the scenario exercise: Process – Product
	The role of value in the scenario process: Descriptive – Normative
Exploration – Pre-policy research	The subject area covered: Issue-based – Area based – Institutional based
	The nature of change addressed: Evolutionary – Discontinuity (Abrupt – Gradual discontinuity)
Design of the scenario process	Inputs into the scenario process: Qualitative – Quantitative
	Methods employed in the scenario process: Participatory – Model-based
Intuitive - Analytical	Groups involved in the scenario process: Inclusive – Exclusive
Content of the scenarios	The role of time in the scenario: Chain – Snapshot
	Issues covered by the scenario: Heterogeneous – Homogeneous
Complex – Simple	Level of integration: Integration – Fragmented

In the literature meant for academic international relations discipline and the EU's defence policy purposes the modelling of scenarios is mostly researched by Laure Borgomano-Loup[41], Claire Taylor[42], Henrikki Heikka[43], Kulliki Tafel and Erik Terk[44]. Application of prognostics methods in the discipline of international relations is based on the assumption that it is not enough to only explain and understand international processes. It is also necessary to foresight the development possibilities of the processes as these processes are future oriented. The aims, formation characteristics or variables and the contents of scenarios in different fields of study or policy making can differ, however, the high flexibility of the scenario building method allows for a wide scale of application in researching various political problems, including the future development possibilities of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy.

To summarise, a scenario is a logical and consistent chain of events describing the development of an event, process or phenomena connected by cause and effect clauses. A scenario hypothesizes future perspectives based on qualitative or quantitative assumptions. The scenario building method is highly valued because it offers not a single but multidirectional approach to the output of the researched chain of events. The aim of the scenario building method is to provide a possibility for the subject to prepare multiple responses for the multiple possible outcomes of events or processes in order to manage the events or processes in the future.

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[41] Laure Borgomano-Loup. "The Fututre of Security and Defence Alliances in Europe". NATO Defence College, 2003.
[42] Claire Taylor. "Prospects for ESDP Progress Outside the EU Constitution". International Affairs and Defence Section, 2006.
[43] Henrikki Heikka. "Grand Strategies and the Northern Dimension of European Security: four scenarios for 2010". The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003.
[44] Kulliki Tafel and Erik Terk. "EU – which kind of future? Three different scenarios". The Baltic Review, 2003.

3.2 COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS

In order to be able to model the CSDP scenarios it is necessary to understand the driving factors behind the policy making. Wars in Europe have been occurring throughout its entire written history. The struggle for domination culminated with the WWII – the most devastating war Europe has seen yet. In order to rebuild Europe by providing financial assistance the US introduced the Marshall Plan[45] for Europe and to restore lasting peace the US redirected its foreign policy from the usual withdrawal from regional conflicts and not directly involving towards a foreign policy of possible intervention in faraway conflicts with the announcement of the Trumann Doctrine[46] by the US president Harry S. Truman. Thus, the ECSC was established in an effort to bind the European countries with a political, economic and military federalisation approach similar to that of the US. As Daniel Elazar pointed out the shift from a world of states towards a world of diminished state sovereignty in the XX century "in the midst of a paradigm shift from a world of states, modelled after the ideal of the nation-state developed at the beginning of the modern epoch in the seventeenth century, to a world of diminished state sovereignty and increased interstate linkages of a constitutionalised federal character" (Elazar, 1982). However, this approach was not a complete success as the European countries were reluctant to forfeit their national sovereignty.

According to Michael Burgess the European states have become a "conceptual enigma" between federation and supranational entity (Burgess, 2000). In terms of security and defence the European countries mostly by French effort tried to establish the EDC to ensure a common response to potential security threats to Europe, however, these efforts failed and the US anchored its hegemony in NATO and Europe by becoming a the only reliable security provider for the European countries. Although artificial, but new efforts in the search for a common security and defence policy have emerged after the Balkan wars with the signing of the Maastricht treaty and with the formation of the ESS.

Looking at the policy from the position of international relations the Intergovernmentalism European integration theory some interesting points arise (Bergmann and Niemann, 2013)[47]. The development of the CSDP is fragmented on the theoretical level and needs a loud and systematic debate, based on empirical and theoretical inquiry (Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2011) while some have gone further by stating that the CSDP is "notoriously undertheorized" (Kurowska and Breuer, 2011). Since then a new wave of researches has been conducted. Daniel Fiott concludes that the main driving forces behind the formation of the CSDP are that of realist nature "realism still provides the most

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[45] Marshall Plan, 1947. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/marshall-plan
[46] The Truman Doctrine, 1947. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine
[47] Bergmann, J., Niemann, A., (2013). Theories of European Integration and their Contribution to the Study of European Foreign Policy.

compelling IR theory when analysing the CSDP. Ideas and institutions indeed play a role in the development of the CSDP but they are set against the state, and it is the state that maintains the military capabilities and the political interests for, which such capabilities are required" (Fiott, 2013). In other words, ideas and institutions force the artificial development of the CSDP rather than pure necessity.

On the other hand, from a structural perspective the continued evolution of the CSDP is an effort by the EU to find balance against the influence of the US on Europe's defence. Posen concludes that if the EU pursues the goals of the CSDP by building its own defence capabilities while there is the available support of NATO and relative peace after end of the Cold War in Europe can only lead to complicating the international relations between the EU and the US. Posen argues that the development effort is based on a number of inter-related assumptions: representation of an aspiring global power; a means of maintaining prestige of states such as France and the UK; a means of managing regional crises (Posen, 2004; Posen, 2006).

