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
European Union's Influence on Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Master's Final Degree Project

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Kaunas, 2023



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Public Policy and Security (6211JX044)

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Summary

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most contentious issues in today's global political discussion and one in which other political forces frequently interject. There are already some studies analysing this phenomenon, but there is little analysis of the EU's and its policies' role in the process of affecting the conflict and the conflicting countries. As a result, the subject of this master's thesis includes the role of the European Union in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The paper aims to investigate to what extent and how the conflict between Israel and Palestine is influenced by the power of the European Union. In order to achieve the above aim, the following objectives have been set:

1. To examine the nature of the European Union's power using the theoretical framework of the literature.
2. To determine the European Union's implemented policies towards Israel and Palestine in order to analyse the interdependence between the EU, Israel, and Palestine.
3. To evaluate the EU's influence as power in connection with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The master thesis consists of 65 pages (introduction, theoretical framework, methodology, empirical part, conclusion, summaries), 1 table, 8 figures, 108 sources of scientific literature and 37 sources of information were used. The first part of the study discusses the theory and notion of International Relations, it focuses on the characteristics and variations of power as an influence, including soft and hard power conceptualisation, as well as, it identifies the general power of the European Union which is expressed through Normative Power. A historical perspective is used to examine the development of the conflict and actions undertaken by the EU. The empirical study of this work includes a discussion of the EU's policies towards Israel and Palestine and the EU's influence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The research is based on the documents developed by the EU and the chosen countries.

After the qualitative analysis of the European Union's policies and activities toward Israel and Palestine, it was concluded that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is the EU's primary tool of influence when dealing with conflicting nations. Through it, both nations profit politically or economically in exchange for upholding democratic principles and respecting human rights. The EU employs normative power (NPE) through financial influence techniques to Israel, while its aid stipulates modernization and adaptation to all humanitarian needs in Palestine. According to this study, the EU appears to have a considerable influence on the conflict. Due to measures adopted, the EU is one of the key upholders of the status quo in the problematic region and one of the factors contributing to the escalation of the confrontations between Israel and Palestine.

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Santrauka

Izraelio ir Palestinos konfliktas yra viena iš aktualiausių temų šiandienos pasaulio politinėse diskusijose, į kurio aptarimą bei eigą dažnai įsikiša kitos politinės jėgos. Atlikta keletas tyrimų, analizuojančių šį reiškinį, tačiau trūksta rašto darbų nagrinėjančių Europos Sąjungos ir jos vykdomos politikos vaidmenį bei poveikį konfliktui ir konfliktuojančioms šalims. Dėl to šio baigiamojo darbo objektas yra Europos Sąjungos vaidmuo Izraelio ir Palestinos konflikto kontekste. Darbo tikslas – ištirti kaip Izraelio ir Palestinos konfliktą įtakoja Europos Sąjungos galia. Siekiant įgyvendinti minėtą tikslą buvo nustatyti darbo uždaviniai:

1. Išnagrinėti Europos Sąjungos galios prigimtį apžvelgiant teorinę literatūrą.
2. Nustatyti Europos Sąjungos vykdomą politiką Izraelyje ir Palestinoje, siekiant išanalizuoti Europos Sąjungos, Izraelio ir Palestinos tarpusavio priklausomybę.
3. Įvertinti Europos Sąjungos galios įtaką Izraelio ir Palestinos konfliktui.

Baigiamąjį darbą sudaro 65 puslapiai (įvadas, teorinė dalis, metodologija, empirinė dalis, išvados, santraukos), 1 lentelė, 8 figūros. Darbe panaudoti 108 mokslinės literatūros šaltiniai ir 37 informacijos šaltiniai. Teorinėje darbo dalyje aptariama tarptautinių santykių teorija bei terminai. Pateikiama galios, kaip įtakos, terminas bei jos skirstymo būdai, apimant švelniosios ir kietosios galios konceptualizavimą. Taip pat nagrinėjama Europos Sąjungos galia, per normatyvinės galios prizmę. Per istorinę perspektyvą nagrinėjama konflikto raida ir veiksmai, kurių ėmėsi Europos Sąjunga. Šio darbo tyrimas nagrinėja Europos Sąjungos politiką Izraelyje ir Palestinoje bei Europos Sąjungos įtaką Izraelio ir Palestinos konfliktui. Tyrimas paremtas Europos Sąjungos ir pasirinktų šalių dokumentais.

Atlikus kokybinę analizę Europos Sąjungos politikos ir veiksmų priimtų Izraelio ir Palestinos atžvilgiu, tyrimas parodė, kad Europos kaimynystės politika (EKP) yra pagrindinis Europos Sąjungos įtakos įrankis bendradarbiaujant su konfliktuojančiomis tautomis. Įgyvendinant EKP abi tautos gauna politinės ar ekonominės naudos mainais už demokratinių principų laikymąsi ir žmogaus teisių gerbimą. Europos Sąjunga išreiškia normatyvinę galią, pasitelkdama finansinės įtakos metodus siekdama paveikti Izraeli bei šios galios pagalba skatina Palestinos modernizavimą bei užtikrina visus humanitarinius poreikius Palestinoje. Remiantis šiuo tyrimu, Europos Sąjunga daro nemažą įtaką konfliktui. Dėl taikomų ir priimtų priemonių Europos Sąjunga yra viena iš pagrindinių „status quo“ puoselėtojų konfliktuojančiame regione ir vienas iš veiksmų, prisidedančių prie susidūrimų eskalavimo tarp Izraelio ir Palestinos.

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Introduction

The relevance of the topic. Numerous nations continue to struggle with a variety of crises that put their stability, security, economy, and democracy in jeopardy in the 21st century. Different opposition movements, governmental collapses, and numerous other failures of proper state performance functions occur in different countries. Some of them are independent, while others relate to alliances with other nations or international organizations and adhere to their goals and principles. The European Union (EU) is one of the major players on the global stage with a significant economic and rising political influence. Since the European Union's founding, its policies have been based on democratic ideals and standards, including good governance and objectives to spread these values around the world. The EU "must contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty, and the protection of human rights," states the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (2012, p. 17). As a result, some nations decide to participate in its procedures and support freedom, democracy, and equality since doing so encourages factors that are good for social, and economic development. In an effort to bolster regional security and resolve the situation at hand, the Union itself works cooperatively to advance these ideals not only in each of its member nations but also in developing connections with "third countries."

Numerous studies examine the trade economy, innovation initiatives, collaboration arrangements, and advancements both inside and outside the European Union; they also examine how the Union collaborates with its member states and nearby nations. Typically, the EU is portrayed favourably in such analyses, with a focus on its accomplishments, the promotion of peace, and assistance to those in need; as a result, many nations outside of Europe and the rest of the world see the EU as a reliable organization (Standard Barometer 97, 2022). Nevertheless, some voice their contradictory opinion, condemning the EU's methods of operation. More specifically, different academics debate the precise function of the EU's policies. According to some (Varsa, 2017, Cross and Karolewski, 2017), the European Union's policies are even being executed inadequately in some cases, which might result in problematic situations where the EU's stance is not being upheld. As a result, many people began to believe that the EU is fundamentally connected to a number of continuing crises that have an impact on both the foreign and security policies of Europe and the rest of the globe.