However, a decade later from Posen's research new developments in the geopolitical arena occurred. The international relations between the EU and Russia have greatly declined. So much in fact that the term of the "New Cold War" between Russia and the western world has been used as debated by Edward Lucas (Lucas, 2008). Russia's intervention in Ukraine – Russia is suspected to be supporting the Ukrainian rebel forces by arming them with a vast amount of weapons, tanks, military vehicles; the downing on the MH17 civil airplane by the Ukrainian rebels, which are suspected to be armed by Russia; involvement in the Syrian military conflicts has not been left unnoticed. The NATO members of the EU newly reassessed the threat perception and military strategies of Europe, "The crisis in Ukraine has led to a major reassessment of threat perceptions and military strategies in much of Europe. To face this crisis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in particular has developed a Readiness Action Plan, which includes a new rapid reaction force to respond to any potential military crisis in NATOS's eastern states and the continuous rotational deployment of NATO forces on exercises in the Baltic states" and increased military spending "This increased perception of a potential Russian threat has led to plans for increased military spending in many of those European countries nearest to Russia, NATO members and non-members alike, where concerns over Russia's behaviour are most pressing" (SIPRI, 2015). This shows that the EU MS have understood the message sent by Russian IR and revaluated their point of view regarding national security and defence. This can lead to deeper cooperation in the field of building up common defence between the EU MS.

Other scholars such as Pape argued in favour of the "soft balancing" of power between the EU and the US rather than "hard balancing" through building-up military power. According to Pape, he cannot see any empirical evidence supporting military build-up against the hegemonic US position in NATO. Even though Europeans are dissatisfied with the US foreign policy and military action in the past Pape advocates for the soft approach by balancing against the US influence through "international institutions,

economic statecraft, and strict interpretations of neutrality". The idea is not to pose a challenge to the US position but to impel reassessment of its power (Pape, 2005). Finding a balance to the US power in Europe is important to the CSDP future development as Jones explains that due to the strong presence of American forces in Europe in the past the plans of EDC (1950-1954), the Fouchet Plan (1958-1963) and EPC (1969-1991) for cooperation in European security has failed. Jones concludes that after the end of the Cold War, which ended in the unification of Germany and reduction of US military presence in Europe, cooperation in the field of security became possible (Jones, 2007).

Since the theoretical knowledge gaps of the CSDP development are in the process of being filled by researchers, changes on the geopolitical arena and newly rising threats and challenges have emerged. Alex Younger, the head of the British intelligence agency MI6 in an interview[48] in 2016 identified cyber-attacks, propaganda and subversion from hostile states as the "fundamental threat" to democratic countries of the EU. Younger also pointed out that hybrid warfare is a dangerous phenomenon, which poses a threat to democratic processes. Although he did not name the specific country as the source of danger Younger made it clear that the target of his remarks is Russia. Younger also noted that Russia's conduct in Syria and involvement in supporting the Syrian regime and Bashar al-Assad will create the problem of radicalisation in the region and increase security threats of terrorism. Edward Lucas[49], an expert in Central and Eastern European affairs has since 1986 covered the topics of Central and Eastern European affairs politics, economics and security of the region. He describes the dangers of cyber-attacks in his book "Cyberphobia" (2008). He emphasised the vulnerability of the computer networks, systems, data protection and how people are ignorant towards the danger of hacker attacks as well as how these attacks can be used against democratic processes of states. Not only that but Russia has been accused by attempts of hacking elections including in the US "The evidence is compelling. The U.S. government has officially pointed to Russia as the culprit in the hacking of the Democratic National Committee, and the FBI suspects that Moscow hacked into Hillary Clinton's campaign emails" and organising coups in the Balkan countries "The Balkan states have become an important soft power target for Moscow, which worries about NATO and European Union encroachment in its near abroad, as well as the presence of more or less successful models of democratic transitions on its doorstep" (Foreign Affairs, 2016)[50]. This shows the increasing Russian involvement in global foreign affairs and attempts to destabilise democratic processes and interfere with EU and NATO relations and the development of the CSDP.

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[48] Hostile states pose "fundamental threat" to Europe, says MI6 chief regarding security threats in "The Guardian" (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/08/hostile-states-pose-fundamental-threat-to-europe-says-mi6-chief

[49] Edward Lucas. An expert on espionage, subversion, the use and abuse of history, energy security and information warfare. Author of four books: The New Cold War (2008); Deception (2011); The Snowden Operation (2014) and Cyberphobia (2015). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://cepa.org/experts/edward-lucas

[50] This Is What It Looks Like When Russia Really Wants To Mess With Your Election" (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/08/this-is-what-it-looks-like-when-russia-really-wants-to-mess-with-your-election/?wp_login_redirect=0

Other researchers such as Salome Samadashvili point out the Russian influence in the information media space. Samadashvili describes Russian propaganda as informational warfare "Information warfare is an integral part of Putin's assault on Europe. The scale and intensity of Russia's information warfare capability has fully come to light in the country's aggression against Ukraine" (Samadashvili, 2015). According to Samadashvili's research the Russian government information warfare strategy is seeking two interrelated goals of curtailing informational freedom inside Russia in order to keep control over its citizens' moods as well as indoctrinate pro-Russian voters and the Russian-speaking parts of population outside the Russian territory "On the defence capabilities front it aims to curtail the freedom of information at home in order to avoid a "colour revolution" scenario, using information as the tool to indoctrinate Russian voters and preferably Russian-speaking populations beyond Russia too" (Samadashvili, 2015). The second goal is to influence the perception of the western world through informational warfare in order to pursue Russian interests in the west "Offensively, it seeks to build and sustain a powerful infrastructure in the West in order to advance Russian interests by influencing public perception" (Samadashvili, 2015). However, as the freedom of speech is one of the fundamental rights in democratic countries, tackling the Russian propaganda issue is a difficult task. The lack of the EU institutional capabilities to respond to the Russian informational war challenge urges a response at the policymaking level. EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy, Johannes Hahn, recognised increased informational threat to the EU in 2014 "We Have Some Ideas How to Deal with Russian Propaganda", however, the response to this threat of EU countries was ad hoc in its nature[51].

The US elections in 2016 ended with the success of Donal Trump. So far the new president has communicated with harsh rhetoric regarding the US position in NATO as the security provider for Europe. President Trump expressed his position that NATO costs the US a fortune. He further argues that "the countries over there don't seem to be so interested" in what the US has to offer. Although Trump did not express the position that the US would leave of the alliance entirely, however, in an interview for the New York Times, he questioned one of the most fundamental principles of NATO: the Article 5 provision stating that "an attack on one member state is an attack on all". Trump pointed out that as the president of the US he would firstly evaluate if the MS has "fulfilled its obligations" to NATO. After that he would decide whether to provide military assistance to a EU MS under attack[52]. This position of the new US president fundamentally undermines the trust placed in NATO and all developments for security and defence until present day between the EU and the US in the framework of NATO. At the same time this new turn in the US policy could mean that the EU MS in need of military

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[51] Hahn: "We Have Some Ideas How to Deal with Russian Propaganda", 2 December 2014. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/hahn-we-have-some-ideas-how-to-deal-with-russian-propaganda/
[52] Arsenal of Democracy (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/23/arsenal-of-democracy-nato-donald-trump/

assistance could already be occupied by hostile forces by the time the decision is made. In this case the entire NATO cooperation between EU and the US would lose its meaning and would allow for different security and defence development in Europe, whether it will be deeper cooperation within the EU or further disintegration and security crisis.

On the other hand, the position of the US president is understandable. The NATO financial requirements have been neglected by the EU MS. By the year 2015 only 4 EU MS: Poland, Britain, Estonia, Greece, which are members of NATO had reached the required defence spending of 2 % of their GDP. However, since the year 2015 18 of the 28 NATO countries are increasing their military spending in real terms according to NATO's statistical data[53], as the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated about the changing EU MS position on national defence funding, however, he warned that the total alliance spending will still decline roughly by 1.5 % in 2015 year to the collective amount of $892 billion dollars (NATO, 2016)[54]. Despite the newly rising threats to European security from the Russian Federation the EU's is response is fragmented and slow at best even with the CSDP in mind. Already stressed by Kenneth Payne that an independent EU's security policy and capabilities would potentially duplicate NATO's responsibilities but would not provide France "the same opportunities for engaging and constraining US foreign policy" and that "London's limited conception of an ESDP subordinate to NATO" would discourage the UK from deeper involvement (Payne, 2004). This could explain the reluctant position of the EU to further develop collective or supranational defence forces as France and the UK are the key MS, which have relevant military capabilities in comparison to the most remaining MS. Although the Lisbon treaty stated that the EU's military capabilities according to the CSDP will not duplicate NATO's responsibilities and are aimed to be independent from NATO. However, institutional strategies without political will had little success. Added the fact that the assistance of NATO and the use of its resources and capabilities at the EU's disposal with or without a functioning CSDP allowed the EU MS to neglect the deeper development of the CSDP as well as funding national defence needs according to NATOS's requirements.

Another important aspect, which has influenced the current state of the CSDP are the military conflicts outside Europe. Following the "Arab Spring"[55] in other Arab countries such as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt an uprising turned out into an all-out war in Syria since 2011 (POLITICO, 2015). The Syrian war has produced and keeps producing up to the present day a mass of problems: huge number of refugees, the spread of terrorism, a fight over geopolitical influence within the middle east region by the

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[53] NATO Members' Defense Spending, in Two Charts. 2015. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/06/nato-members-defense-spending-two-charts/116008/
[54] Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009-2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160704_160704-pr2016-116.pdf
[55] Politico. "The Middle East Is Falling Apart", 2015. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/america-not-to-blame-for-middle-east-falling-apart-118611

US, EU and Russia. The Syria's war created the great humanitarian crisis affecting more than 11 million Syrians "Half the country's pre-war population – more than 11 million people – have been killed or forced to flee their homes" while the death toll is nearing half a million[56](Fronline, 2016). Adding the Syrian refugees to the already existing economic migrant and refugee flows from north Africa's states into the EU, the Syrian refugees account for at least 4.8 million refugees from Syria alone, which are hosted by only five countries Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt while the numbers of Syrian asylum seekers sum up to nearly 900 thousand in 2016. 64 % of the refugee target countries are Germany and Sweden (Eurostat 2015; Eurostat 2016)[57]. However, the refugees bring not only social and economic burden to the EU. Terrorists have infiltrated into the refugee slows to Europe and committed a series of terrorist attacks. The threat of terrorism has become the cause of 892 deaths by terrorist attacks across Europe including Turkey in 2016 (Politico, 2016)[58]. The refugee crisis and the terrorism threat are fundamental challenges of the CSDP, however, the EU was unable to respond to these threats in a collective pattern and the Balkan MS have erected fences as physical barriers to slow down the flow of refugees but "The biggest problem of this plan is that it doesn't address the source of the crisis. The real crisis is in the nature of Europe's response, which has been unable to solve the long-term nature of a worldwide threat" (Politico, 2016)[59].