The novelty of the topic. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most contentious issues in today's global political discussion and one in which other political forces frequently interject. The Arab and Jewish populations are at odds in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict over control of Palestine and Jerusalem, which each side views as its ancestral home. The fight started out being local, but after the State of Israel was established in 1948, several Middle Eastern Arab states joined it. This dispute has caused political unrest and outright armed conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has significant political ramifications for the Middle East and world politics as a whole, both practically and symbolically. Therefore, the Middle East's future as well as the fate of the global community as a whole relies on how the conflict is resolved in the future. The EU has a clear interest in preserving peace and stability in the Middle East since it is an important region for Europe for a variety of reasons. The political, economic, social, and cultural relationships that the European Union and its members have with the opposing parties have a long history and are still growing today. Concerning the conflict, the EU is heavily involved in political and diplomatic endeavours. In order to strengthen its position in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the EU is employing a number of methods, such as sending troops to the area to offer border security and engaging in international relations both on

its own and with the support of third parties through several cooperation projects. It can be assumed, that its relationships with these countries are closer than those with other regional countries; the ties are formed through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), European Neighbourhood Policies (ENP), Association Agreements, and other. The foundation of EU cooperation with Israel and Palestine is mainly based on the Union's norms and values.

It is hard to claim that the issue of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has received little research. A broad set of public relations-focused scholarly literature is devoted to it. Nonetheless, it should be highlighted, that the scientific community has not given the EU's role as an actor in the process of resolving and effecting this issue its proper consideration.

As a result, given the conflict between Israel and Palestine, further research is still needed to examine the EU's role as a factor in affecting those two countries. Therefore, it is necessary to explore what abnormalities can be seen while observing the implemented policies and actions taken towards those two countries. Thus, **the problem of the research** is the effects of the European Union's policies on the conflict prevailing between Israel and Palestine.

The subject of the research includes the role of the European Union in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The aim of the paper is to investigate to what extent and how the conflict between Israel and Palestine is influenced by the power of the European Union.

To achieve the above aim, the following **objectives** have been set:

1. To examine the nature of the European Union's power using the theoretical framework of the literature.
2. To determine the European Union's implemented policies towards Israel and Palestine in order to analyse the interdependence between the EU, Israel, and Palestine.
3. To evaluate the EU's influence as power in connection with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The research methods. The descriptive strategy made it possible to organize theoretical data regarding the International Relations theories and material that was employed to ascertain the nature of power. A historical perspective is used to examine the development of the conflict and actions undertaken by the EU. In addition, qualitative and comparative research methods are combined to complete the master's thesis.

The outline of the paper. The project consists of 65 pages (introduction, theoretical framework, methodology, empirical part, conclusion, summaries), 1 table, 8 figures, 109 sources of scientific literature and 36 sources of information were used. For the purpose of gathering theoretical information for the first section of the thesis, numerous specialists' books and scholarly publications were examined. The review of literature examines the theory and notion of international relations. Focus is placed on the idea of power within the IR framework, as well as the writings of academics like Barnett and Duvall, Nye, Manners, and others. The theoretical framework is followed by a presentation of the research's materials and methodological considerations. The results of the research form a part of the work's empirical component. Additionally, the EU's policies toward the chosen countries are discussed, as well as the history of the main conflict between Israel and Palestine. Discussion of the impact of the EU on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is part of the empirical portion

of the work, it includes a discussion of the EU's influence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ultimately, the concluding section of the thesis summarizes the results and offers conclusions for this study.

The following chapter provides a literature review of the main key concepts and theoretical framework for the current study.

1. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE KEY CONCEPTS

This section reflects the main principles of the theoretical framework undertaken in the research. It deals with the general definition of power and its nature, its meaning in the context of International Relations, and its use by the European Union. The following sub-section presents the ideas of various types of research on the concept of power from a historical perspective.

1.1. Nature of Power

Power as such has been widely analysed by a number of scholars over the decades and centuries, from Aristotle, Plato, and Machiavelli to theorists such as Hobbes, Weber, Parsons, and other notable scholars. As stressed by Dahl (1957, p. 201), the notion of power is “ancient and ubiquitous,” and is often referred to by the synonyms “influence and control.” For this reason, many debates arise regarding the exact definition of power and different researchers provide various approaches to it.

During the first attempts to define power, it is believed that ancient philosophers distinguished two different concepts of power. Haugaard and Gleg (2009) argue that Aristotle developed crucial ideas by contrasting the rule of law with tyranny this way stressing the legitimate and illegitimate powers. In general, the rule of law “describes the supreme authority of the law over governmental action and individual behaviour. It corresponds to a situation where both the government and individuals are bound by the law and comply with it” (Valcke, 2012, p. 2). Therefore, it focuses on the legitimate power, where the interests of all are taken into consideration, while the further represents the arbitrary rule, in which everything is governed by a specific person in the manner he or she wishes. Such political philosophy as well is seen in Plato’s ideas. He justifies the stance that authority as power over others is in hands of a single person who has wider knowledge and higher expertise (Brooks, 2006). Similar ideas are supported by Niccolò Machiavelli in his work “The Prince.” Haugaard and Clegg (2009) underline that Machiavelli defines power as political activity exercised by the strong over weak ones. Accordingly, it is clear that to have power means to possess something or to be in control of something or someone. Contrarily, those without power are subdued and forced to be obedient. According to Bandurin et al. (2015), humans can be differentiated by their personalities to those in command and those in obedience. Thus, there exist two types of personalities – the dominating “leader” and the submissive the “led” one, which interact one with another forming foundations for relationships and social structures. Therefore, such a hierarchical system based on the possession of power is embedded in the core of human nature.

Even English philosopher Thomas Hobbes believed that “the desire for power is a basic human drive since power is the necessary mean for happiness and getting what humans desire.” (Grcic, 2007, p. 373). Later, Hobbes named it as individual power by considering it as a commodity, an element of glory, fame and fortune, but the means to achieve it are backed up with self-preservation. Thus, in the achievement of individual power, violence and conflict are inevitable. However, in addition to that, he introduced other branches of power which included social and sovereign ones. The first one reflects the sum of individual powers, which reflects a single unit’s capability, while the second one characterises “a power created by the transfer of certain individual rights to one or several persons, with the idea of general protection guaranteed by mutual agreement” (Riška, 2006, p. 512). Such “common power” is needed to suppress the individual urge for needs no matter what and to force the obedience of general laws of nature. In this case, as discussed by Raphaels’ (2014, p 58), the multitude

is “united in one artificial person, the State.” As a result, the one to whom the authority is transmitted becomes the sovereign, and the others become his equal subjects.

Similarly, to the above-discussed Aristotelian and Plato’s ideas, Hobbes as well reflects on the existence of two ways in which sovereign power may be obtained. He suggests separating them into two ways, as seen below (ibid):

- I. Mutual agreement. A commonwealth by institution.
- II. Force. A commonwealth by acquisition.

On one hand, power is acquired by the peace agreement among themselves, on the other by conquest or coup. This distinction reflects two points of view. However, the main difference between the above-mentioned scholars’ discussions is the believe that power is a property of an individual, while Hobbes states that power streams from society to the individual. Equivalently, Hannah Arendt believes that power arises from a commonly formed group (Navarro Diaz, Romero-Moreno, 2016). Therefore, the concept of power is not restricted to the desire for control and leadership of a single person. Based on the authors’ ideas (ibid., p. 60) power is a part of the relationship between things or with other people. Contrarily to hierarchical social interactions between the various levels of governance, the subjects belong to the same structure and interact on the same level without having more certain exclusivity than others. This is to say, that it takes into consideration equal rights without the exclusion of certain groups.

Furthermore, one more prominent definition is developed by the foremost social theorist of the 20th century Max Weber. According to Weber “power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (in Martin, 1971 p.241). Based on this, Dahl explains power like this (1957, pp. 202-203):

“A has power over B to the extent he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”

Therefore, power can use any means to enforce the will. By this, the conflict situation is as well inevitable, as mutually convenient relations are not taken into account. It is clear that power, in this case, is closely connected to a zero-sum game, as the final achievements depend on individual qualities and available resources. Thus, status and class have an effect on power. However, many argue that the Weberian definition does not provide the specific meaning of power, but rather confuses it by additionally combining it with the terminology of authority and dominance, as later Weber states that “domination is power as authority” (Barbalet, 1985, p. 535). As a result, Uphoff (1989, p. 298) believes that such a formulation blurred the difference between these terms. Nevertheless, these days ideas based on Weberian terminology are still taken into account.

By analysing the views of the above-mentioned scholars and taking into consideration those blurred definitions other researchers (Haugaard, 2010, Shokri, 2017, Meier and Blum, 2019, Avelino, 2021) tend to distinguish several contrasting perceptions of power:

- *Power over (coercion and manipulation)*. In this case, power is seen as the domination of authority, where one might gain and another experience the loss. It represents the concept presented by Dahl (1957).
- *Power to (resistance and empowerment)* is seen as the right to do and attain something.
- *Power of*. It has similar connotations with “power to.” As stated by Shokri (2017, p. 2), this perception “implies the will and the intuition - of a person or political organization to act autonomously to claim the rights, and also being aware of or being conscious of the two other concepts of power.” As a result, it illustrates the moral importance of those rights for something.
- *Power with (cooperation and learning)*. It is a collective interpretation of Arendt’s “power to” (1998). Therefore, this type does not work independently from the other dimensions and is mainly built on solidarity.

To understand the exact concept of how it manifests and plays a role in change, based on power perceptions, Avelino (2021, p. 429) suggests such example, “A and B can contribute to or resist change (*power to*), and/or A can coerce or hamper B to change (*power over*), and/or A and B can cooperate for or against change (*power with*).” Hence, these dimensions of power can act as elements encouraging resistance, challenging oppression and urging collaboration. In the case of politics, Pansardi, (2012, p. 81) views these elements as necessary for political performance and decision-making. As a result, the mix of authority, right and capacity justify the legitimacy of actions undertaken.

To sum up, it is clear that it is difficult to concretize one specific definition of power, as many scholars tend to debate its accurate meaning by suggesting individual terminologies of power. However, it is evident that there are two stances towards it: power is considered an element of an individual; power as an element of society. Thus, it can be analysed on different levels. Moreover, as a consequence of various discussions regarding the specificity of power, it appears to be comprised of integrated concepts based on the nature of attribution.

The second subchapter focuses on power in a political sense, focusing on the framework of international relations.

1.2. Power in International Relations

Political science considers power to be one of its key concepts. It is manifested in everyday actions of governments, and institutions both on state, national, and international levels, and it is reflected in everyday relations, and ideologies. Hague and Harrop (in Fadakinte, 2019, p. 16) describe power as “the currency of politics” as without it to those in charge, it would be impossible to serve and perform for the good of their subjects, as well as, exploit their subjects in specific fields. Parsons (1963) states that it is a crucial element in political phenomena. Wherefore, it is evident that the broad concepts about power mentioned in the previous section are significant in the field of international relations (IR), as power centres around the idea of “relations among people” in which one influences another (Dahl, 1957 p. 202) while international relations denote the idea of “the behaviour of and the interaction between states” (Pukšto, Jakštaitė, Česnaskas, 2013, p. 5). Therefore, those two notions clearly interdepend as they convey the same thought, however, they cannot be used as synonyms,

rather power can be just an element of the IR or it can be assumed that international relations are built on power.

Correspondingly, Hart (1976, p. 289) identifies, that power in international relations and politics can be observed through the three approaches:

- 1) control over resources,
- 2) control over actors,
- and 3) control over events and outcomes.

The first strategy is centred mostly on military spending and armed forces. As each nation has a specific quantity of possessions that indicate its power or advantage over other nations, it concentrates on possession of the resources that can be assessed at the national level. However, some counter that this strategy ignores the fact that countries often form alliances and that by doing so, nations lose sovereignty over resources since these are typically shared within those unions. The second strategy is related to persuasion and takes into account both coercive and noncoercive techniques. The third, however, seeks a specific benefit (utility) based on decisions on rational choice. Such a theoretical perspective has a close relationship to the traditions of realism, which are studied in depth as part of the field of international relations.

1.2.1. Realism

In general, it is believed that Realism focuses on the idea that various actors in the international and political environment primarily desire power, security, and autonomy since they prevail in a self-help system in which no one can be trusted. According to Pukšto, Jakštaitė, and Česnaskas (2013, p. 9), those actors “seek to enhance their power and expand influence, rejecting idealistic or identity-related elements.” Therefore, through a desire to be independent and trust only in oneself, realism focuses on rationality stimulating a conflictual and competitive side, as the only effective way to achieve the set objectives is to win a conflict or war.

Various scholars (Antunes and Camisao, 2017, Rosenberg, 1990, Donnelly, 2000, Pukšto, Jakštaitė, Česnaskas, 2013) tend to agree that realism, as a set of additional theories of neorealism, classical, defensive and offensive, and neoclassical realism, is composed of three ideas:

- the most significant actors in international relations are nation-states;
- there are definite distinctions between domestic and international politics;
- international relations are a “struggle for power and peace.” (Pukšto, Jakštaitė, Česnaskas, 2013, p. 10)

Based on this, realism opts out all international, non-governmental actors and considers the state as a crucial unit acting in self-interest by following basic human nature which according to Donnelly (2000, p. 9) “is at its core egoistic.” Therefore, when only national interest is taken into account, for realists, it is difficult to believe that there could be any development on an international level while choosing cooperation with other states. This way, the interaction between several sovereign states differs from the synergy inside a state, as each state egoistically strives to acquire power in an effort to endure and rule in the global arena.