Fuelled further by the Russian propaganda in the informational space, the EU's inability to ensure a decisive response to the increasing threats of terrorism and flow of refugees added up to the rise of Euroscepticism and anti-EU political parties in Europe "Increasingly, however, heightened fears about immigration and the sizeable migrant and refugee flows appear to be driving rising poll numbers for populist and/or euroskeptic parties, especially those that harbour anti-immigrant sentiments" (Archik, 2016). In addition, Kristin Archick pointed out the decreased democracy and solidarity in the EU "concerns about the EU's "democratic deficit" – a sense that ordinary citizens have little say in decisions taken in faraway Brussels" and lack of leadership and vision for the EU development in all policies "Although German Chancellor Angela Merkel has played a central role in responding to the Eurozone crisis, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the migrant and refugee flows, critics view her as being too hesitant and tactical in many instances, rather than acting as a leader of Europe writ large" (Archik, 2016). In terms of numbers the increased discontent with the situation in the EU has translated to the

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[56] Frontline. "A Staggering New Death Toll for Syria's War — 470,000" (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-war-470000/

[57] Eurostat (2016). "Asylum statistics", 2015. Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics

[58]"Terror deaths in Western Europe in 2016 highest in over a decade: report" (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.politico.eu/article/terror-deaths-in-western-europe-in-2016-highest-in-over-decade-report-terrorism/

[59] "How Europe can solve a global crisis" (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.politico.eu/article/how-europe-can-solve-global-migration-refugee-crisis-debate-middle-east-conflict/

following rates of Euroscepticism: Greece – 71%, France – 61 %, UK – 48 %, Germany – 48 % (Eurobarometer, 2015; Politico, 2016)[60].

The lack of leadership, vison for the EU and the deficit of solidarity and empathy for each other's problems between the MS has led to potential partitioning of the EU as the referendum results in the UK were in favour of the "Brexit" option, which meant that the UK must leave the EU. However, the departure of the UK from the EU is highly complex not only due to the nature of the "Brexit" negotiations between the MS but within the UK itself as the High Court of Justice of England and Wales ruled out that the UK's Prime Minister Theresa May does not have the authority to trigger Article 50 – the provision, which would enable the UK to leave the EU. In addition, the UK parliament must find consensus in favour of leaving the EU, however, many parliamentarians oppose the "Brexit" idea[61]. Thus, it is yet to be decided how will the UK's membership in the EU will turn out.

Furthermore, the upcoming presidential elections in France where the right wing candidate Marine Le Pen could win the elections[62], the parliamentary elections in Germany and the Netherlands where the right wing parties: "Alternative für Deutschland" in Germany[63] and the "People's Party for Freedom and Democracy" in the Netherlands[64] are gaining momentum on the boost of Euroscepticism and the moods of national priorities in 2017 (Foreign Affairs, 2016; Foreign Affairs, 2016; Politico, 2016). As these European political drivers are oriented in favour of national needs and against the deeper cooperation between the EU MS, future uncertainty arises in, which direction will the development of the EU and its policies will turn or stop entirely.

Thus, it becomes clear that the following variables in Table 3 are the basis for the development of the future scenarios of CSDP. The variables for the three scenarios are intended to propose the plausible developments that can impact the development of the EU's CSDP in the medium term of 3-5 years. The variables are based on recent events that have a strong influence in the formation of EU's policies as well as historical events, which are still relevant as a source of insight in order to forecast future events.

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[60] Public opinion in the European Union. (2015). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf
"French and Greeks like the EU even less than Brits" (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.politico.eu/article/poll-the-eu-is-bad-news-but-britain-shouldnt-leave-it/
[61] Brexit, Parliament, and Article 50. (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-kingdom/2016-11-07/brexit-parliament-and-article-50
[62] France's Next Revolution? (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/interviews/2016-10-17/france-s-next-revolution
[63] Germany's Right-Wing Challenge. (2016) Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-26/germanys-right-wing-challenge
[64] Netherlands braces for sharp right turn. (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from http://www.politico.eu/article/netherlands-election-2017-mark-rutte-geert-wilders-right-wing/

Table 3. Variable specifications based on the opinions of experts and scholars in chapter 3.2.

Variable type	Variable description
External variable	Russian Federation foreign policy towards Europe
	The role of USA in NATO (Europe)
	Military conflicts outside the EU's borders
	Refugee flow
	Terrorism threat
Internal variable	Attitudes of MS on national security issues
	Direction of European integration

According to Christine Oliver and Ingo Holzinger having a vision for the future, developing plans and executing them are essential for the dynamics of any successful organization "We apply a dynamic capabilities framework to strategic political management to address two questions: What are the alternative strategies that are likely to be effective in influencing public policy? Under what conditions will these strategies be most effective in leading to higher performance and competitive advantage?" and the scenario building methodology is exactly the tool for evaluating decisions and allow for testing policy options by conducting "practice runs" of the possible future processes, which indicate the possible effects towards decision making (Oliver and Holzinger 2008; Van der Heijden et al., 2002; Wilson, 2000). Thus, the following three scenarios are constructed in order to foresight three possible future outcomes of the CSDP development according to the external and internal characteristics or variables, which influence the development of these scenarios. The scenarios are named Scenario A – the "Disintegration" scenario, Scenario B – the "Stagnation" scenario and Scenario C – the "Integration" scenario and each represent a possible future state of the CSDP. The "Disintegration" scenario proposes the possible future of the CSDP in correlation with the variables, which shift towards highly unfavourable outcome of events for the EU, critically obstructing the development of the CSDP. The "Stagnation" scenario proposes the possible future of the CSDP in accordance with the variables shifting towards negative outcome of events for the EU but allowing for minimal possible developments in the CSDP. The "Integration" scenario proposes the possible outcome of the CSDP in correlation with the variables, which allows deeper cooperation and development of the CSDP for the EU.