Similarly, Mearsheimer distinguishes several assumptions regarding realism (2001, p. 30):

- 1) The international system is anarchic.
- 2) States exhibit instrumental rationality.
- 3) Survival is the most fundamental motivation for states.
- 4) States already have some degree of offensive military capability, giving them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other.
- 5) No state will ever be able to guarantee that another will not employ its military power.

The first assumption is that anarchy dominates in the international system, thus, it indicates that there is no hierarchically superior. As observed by Antunes and Camisao (2017) in case of emergency, nobody is expected to take action and help, as internationally there is no one in charge. Wherefore, actors can only rely on themselves. Secondly, states are rational actors, i.e., they do not act recklessly, they anticipate the short- and long-term repercussions of their choices and plan ahead strategically on how to survive (Mearsheimer, 2001, 31). Moreover, by underlying rationality, it becomes clear that states plan how and when they can survive by increasing their power in a competitive environment. Then (4) assumes that states are dangerous to each other as the great powers possess certain combat readiness and force structure. Therefore, it closely intersects with the approach of “balance of power” which explores military force as the measure of power and war-winning ability as the vital matter (Baldwin, 2013, p. 281). Likewise, the last assumption (5) regarding the other state’s intentions emphasizes the idea that there’s no hundred per cent certainty, that states would not take radical actions of aggression towards other countries, because, as above mentioned, states tend to act egoistically by struggling to gain power on international and national levels. From the discussed assumptions on realism, it becomes clear that “it depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war” (Walt, 1998, p. 31). Thus, in the international system, governments are the key players who wield the essential power which is necessary to conduct politics. Nevertheless, different branches of realism, despite considering power as a crucial key in political relations, tend to argue about what forces the struggle for it. Classical realists support the idea of basic human strive, while neorealists claim that the international framework promotes the pursuit of power by states (Pukšto, Jakštaitė, Česnaskas, 2013, p. 12). Thus, once again the distinction between individual and collective power is evident.

Additionally, to this controversy, there exist disagreements regarding the measurement of power. Based on Baldwin (2013, p. 274), prevail two approaches to analysing power in IR; national power and relational power approaches. The first one views power as a “possession or property of states” while the other sees it as a current or prospective relationship (ibid.). On one hand, power can be conceived through belongings and resources, and in contrast, it also can be viewed through behaviour, and the ability to affect others with it. It can be noticed, that the relational approach to power is similarly structured as the Weberian concept of power. Where “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.” It is obvious that two or several actors are needed for such a relation-forming interaction. However, according to Pustovskij and Kremer (2011, p. 12), the narrow number of actors in such relation “results into an ad-hoc structure which only exists for the

limited duration and scope of this specific action.” Such a view suggests that this power has several dimensions. Furthermore, Baldwin (2013, p. 275) distinguishes several important dimensions of power. He suggests, that it can be described based on *scope*, i.e., the influence of an actor over another might vary depending on the subject of matter and its relevance at a certain moment. Secondly, based on *domain*, i.e., the “importance of other actors subjects to its influence” (ibid.), thus, depending on the region, and state’s size the exercised power might have a bigger or smaller influence. Thirdly, *weight*, the impact of state’s A behaviour on B; whether it can be persuaded or affected. Moreover, *costs*, denote the idea of the estimated price of influence, whether or not it is “costly or cheap for A to influence B <...> for B to comply with A’s demand” (ibid.). And, lastly, *means* are crucial in international relations as they affect through communicative, economic, military, and diplomatic actions. Generally, it denotes the idea of the multidimensional nature of power. Only by taking into account all elements actors’ power can be estimated. However, that is to say, the relational approach asserts that the interaction among actors is strategically planned based on foreseen benefits, thus, actors intentionally seek power over others.

Notwithstanding that, some argue (Nye, 2011) that such an approach to power might not be appealing as it might last only for a short time due to changing nature of actors. Therefore, the national power is more captivating to decision and policymakers as it is stable, measurable, and more concrete, as it includes elements such as population, territory, climate, natural resources, and military. Based on it, these tangible elements are considered as the power itself. As stated by Tellis, they are of great importance in “competitive social environments” because “superior assets help their possessors secure advantageous outcomes” (2015, p. 5). Therefore, they act as important factors in the development of the states. However, others argue (Jablonsky and Bartholomees, 2014, p. 101) that despite possessing e.g., military assets, it is not enough, as those assets might be inadequately allocated and used. It is not always clear whether actors will manage to use those measurable elements, thus, the competence and capacity of actors’ performances must be taken into account in the national power approach. Therefore, the definition of national power should denote the idea of a nation’s potential and capability to use its material and spiritual resources for the achievement of national interests and goals (Tchereni and Mathekga, 2008). It becomes clear that both tangible and intangible elements should be taken into consideration. Hence, Morgenthau’s definition most clearly conveys the idea of national power. He (in Hagström, 2017, p. 8) classifies this type of power as:

“Geography, natural resources (food and raw materials), industrial capacity, military preparedness (technology, leadership, quantity and quality of armed forces), population (distribution and trends), national character, national morale, and quality of diplomacy and government.”

For the simplification of national power, these components can generally be divided as seen below (**Figure 1**).




Figure 1. Elements of National Power

Nevertheless, national power should be considered as a combination of both measurable and invisible resources which depend on one another. As those elements seek to guarantee the “satisfaction of the needs and wishes of a nation or a country” (Zarghani, 2010, p. 4). However, the theory of realism and its typologies is not universal. International relations are comprised of additional theories of Constructivism and Liberalism which have other views on the same issues.

Therefore, the subsection below briefly discusses these branches of the IR and their stance towards power.

1.2.2. Liberalism and Constructivism

The theory of International Relations supports the idea that the same action, process or object in the international environment can be evaluated differently. Therefore, the dominating perceptions of IR theory completely differ in their traditions towards analysis, and attitudes to the same thing. Not an exception are theories of Liberalism and Constructivism.

Constructivism is the most recent theory in the international relations discourse which suggest a wider explanation of how politics are performed in the world. International relations constructivists argue that significant components of IR are historically and socially produced rather than the inevitabilities of human nature or other fundamental aspects of global politics. Contrary to realists, constructivists analyse the influence of ideas alternatively to material factors. It explains how actors of the international system act and interact with others mainly based on their identities and central ideas (Pukšto, Jakštaitė, Česnaskas, 2013, p. 12). It focuses generally on values and norms, on their construction and development depending on the situation. Therefore, the material elements of the world are not considered to affect the behaviour of states as it is by realism. On the contrary, as argues Mengshu (2020, p. 2) “the actions of actors depend on their interests.” But despite that those actors can hold military or coercive power, they do not use it in their amoral interests (Chandler, 2004, p. 25). Thus, states do not act as rational and calculating actors, they do not seek to dominate or achieve

power over other actors as they do not consider them capable of hurting. However, researchers of this theory do not omit the significance of power in international relations. Based on Tannenwald (2005, p. 19), “ideas define the meaning of material power.” It is, that the material world is widely interpreted by contextual meanings. Hence, constructivists exalt the concept of nonmaterial power which includes knowledge, language, culture and ideology. In general, nonmaterial power is connected with material power as through it is possible to comprehend the state’s structure and its relation with other actors. According to constructivists, the behaviour of states in politics is constructed based on their understanding of the surrounding world. Therefore, sophistication and general understanding, comprehension of the surrounding environment are linked to power.

The third crucial theory of international relations (Liberalism) is the opponent to the previously discussed concepts. It is an expansive concept that covers freedom and the need for better living conditions. when explaining world politics. According to Doyle (1986, p. 1152), the main characteristics of liberalism are “individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity.” It was developed due to the need for changes to outdated realism, however, it still carries similar views towards the actors involved. Eriksson and Giacomello state (2006, p. 230) that “liberals agree with realists that states are central actors in world politics, but in contrast to realists, argue that states are by no means the only actors that play significant roles in international relations.” Therefore, they take into consideration both international institutions, non-governmental organisations and transnational corporations, as well as, individuals who strive for freedom, security, and economic prosperity. Both liberals and realists are concerned with the individuals who hold power and how they exercise it. They are interested in “the distinctive structures within which these agents interact in pursuit of their respective interests, and with the relations between such agents and structures” (Lukes, 2005a, p. 485). However, contrarily to realists, representatives of liberalism view relations in a positive light, highlighting the fact that through cooperation it is possible to attain more benefits for different actors. They condemn the concept of power, as they believe, as stated by Starr (2007, p. 16), that exercising power can destroy individual liberty and the rule of law. Thus, as power mainly centres around violence, conflicts, wars and tyranny, it is crucial to limit it in order to maintain secure cooperation without force. The limitation of the state’s power could lead to higher chances of prosperity, welfare, knowledge (by learning from each other), an increase in resources (through an exchange of goods and services), in general, security which encompasses as well health and environmental protection. That is why liberalism focuses on establishing and constructing institutions that protect individual freedom and check political power (Meiser, 2017, p. 22). As argued by Pukšto, Jakštaitė, and Česnaskas (2013, p. 22), “International institutions strengthen reciprocal trust of states and promote stability in international system.” This way they diminish the fear of distrust among states because it is believed that everybody acts beneficially for mutual interests. Notwithstanding that, some critique this approach as they are concerned with the “unequal leverage in determining collective outcomes” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p. 52). Even despite those institutions are created to help to avoid miscommunication and achieve mutual agreements, it is believed that they still follow an uneven “winner-loser” pattern, as some actors tend to receive significant help from those institutions, while others lesser.

Nevertheless, it is important to state that the brief discussion of paradigms above does not try to explain which perception of the IR serves better in understanding how politics is performed, rather than emphasising the idea that power can be comprehended differently, with a lesser or greater focus on specific aspects. In this case, constructivism and liberalism do not put great significance to the

analysis of power's concept in contrast to the theorist of the realist school, but for all that, they generate some additional aspects to it. However, at this point, it is clear that power analysis is multifaceted and it is difficult to establish one specific notion on it. Therefore, the following subchapter will present the taxonomy of the power suggested by several authors.

1.2.3. Variations of Power

Power cannot be described in a single formulation as it comes in different forms and expressions. Some view, that it is significant to think about it broadly, rather than narrowly, because if to analyse it only in terms of two actors and control among them there still rise obstructs and obscurity in the analysis. Hence, Lukes (1974, 2005b), looks into this issue and identifies “three dimensions of power.” This dimensional theory, firstly, defines power as a relationship exerted to achieve verbally or physically (including conflict) the intended outcomes, generally, by making decisions. The second dimension aims to investigate power relations which are “less obvious and involve processes such as the suppression of issues and inculcation of attitudes that favour some interests and disreect others” (Robbins, 1993, p. 212). The “third face of power” deals with “structural influence” (Schmidt-Thomé and Mäntysalo 2014, p. 117). Power is seen as an instrument of shaping and manipulating the interests, believes and desires of actors, thus, leading to compliance with domination. According to Hathaway (2016, pp. 120-121) scholars focusing on the above-discussed approach resulted in developing three forms of power termed as “visible”, “invisible”, and “hidden.” Visible power is performed explicitly in public spaces or through formal decisions attainable by others. Generally, while analysing visible power it is crucial to look at “who participates, what potential sanctions exist, whose interests prevail, who controls important resources, and who is vested with formal authority” (ibid.). Similar to the first dimension of power, it focuses on decisions and their making bodies. Then, hidden power occurs when certain actors control the influence “by setting and manipulating agendas and marginalising the concerns and voices of less powerful groups” (Hunjan and Keophilavong, 2010, p. 14). Therefore, it is when the interests of weak actors are excluded from the decision-making procedures and only specific choices are taken into account. While invisible power prevails not only when problems and issues are not analysed by decision-makers, but when actors' understanding of their needs and possibilities are affected both on psychological and ideological levels (VeneKlasen and Miller, 2002, Gaventa, 2006. In this form, A exercises power over B “by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants” (Lukes, 2005a, p. 27). Despite it being less concrete it is still can be identified. As a result, based on such differentiations provided, Barnett and Duvall (2005) generated the conceptual framework for the power taxonomy.

1.2.3.1. Barnett and Duvall's Typology of Power

Barnett and Duvall's typology derives from the definition of power which indicates that “power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects on actors that shape their capacity to control their fate” (ibid, p. 45). Derived from that, scholars distinguish four types of power which include Compulsory, Institutional, Structural, and Productive types (see **Table 1**). The two analytical dimensions are formed on how power is being operated through certain relationships or actors and on the specificity of social relations through which power is produced.

Table 1. Taxonomy of Power by Barnett and Duvall (2005)

		Relational specificity	
		Direct	Diffuse
Power works through	Interactions of specific actors	Compulsory	Institutional
	Social relations of constitution	Structural	Productive

Compulsory power focuses on an actor’s direct control of others and their actions, through violence, threat and pressure. Such controlling interaction is similarly based as previously discussed in Weberian and Dahl’s definitions of power where A possesses power over B, but in this case, Dahl does not look into the unintentionality of power, whereas compulsory power suggested by Barnett and Duvall, highlights the idea that actors who have the power not always act intentionally, as they might be unaware of the effects their actions produce. Thus, compulsory power should be analysed through the “perspective of the recipient”, as the power is a “production of effects” and can be experienced even when the domination was unintendedly performed over some recipients (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p. 50). Moreover, Casier (2018, p. 104) points out that this power can be exerted using material resources alongside “symbolic and normative resources.” Therefore, shaming for not respecting norms, or implementation of sanctions with legal actions are examples of how direct control can affect the behaviour of another. In the contrast, **institutional power** refers to the indirect influence of one actor over another. It suggests the mediation of power through diffuse control via institutions. In this case, institutions are not “possessed” by an actor, thus, an actor does not have the resources of power as the one in compulsory power. Institutional dominance can eliminate the conflictual issues that might arise. However, a particular relationship (between dominant actor and institutions) and “varying institutional arrangements imply, different capacities of agenda-setting or unevenly distributed rewards” (ibid., p. 105). As a result, it implies an asymmetrical interdependence in which both parties have unequal control over the final outcomes. (Keohane and Nye, 2017, p. 171).