SCENARIO A - "Disintegration"

The direction of the variables in the "Disintegration" scenario propose highly unfavourable future development of the CSDP. The state of EU's foreign relations with neighbouring countries and partners have become so tense that there is no more room left for constructive political dialog. Only mutual

political criticism remains and all previous cooperation in the field of security, social, cultural and political dialog is at a complete halt.

It has been almost a decade since the last global financial crisis stuck the world in 2008. However, the concern over China's economic slowdown is already increasing the tension in the global political arena. Experts forecast the increased costs of labour, increased production costs, the nearly catastrophic levels of the state of ecology in China, involvement in the arms race in order to dominate in the region. These will be the driving factors towards the slowdown of China's economic growth. As China is the top global exporter of goods with the share of almost 15 % and almost 2,275 trillion dollars according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Statista statistical data[65]. China's economic stagnation may bring around another wave of recession in the global economy. EU MS would then become even more consumed with national economic affairs and the increase of national competitiveness in the EU. Tensions between the economically developed and developing EU MS would heighten due to lack of funding of defence capabilities in the developing MS and CSDP development would become increasingly difficult.

Since the coming to power in 1999 the Russian Federation president Vladimir Putin has been exercising a strong authoritarian type of rule. Trade in natural resources and the rapid modernisation of Russia's military forces has become a governmental priority on the agenda. Due to the cut in the Brent crude oil prices since 2015, which was agreed upon by the US and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a response to the Ukraine crisis the price of oil has decreased dramatically. The price had dropped beneath 30 dollars per barrel at one point. This posed a serious economic threat to the Russian budget but even then Russia's military expenditures did not lessen. Thus, the US oil price cutting tactics failed to affect Russia's aggressive rhetoric at the political level. However, since then the oil prices have been steadily rising and may stabilise at a relatively low rate of 40 dollars per barrel. This oil price might not allow to collect enough funds for the Russian budget, thus increasing the aggressive Russian rhetoric and behaviour in the geopolitical arena. Russia may increase its military involvement in the Middle East and increase military exercises and provocations near the borders of the eastern EU MS. V. Putin's ambitions for Russia to dominate the region and to become a globally acknowledged superpower will continue fuelling the fear of the eastern EU MS of potential military invasion. All of these actions would be provoking a global response by increasing expenditures in national and military security. However, due to the economic crisis and internal political division between the EU MS no effective cooperation in the collective defence would be established.

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[65] China's Export Machine Is Grabbing More of the Global Market (2016). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-06/china-export-machine-defying-gravity-grabs-global-market-share
Top 20 export countries worldwide in 2015 (in billion U.S. dollars) (2015). Retrieved December 22, 2016, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/264623/leading-export-countries-worldwide/

With the US presidential elections in 2016 came another shock to the stability of the EU – the new US president Donald Trump. The newly elected leader of the US might execute his foreign policies and reconsider the position of the US in NATO. The less economically developed countries would continue to struggle to reach the required 2 % margin for defence expenditures due to the new economic crisis. Due to the long term incapability to fulfil these NATO requirements for defence the US might withdraw from NATO and resign its duties to protect the EU in case of military threats. This might result in deeper fragmentation of the EU MS foreign policies as the key EU MS would attempt to reset EU-Russian relations. This would put the border MS at an increasingly greater risk as they become completely vulnerable to any type of military intervention.

The military conflicts in Ukraine and Syria may become long term frozen conflicts. The US withdrawal from the regional hotspots policy leaves Russia to operate in these regions and expand its influence unimpededly. This would create a very sensitive buffer zone around Europe, which could explode at any time necessary. The frozen military conflicts would become a source of a potential tidal wave of refugees threatening the richest EU MS security.

The terrorist attacks in 2015 – 2016 in France clearly revealed that the EU was not ready to defend against terrorist attacks. According to a 2016 report from the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) there were claims by an ISIL operative claimed that some 4000 fighters had been sent to Europe via Turkey. Although this number was thought to be improbably high this does not make the terrorist threat less serious, the flow of refugees already brought the increased terrorist threat to the EU[66]. In the future the refugee flows would continue to move towards the richest EU MS and continue to infiltrate new terrorists into the EU. New terrorist attacks might occur in France, Belgium, Italy and Germany, which would cause a wave of public protests and attempts to review the migration and security policies. However, due to the fragmented positions of many MS it might not be possible to adopt changes to the migration and security policies for the entire EU. Thus, the victim MS of the terrorist attacks might attempt to form a new localised anti-terrorist security agency with high capabilities of instant intelligence sharing, surveillance, tracking and interception of suspicious individual's activities within the states of the agreement.

According to the Eurobarometer report of November 2015 half of the current Member States respondents were sceptical about their country's membership in the EU. This already led to the referendum in the UK also known as the "Brexit" to withdraw from the EU. The referendum was a success for Eurosceptics. This would further inspire referendums in the Netherlands and France to withdraw from the EU as well as the 2017 elections would be won by the right wing nationalist politicians. The UK would decide to withdraw from the EU and it would be necessary to implement new

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EU budgetary reforms in many fields and reconsider CSDP mission execution to compensate the loss of a core member of the EU. The global financial crisis would affect the UK stronger than expected by the British economic experts predicted and would discourage the Netherland and France Eurosceptics from voting in favour of the withdrawal of the EU. However, in the nearest 3-5 years Euroscepticism would still increase in the MS due to the ongoing economic crisis and increasing Russian propaganda. This would cripple the EU's capability to develop the CSDP any further.