Above discussed concepts of power (compulsory and institutional) denote the idea that power mainly belongs to an actor and with it, he changes the actions of others. This way it focuses on specific interactions, taking into account who influences whom based on material, symbolic and institutional resources. Nevertheless, another dimension of power (**structural**) focuses on the social relations of the constitution. Barnett and Duvall examine it through the question of “how particular social relations are responsible for producing particular kinds of actors” (2005, p. 46); therefore, it mainly puts focus on how certain actors with different identities and interests are defined as the relation with others. In the case of “structural power”, power is expressed through the capabilities of certain actors in direct structural dependency on other actors. Gwynn (2019, p. 204) provides a such definition:

“Structural power characterizes a situation in which the institutional context shapes actor preferences or incentives in such a way that one actor (B) conforms its behaviour to (A)’s preferences, independent of any specific attempt by (A) to affect their relationship.”

Thus, the structural positions in which actors operate determine their social relationships, herewith, structural positions, but not an actor, affect their behaviour and existence. Hence, power depends on the position of an actor. In general, as points Ritchie and Egeland (2018, p. 123), structural power directly conditions the roles and opportunities of actors “through economic and political relations that advantage some and disadvantage others.” Therefore, it creates hierarchical domination similar to capital-labour, and master-slave relations. Lastly, the fourth category is **productive power**. It shares similarities with structural power as it is not affected by actors but rather their actions and does not focus on the conflicting nature of power. Nevertheless, they differ in aspect of relation, as contrarily to direct-structural, productive power is diffuse. As states Macdonell (in Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p. 55), this power “concerns discourse, the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed.” It analyses politics in daily actions, cultural activities and “sites of social relations.” Basically, productive power is about how meaning is created by actors through certain aspects that formulate the perception of the world of politics in a specific way but not the other (Shiffman, 2014, p. 287). Thus, thinking and actions are constructed through social processes based on knowledge, taking into consideration all social identities without hierarchical differentiation. However, there still exists critique of this type of power as there is no concrete definition highlighting who has power in shaping beliefs and to what extent or whether power is intentionally produced.

Notwithstanding, the typology of power developed by Barnett and Duvall is a significant advancement in the study of power in international relations. The four approaches to power conceptualized through the two-axes offer distinctive but important aspects of how power operates emphasizing the distinction between direct and indirect power. However, their typology of power is not ultimate. As there exist different explanations of power among which the most commonly used is the theory of soft power, along with hard and smart powers. Thereby, the following section will therefore examine Nye’s (1990) classification of power in more detail.

1.2.3.2. Nye’s Classification of Power

The changing political world order, increasing interdependence and globalisation have generated a broader interest in international relations. With the shift of understanding how states and additional “non-state actors” function, the definition of power has evolved from a simple means of controlling




Figure 2. Nye’s Power Classification

others to a perception of power as an element (tangible and intangible) encompassing culture, education, technologies, the economy as well as military resources. Therefore, the sources of power have been broadened. Thus, the famous American political scientist Joseph Nye decided to classify power into forms based on how it is exercised. He coined the terms “**soft power**” and “**hard power**” (Nye, 1990a, p. 181) and in 2004 expanded his classification with the third type of “**smart power**” which is a mixture of the two previous forms of power. The classification can be seen in **Figure 2**.

In general, Nye’s classification is drawn from the oldest definition of power which considers it as means by which others can be controlled or manipulated (Nye, 1990b, p. 154). This definition is essentially similar to that discussed in the sections above; it follows the ideas of realism. However, Nye emphasises, that power associated with attributes such as force and coercion, which have long been considered elements of power, can be called as hard power, or in a synonymic manner “command power.” This type of power, as Nye (1990a, p. 181) states, rests on inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”). Where threats are posed through force, while inducements are through benefit. Consequently, this power is achieved through militaristic threats or interventions and through economic rewards, the lowering of trade barriers, or protection alliances. As defined by Gray, hard power is “the ability purposefully to inflict pain or to reward in the pursuit of influence, it is convenient and plausible to identify it with military and economic instruments of policy” (2011, p. 28). In such a way, it is easier to identify and measure its impact, as interests are considered within frames of calculable costs and benefits. In general, scholars (Wilson, 2008, Rubin, 2010, Lustig, 2016) tend to distinguish the criteria by which command power could be analysed. These include elements such as material resources, economic prowess, geopolitical location (territory), demographic size (population), and military might (combat capability), see **Figure 3**.




Figure 3. Hard power elements

Therefore, actors choose how they would like to impose their will using these elements, i.e., hard power depends on their strategies. According to Wilson (2008, p. 114), these “strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions.” The examples of “hard power” can be considered the United States policy towards the Iraq War and the destruction of Saddam, as well as, the Afghanistan War. Moreover, policies and sanctions were implemented towards the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine both in 2014 and 2022. Thus, it is a strategy aimed at expanding influence and establishing the dominance of policies through strength and material

resources. However, Trunkos (2020) argues, that military activities can be supported with soft power, consequently, hard power interacts with the patterns of soft power. Ultimately, the goal of both powers seems to be the same.

The phrase “soft power” itself is employed in the context of public diplomacy and international affairs. According to Bilgin and Eliş (2008, p. 12) “soft power constitutes an improvement upon realist power analysis insofar as it raises the analyst’s awareness of the ‘second face of power’.” It is defined as the capacity to influence other actors to take a particular action, that the other actor wants. However, contrasted with hard power, where coercion and performed violence in achieving results are at its core, Nye (2008, p. 94) defines soft power as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want” using attraction and persuasion. The scholar suggests co-opting rather than a constraint on others. In this case, only a sincere attitude towards others and the ability to convince without pressure to carry out or obtain certain practices plays an important role. Thus, legitimacy is crucial in soft power’s performance.

Furthermore, this type does not consider material factors, i.e., financial, military or economic resources, as pillars of power. In contrast, it focuses on intangible elements. Therefore, this form of power can be manifested in different contexts with varying intensities.




Figure 4. Soft power’s resources (Nye, 2008)

It is assumed that ideational capacities form the core of soft power. It can be associated with attractive personalities, institutions and moral authority. However, in his early works, Nye argues, that soft power depends on three resources, thereby, **Figure 4** expresses his idea that goals can be reached through the use of **culture, political values, and legitimate foreign policies** (2004, 2008).

According to Nye, the first pillar of soft power resources is the attractiveness of culture and lifestyle. The author points out that influence can be projected on the international arena not only through the potential of the military and the economy but also through high culture and popular culture. The highbrow culture focuses on literature, art, and education. It includes investment in education, academic mobility, the number of foreign students who come to study in certain fields, training activities, language prevalence, the number of Nobel laureates in physics, chemistry and economics, as well as, museums with their exhibitions and programs. While pop culture, on the other hand, embraces the popularity of films, music, theatre and other manifestations of mass culture, furthermore, as international coverage of the country’s products and food. As Yavuzaslan and Çetin state, the cultural values that determine soft power usually are “compatible to those living in the country and abroad as this integration [determines] the greatness of the power” (2016). Therefore, the general culture promotes the attractiveness of agents to others. However, Nye (2004, pp. 11-12) warns not to equal resources with the behaviour of attraction. He provides an example of Kim Jong Il, the North Korean dictator, who reportedly liked pizza and American videos. However, the attraction to foreign pop culture and food did not affect his attitude and stance towards nuclear and missile

diplomacy. Thus, it is crucial to consider the context when evaluating the effectiveness of the resources.

Furthermore, foreign and domestic policy development is considered a source of soft power as it can directly affect its effectiveness. At a certain stage implemented policies that promote human rights or equality can serve as examples to other actors in their development stages. While the undertaken policies with opposite interests to the national ones can negatively reflect on the exercised power by minimising its influence. As contradicting views and hypocritical decisions can cause distrust. For instance (ibid.), the attractiveness of the United States to people declined after Iraq War in 2003, due to actions taken (intervention in Iraq to destroy mass destruction weapons) and policies adopted by the government at that time. Notwithstanding that, the distinction between policies, culture and values prevailed, as people did not lose interest in high or pop culture. Thus, this type of resource looks at whether the force of an actor has good or bad intentions, as it is about preserving legitimacy and moral authority in its actions both on a domestic level and abroad.

Another pillar of soft power is political values or ideologies that are taken into account by external agents. Therefore, soft power manifests itself in certain standards, rules and norms of behaviour, by which others should be guided when implementing domestic and foreign policies. Nye speaks of democratic ideals, such as freedom of the individual, mobility, and openness, which are frequently reflected in American popular culture, higher education, and foreign policy. While Cammack (2008) draws attention to the key values of democracy, globalisation, and an open international economy. In essence, soft power is extended to others through this set of complex values, but not by force rather than by a more attractive alternative. According to Armitage and Nye (2007, pp. 6-7), it is less challenging to attract people than to coerce them into democracy. It is evident, that soft power is built on the attraction of foreign populations and help provided to achieve democratic strands in conflicting situations. Thus, it is crucial to note that these resources are not considered as power as such, in this case, culture, political values, and foreign and domestic policies are considered as potential for power, which dominates not only through influence but also through attractiveness.

Despite Nye's distinction of generating soft power components, Treverton and Jones (2005, p. 14) suggest, that technological innovation, patterns of development aid, tourism, emigration, alliance networks, or Internet communication can serve as a measurable index of soft power. Olivié and Molina (2011) also develop similar ideas, suggesting such indicators: scientific research, international patents and development assistance, consisting of foreign aid abroad. Thus, the nature of soft power is more complex, as various scholars suggest that this type of power can be measured differently. For instance, the most representative resource-based measure of soft power is Jonathan McClory's, Soft Power 30 project (2010, 2011, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019), formerly known as the New Persuaders before 2015. Based on various resources, policies, and survey data about the perception of a country, McClory's study lists 30 countries based on their soft power, from its highest level to the lowest.




Figure 5. Soft power indices (McClory, 2015)

Taking into consideration Nye's pillars, McClory suggested five categories for assessing soft power in the year 2010: **Culture** (as a collection of practices that create meaning for society), **Government** (political values of the country and its effectiveness), **Diplomacy** (foreign policy and its ability to shape favourable narrative to others), **Education** (references to mobility and higher education's impact), and lastly, **Business/Innovation** (indicates how appealing an economy's openness and propensity for innovation are in a given country). In 2015, however, the author's original typology was reconfigured into the six categories of culture, government, engagement, education, digital, and enterprise, as seen in **Figure 5** above, which illustrates the six sub-indices.

In general, the categories have remained the same. However, some indications were rephrased; business and innovation became an enterprise, while diplomacy shifted into engagement, and it "captures the ability of states to engage with international audiences, drive collaboration, and ultimately shape global outcomes" (ibid., p. 21). Moreover, a new index "digital" appeared which embraces technologies and the connection to the digital world. Generally, it includes the music market, the number of universities, Internet bandwidth, diplomatic cultural missions, and direct investments just to mention a few. The author suggests an assessment that takes into account 70 per cent of this categorisation as objective and 30 per cent of the intangible factors, such as the standard of the national cuisine and drink, the presence of cultural icons, the standard of the national airlines, and the prestige of diplomatic missions and diplomats. Therefore, it is fairly understandable that such a methodology has produced slightly disputed but plausible findings. For instance, Trunkos (2020, p. 3) criticises this methodology, as, despite the high cultural soft power resources, some countries still are not ranked as having high-level soft power because they do not give much attention to foreign policy actions. Therefore, "what countries have at their disposal does not necessarily lead to a correct estimation of their soft power" (ibid.) Meanwhile, Lusting (2016, p. 112), on the other hand, quotes Javier Noya, who claims that "soft power is not a type of power but in fact, any resource – including military capacity – may be soft as long as it is socially legitimized for a specific purpose" i.e., numerous different forms of resources could support the increase of soft power (such a view interconnects with the further discussed conception of smart power). Theoretical disagreement rises, when some researchers (Olivie and Molina, 2011, Trunkos, 2013) state that resources of power overlap with the outcomes of soft power. Trunkos (2013, p. 5), argues that the above-discussed indices "do not separate the resource variables (foreign aid, language, etc.) from the outcome variables (national branding, tourism, etc.)." In general, such quantitative measurements are predicated on a sizable number of assumptions and simplicities, and most importantly, they directly depend on the standards established for evaluating soft power. These evaluations frequently reflect the ideological and political stance of the researchers. Since it is difficult to understand soft power properly, an individual assessment must distinguish certain areas in which analysis of countries' soft power levels should be carried out and in what scope.

Nevertheless, political power is built not only on the potential capabilities of one or another agent but also on the actual use of resources that guarantee superiority over the others. Thus, power is based on the agent's practical ability to realise his potential. The strength and will of the subject are equally invariable attributes of power. Therefore, the aforementioned concept of smart power is important because it justifies certain actions performed in the political arena. The basis of this phenomenon, which is already actively used as a political strategy by many countries, follows the idea that the modern art of public administration and political communication is based on the combination of two types of power. According to Armitage and Nye (2007, p. 7), smart power "is the skilful combination