SCENARIO B - "Stagnation"

The direction of the variables in the "Stagnation" scenario propose slightly unfavourable future development of the CSDP. The state of EU's foreign relations with neighbouring countries and partners have become very tense. Constructive political dialog has been replaced by mutual political criticism. Partial cooperation still exists on the social, cultural level.

After the last global financial crisis, which stuck the world in 2008 another global financial downturn will place as China's economic slowdown is increasing. This might bring around another wave of recession in the European economy. However, lessons were learned from the last economic crisis and preparations were made in advance to mitigate the recession affects. The key MS agendas would still be consumed by economic matters first and the matters of security and defence second. This would not allow for any significant developments of the CSDP.

The drop in the oil price was not long lasting and started to increase steadily since 2016. The price might keep increasing over the nearest 3-5 years steadily and could stabilise at 60 dollars per barrel. This would allow Russia to balance its budget and increase military spending, further fuelling Russia's geopolitical aspirations and informational war against the EU. This would also allow Russia to continue expanding its influence in the Middle East and Ukraine and further conduct military exercises and provocations to heighten tensions within the eastern EU MS, which would lead fragmented positions of the MS in the development of the CSDP, thus stopping any significant progress.

At the same time the newly elected president of the US – Donald Trump would decide to suspend any assistance to the NATO members of the EU until the 2 % military expenditure would be reached. This could lead the European Council to force the EU's MS to increase expenditures for defence. A new strict plan would be adopted to reach the 2 % budget expenditures for national defence needs to meet the NATO requirement within a period of 5 years. However, due to the economic recession effects the southern European states might fail to reach this objective.

The flow of refugees already brought the terrorist threat to the EU and in the future the refugee flows would continue to bring more terrorists into the EU. New terrorist attacks might occur in France, which could cause a wave of public protests and attempts to limit the refugee flow to France. It could be decided to start new negotiations with Turkey in order to ensure stricter border security. This could lead to changes in the CSDP regarding military border control.

High rates of Euroscepticism already led to the referendum in the UK also known as the "Brexit" to withdraw from the EU. The referendum was a success for Euro sceptics. This might also inspire a referendum in the Netherlands regarding the withdrawal from the EU. However, the politicians in the UK might delay the withdrawal procedure for the following 5 years. During this time new parliamentary elections would occur in the UK. This would result in the new government of the UK to launching a new referendum for the withdrawal of the EU arguing that the previous referendum no longer represents the present opinion of the people. The referendum could end in favour for the UK of remaining in the EU. This would end the uncertainty of the UK's position in the EU and offer more possibilities in the further CSDP formation. This would also increase the trust in the EU's future and reduce the amount of Euro sceptics in the EU, which would lead to the restoration of a fragile stability in the EU's political system.

SCENARIO C - "Integration"

The direction of the variables in the "Integration" scenario propose a more favourable future development possibility of the CSDP. The state of EU's foreign relations with neighbouring countries and partners have become tense and much mutual political criticism exist. However, unwieldy economic and political dialog still remains except in the fields of regional security and defence.

The EU might able to mitigate most of the damage of the global financial downturn due to well learned lessons of the previous economic crisis and China's economic slowdown would not able to significantly damage EU's economy. This would allow the EU MS to pursue the 2 % national defence expenditure requirement by NATO, however, within the next 3-5 years EU MS would not reach this requirement worsening the EU-US international relations regarding cooperation in NATO.

The Brent crude oil prices since 2016 have been rising again and the price might stabilise around 85 dollars per barrel within 3-5 years. This would allow to balance the Russian budget and increase in military expenditures. This would allow Russia to establish a concrete role in the Middle East and Ukraine and further expand its informational war against the EU. The military conflicts in Ukraine and Syria would become frozen and continue to pose a threat of refugee and terrorist flows into the EU.

The new US president's policy would reconsider the position of the US in NATO. As only 5 EU MS have met the required 2 % minimum military expenditure margin in 2015, according to NATO requirements. The US might withdraw from NATO due to the EU MS failure to comply with NATO's national defence expenditure requirement. This could cause great concerns for the EU's security and result in reviewing of policies and an accelerated development of the CSDP. Realising their vulnerability and lack of military capabilities the EU MS would begin a political dialog in order to respond to military, terrorism, refugee and propaganda threats. Intense negotiations could lead to the collaboration in military purchases and formation of national defence capabilities in those eastern EU MS in order to reassure their security and ease tensions related to national defence in the region. Furthermore, the plans for the

single EU military force of 50000 – 60000 soldiers as laid down in the EU's defence plans since 1999 would be reformed to a number of 20000 with the idea of increasing the number by 2000 yearly.

Rising Euroscepticism with the help of Russian propaganda has already led to a referendum in the UK also known as the "Brexit" in order to withdraw from the EU. The referendum was a success for Euro sceptics, however, the UK's parliament could block the UK's withdrawal from the EU. This would cause many discussions as the will of the people would have been ignored. There would be much critique for the UK's government and it could decide to resign and begin a premature parliamentary election process. The newly elected government could launch a new referendum for the withdrawal of the EU arguing that the previous referendum no longer represents the present opinion of the people. The referendum could end in favour for the UK to remain in the EU. As the radical politicians would fail to deliver their election promises to their voters this could also discourage the referendum seekers in other EU MS. The wave of political radicalism, populism and Euroscepticism would gradually decline. This would allow for higher consolidation and easier cooperation in adopting new reforms and provisions for the development of the CSDP.

Table 4 describes how the given variables affect the scenarios of development of the CSDP. Each variable is divided into sections, which have three possible scenarios: Scenario A – Disintegration, Scenario B – Stagnation, Scenario C – Integration. Then, each variable for the scenario is evaluated with a number, meaning that -1 has a strongly negative impact with the potential to disrupt the development of the CSDP, 0 negative impact with the potential to impede or suspend the further development possibilities of the CSDP, while +1 has a positive affect for the possible development of the CSDP.

Table 4. Variable effects for the modelled scenarios

Variable	Scenario	Effect		
Russian Federation foreign policy towards Europe	Scenario A - Disintegration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario B - Stagnation	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario C - Integration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
The role of USA in NATO (Europe)	Scenario A - Disintegration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario B - Stagnation	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario C - Integration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
Military conflicts outside the EU's borders	Scenario A - Disintegration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario B - Stagnation	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario C - Integration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
Refugee flow	Scenario A - Disintegration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario B - Stagnation	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario C - Integration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
Terrorism threat	Scenario A - Disintegration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario B - Stagnation	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario C - Integration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
Attitudes of MS on national security issues	Scenario A - Disintegration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario B - Stagnation	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario C - Integration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
Direction of European integration	Scenario A - Disintegration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario B - Stagnation	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
	Scenario C - Integration	*-1*	*0*	*+1*
Overall scores	Scenario A - Disintegration	*-4*		
	Scenario B - Stagnation	*+1*		
	Scenario C - Integration	*+2*		

Note: For each row, the bold effect value indicates the applied effect. The applied (bold) values are:
- Russian Federation foreign policy towards Europe: A = **-1**, B = **-1**, C = **-1**
- The role of USA in NATO (Europe): A = **-1**, B = **0**, C = **+1**
- Military conflicts outside the EU's borders: A = **0**, B = **0**, C = **0**
- Refugee flow: A = **0**, B = **+1**, C = **0**
- Terrorism threat: A = **0**, B = **+1**, C = **0**
- Attitudes of MS on national security issues: A = **-1**, B = **0**, C = **+1**
- Direction of European integration: A = **-1**, B = **0**, C = **+1**

Summarising the three scenarios, the defined variables may influence each scenario differently, depending on the direction in which the variable is pushing the scenario. The direction of the variables in the "Disintegration" scenario propose highly unfavourable future development of the CSDP. The direction of the variables in the "Stagnation" scenario propose slightly unfavourable future development of the CSDP. The direction of the variables in the "Integration" scenario propose a more favourable future development possibility of the CSDP. This is reflected in the overall evaluation of the variable effects on the development scenarios of the CSDP. In the scope from -7 to +7, the "Disintegration" scenario with an overall score of -4 represents a possible scenario where the CSDP development would possibly fail and EU MS might have to consider the suspension or closure of the ineffective policy. The

"Stagnation" and "Integration" scenarios with the respective scores of +1 and +2 are slightly more optimistic, however, due to the variable directions the overall scores are close and prospects for the development of positive developments of the CSDP are not very high.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of the tasks, which were defined in the introduction part of this thesis. The first task was to identify the main aspects of the evolution of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy development from the end of the World War II until the present day. The second task was to examine the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy institutional structure and legislation, and the third task was to foresight the future possibilities of development of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy.

Conclusions

1. The end of the Cold War and the tense geopolitical situation in the region had a great influence in the formation of the EU's CSDP in the present day. The necessity for a common security system for Europe in the face of military conflicts and other civil threats led to the signing of the two most important documents – The Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Lisbon – that established the EU itself and its foreign and security policies. The Treaty of Lisbon implemented many changes, which expand the development possibilities of the CSDP and pushes the policies development further. The Treaty allowed for the development of the institutional structure, expanded cooperation on the interinstitutional as well as intergovernmental level. The Treaty emphasizes that the future development of the CSDP must be more consistent and effective. The Lisbon treaty enabled the EU to participate in a larger range of missions and operations also the participation of multilateral countries in missions and operations. However, as the geopolitical situation rapidly develops in unexpected directions, so must the CSDP, in order to respond to newly rising challenges and threats in the security affairs of the EU and beyond its borders.

2. Provisions describing the mechanism of the formation and management of the foreign and security policies are declared in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). The European Council and the Commission are responsible for the formation of the direction and the politics of the policies. The European Parliament is able to shape the policies by providing suggestions and proposals and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy delivers the proposals for the decisions to be made in the areas of the CFSP and CSDP to the European Council. The High Representative is also a Vice President in the Commission and works to ensure coordination, coherent work and communication between institutions. The European Council, Commission, European Parliament and the High Representative are the key institutions in the EU's foreign and security policy making, policy shaping and legislation. The formation of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy depends on the policy making decisions of the European Council, which is supported by the High Representative as the intermediary between the institutions of the EU. The European Parliament holds the obligation of the budgetary formation of the CSDP affairs and together with the Commission are responsible for the policy shaping. The Permanent

Representatives Committee (COREPER), Political and Security Committee (PSC), European Military Committee (EUMC), Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), Politico-Military Group (PMG), European External Action Service (EEAS), European Defence Agency (EDA) are the main supporting institutions of the CSDP.

3. The defined variables influence each scenario differently, depending on the direction, in which the variable is pushing the scenario. The direction of the variables in the "Disintegration" scenario propose highly unfavourable future development of the CSDP. The direction of the variables in the "Stagnation" scenario propose slightly unfavourable future development of the CSDP. The direction of the variables in the "Integration" scenario propose a more favourable future development possibility of the CSDP. This is reflected in the overall evaluation of the variable effects on the development scenarios of the CSDP. In the scope from -7 to +7, the "Disintegration" scenario with an overall score of -4 represents a possible scenario where the CSDP development would possibly fail and EU MS might have to consider the suspension or closure of the ineffective policy. The "Stagnation" and "Integration" scenarios with the respective scores of +1 and +2 are slightly more optimistic, however, due to the variable directions the overall scores are close and prospects for the development of positive developments of the CSDP are not very high. The "Integration" scenario has the highest score and would be the most favourable for the EU, while the "Disintegration" has the lowest score and would be the most unfavourable development of the CSDP for the EU, however, the current trends suggest that the "Disintegration" scenario is highly probable.

Recommendations

1. Currently NATO is the security provider for Europe. The historic fact investigation has revealed that there were attempts of self-sufficient common security for Europe. However, due to the lack of resources, the overwhelming power of the Soviet Union and very strong influence of the US in Europe the plans for development of self-sufficient common security for Europe reached a dead end. Therefore, in order to establish a consistent and effective self-sufficient security mechanism for Europe, it would be necessary to review the approach, in which the EU conducts its business in NATO. Rather than participating in NATO as separate states, the EU MS should reshape their cooperation into a form where the EU is a single actor in the affairs of NATO, establish a permanent and fully functional central base of operations, allocate and share resources of defence.

2. Lack of relevant academic and analytical research on the future development possibilities of the CSDP after the treaty of Lisbon has led to uncertainty of how the policy should be developed further. Therefore, it would be necessary to conduct relevant research on the future development possibilities of the CSDP in order to draw plans, which would be acceptable to all EU MS and would provide consistent and efficient security and defence for the EU.

3. The European integration processes are driven by persons and institutions, however, the artificial push for deeper integration has seeded discontent and mistrust between the EU MS. The core MS of the EU have been driving the integration changes without proper consideration for the smaller MS and the discontent with these the push for deeper integration has burst out in the form of Euroscepticism and rising nationalism. The positive future development of CSDP will require to set ambitions of the core MS aside and search for a different approach in the policy development. It would be necessary to start a consistent dialog between all MS in order to determine and achieve progress in the development of the CSDP.

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ANNEXES

Annex 1. The most important documents in the European security policy formation

Year	Agreement	Purpose	Result
1948	Brussels treaty	Establishment of a common European defence system, including mutual defence, in order to withstand the Soviet Union's military threat.	The agreement did not function.
1952	EDC establishment	Military and political integration in order to include Western Germany into European security structure.	France rejected the agreement.
1954	WES establishment	Cooperation in the field of security and defence.	EC participation in field of security and defence.
1981	Genscher-Colombo initiative	Expansion of political cooperation into the field of security and defence.	The initiative failed.
1984	Declaration of Rome	Reactivation of the provision in the WES agreement.	New debates regarding cooperation in the field of security and defence.
1992	Maastricht treaty	The formation of Petersberg tasks: military and civil operations, crisis management became a priority in the field of security and defence.	The EU cooperation in security and defence was formally equated to economic cooperation.
1998	St.Malo agreement	The formation of ESDP.	The necessity of autonomous crisis management capabilities was acknowledged.
1999	Cologne agreement	Establishment of the main ESDP institutions.	The start of ESDP institutionalisation.
1999	Helsinki "Headline Goal 2003"	Establishment of EU's military rapid response forces.	EU military capability development guidelines were drawn.
2000	Feira agreements	Expansion of civil crisis management capabilities.	Start of civil crisis management development.
2000	Nice agreement	The establishment of the first institutions of the EU's security and defence.	The formation of decision making mechanism and division of responsibilities.
2003	Le Touquet agreements	France and UK agreement on the relocation of military forces within 5-10 days.	The agreement was not fully implemented.
2003	France, Germany, Belgium,	Establishment of military capability planning centre and other institutions.	EU MS divided into camps in favour of this initiative and against it –

	Luxembourg agreement		other MS wished for deeper NATO cooepration.
2003	EU constitution agreement	Procedural guidelines for ESDP and deeper cooperation were set.	The agreement was rejected.
2003	ESS	Establishment of strategic goals and instruments to achieve these goals.	The first conception of the ESDP was set in order to allow further development.
2004	Headline Goal 2010	Establishment of EDA and 9 EU Battlegroups.	It was agreed to conduct less ambitious Euro-cooperation projects.
2004	Civilian Headline goal 2008	Drawing the civil crisis management capabilities and requirements.	Civil crisis management guidelines, capabilities and requirements were set.
2006	EDA "Long term vision"	Presented the long term vision of EU's participation in crisis management.	The basis for strategic security and defence development decision making was established.
2007	Lisbon treaty	Establishment of the European defence zone and strengthening of EU's supranational institutions.	The treaty was adopted with almost all of the goals set in the European constitution agreement in the ESDP development vision.

Annex 2 shows a graphical depiction of the ongoing CSDP missions, according to the EEAS.

Annex 2. Ongoing CSDP missions[67]

Annex 3 shows a graphical depiction of the completed CSDP missions, according to the EEAS.

Annex 3. Completed CSDP missions[68]

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