of both.” As discussed by the authors, it includes the development of “an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power.” Hard power is the force of coercive nature and soft is considered the power of attracting others based on their own conscious choice. Therefore, smart power takes into consideration both tangible resources and the military together with partnerships and values when projecting influence and legitimising actions. It “needs material resources to support it and to substantiate its efforts” (Donelli, 2019, p. 116). In a sense, it is the ideal balance in which, on the one hand, the agent tries not to create new enemies in the international arena, and, on other hand, tries to attract other interested actors to cooperate. Based on Nye’s (2011) examples of smart power, Norwegian foreign policy can serve as an example of such a strategy. Norway, in order to ensure its own security, became a member of NATO, but at the same time began to develop non-political activities aimed at providing diplomatic assistance overseas, acting as a diplomatic mediator in interstate negotiations. Furthermore, Qatar, allowed American and other foreign forces to use its territory as the headquarters of the military during the intervention in Iraq, meanwhile, Qatar sponsored Al Jazeera, the Arabic news, which promoted Islamist perspectives and highly criticised actions taken by the US. In this way, hard power is balanced by soft power and smart power is exercised. However, Nye (2007) does not consider smart power as a third power in his classification, rather he defines it as an “approach which helps to understand and select the best possible policies for the specific issues.” Despite that, scholars do not omit smart power from the analyses. Moreover, Wilson (2008, p. 113) states, that such need for smart power increases with the rapidly changing environment, in general, due to the world becoming “smarter.” Therefore, the implementation of smart power in the modern world becomes possible through the use of new modern mechanisms, that are nowadays used in various spheres of life mixed with the classical elements of power. However, the mix of such strategies should be developed based on a theoretical and empirical approach and the calculation of the possible consequences of the actions undertaken, as some smart power strategies could, in contrast, become a catalyst for certain problems and conflicting trends. As a result, the existence of smart power should be linked to legitimacy. Nevertheless, the emergence of the smart power phenomenon reflects changes in the study of world international relations, it helps with the study of political dynamics and helps to foresee possible changes in the political arena.

After the analysis of power in international relations, it becomes clear that based on the perspective of various theorists it can be conceptualised in several ways. However, only realists provide a deeper analysis of power, as they consider it a crucial element of politics because states strive for power in order to survive and dominate in the international system. Power itself has been analysed by many scholars, therefore exists various types of it. Some suggest its differentiation based on visibility, while Barnett and Duvall (2005) suggest their taxonomy of power distinguishing compulsory, institutional, structural and productive types. Despite that, the most prominent classification of power is Nye’s categorization of soft and hard powers, which draws a line between coercive and attractive means while trying to achieve the intended outcomes; including smart power which is used as a mix of both soft and hard means. Notwithstanding, such classification is usually attributed to specific countries, as it is easier to establish the volume of power and the type of power performed while measuring the concrete indices of a country. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the essence of power in the European Union is provided in the last section of this chapter.

1.3. Essence of the European Union's Power

Power analysis has revealed that states can use different types of power based on various points of view. It is clear that state image, national identity and values can serve as resources for soft power. Different states use public and cultural diplomacy to realise their power. Moreover, various modern states successfully implement the use of power in a smart form which provides a balance between hard and soft powers. Supranational organizations are not an exception, they are using power as well. Based on the previous section it would seem that NATO, as a military alliance focuses on hard power, while, the UN, as an organisation striving for peace and social progress, is based on soft. However, the question then arises of what type of power is used by the European Union, which unites 27 countries, each of which has a unique culture, history and different political traditions.

Typically, political scientists when discussing the EU's role in the international arena often refer to power. As mentioned earlier, power is reflected in the relationship between two actors, when A causes a change in the preferences of B. The European Union changes the preferences, and characteristics of other countries, because those who seek to join the Union, have to redesign certain aspects of their systems to meet the required standards. Some scholars refer to this as structural power, great power, soft power, civilian power, command power, normative power or even transformative power. According to Nye (2004), Europe (both the European countries and the Union) is seen as a reflection of soft power. The author (*ibid*, p. 79) highlights that its attractiveness as a mean of soft power stems from special attention to “capital punishment, gun control, climate change, and the rights of homosexuals”, and, more generally, its contribution to global public goods. Smith (2014) similarly agrees that the EU has considerable soft power resources, including its model of international relations. Based on the soft power resources discussed in the section above (**Figure 4**), it can therefore be stated that the European Union as a political actor follows the soft components; it has legitimate authority, acts as a cultural centre, supports moral and democratic strands, promotes peace in Europe and seeks to resolve emerging conflicts.

In general, the foundation of a united Europe in the middle of the last century was based on the soft power idea. At first, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which included France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy was founded in 1951. Its goals were to strengthen economic cooperation by leaving all coercive means behind, to prevent situations of dispute over resources that could trigger destruction, and, mainly, through unity to preserve the conflict-free existence of European countries (Nello, 2012). In essence, unified Europe's desired result was the restoration of peace. Thus, the ECSC was established on the theoretical foundation of liberalism which believed in the improved world order pushed by the common goal through the political and economic associations. At this point, the first attempts to create a Union underlined the shift from the hard power of certain countries to the soft power of organizations. Nonetheless, the external threats remained, the main of which after World War II was communism. That is why political realities made European politicians think about hard power by promoting the treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC). “There was to be a combined army with a single uniform and flag, and its own budget” (Nello, 2012, p. 20). Therefore, the purpose of the existence of such a community was to consolidate European forces in the event of aggressive actions taken at that time by communists. Despite that the Treaty of EDC was not fully ratified; it became clear to the Europeans that the politics of the united community cannot be limited to liberal paradigms. The Western European Union (WEU) became the first attempt in history to create a common armed force for Europe in order to ensure collective security (*ibid.*). However, the WEU's activities were

not visible, as it was tamed by NATO. In general, NATO limits the use of force by the EU Member States. Thus, Moser (2020, p. 10) states, that despite Europe possessing a high level of hard power (military), the Union as such does not have it. As a result, the dependence between the EU and direct hard power cannot be emphasized.

Nevertheless, as Nye (1990b, p. 155) claimed, power depends not only on resources but on the ability to change the behaviour of actors. The Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) developed an economic and monetary union and established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union. It created the strive for partnership which affected the behaviour of other states. The objectives were formulated in a soft manner. According to the Treaty on European Union (2012), those objectives were:

- to create a free and safe Europe with no internal borders;
- to ensure smooth and efficient trade within Europe;
- to ensure Europe's sustainable and steady scientific and technological development;
- to achieve respect for languages and cultures;
- to promote peace not only in Europe but also elsewhere in the world, etc.

In general, the soft power of the EU is reflected in the spread of European culture in third countries; promotion of the economic interests of the Union; increment of the international competitiveness of European industry; strengthening of the policy of cooperation with third countries in order to promote development. Therefore, it is clear that the specific objectives of the EU are fostered not only inside its borders but applied in the neighbouring countries.

Moreover, as mentioned, the Maastricht Treaty formed the CFSP, which aims to preserve fundamental values and freedoms, and protect the interests of the Member States of the European Union by strengthening international security, and developing and consolidating democracy (Bindi, 2010, pp. 26-27). However, it is important to understand in this case the EU's hard power reflects its soft nature, as it is exclusively preventive, but not forced. Similarly, Smith (2014, p. 105) points out the fact, that the EU lacks hard military power, but notes that it possesses economic and diplomatic instruments which can be used for certain measures, author names those instruments as "development aid budgets; the capacity to enter into a trade, association, and other agreements with non-EU states and international organizations; and a network of delegations and special representatives that it can use to engage others in dialogue." The use of such instruments in the international arena strengthens the influence of the EU. Therefore, some argue (Telo, 2007), that actions implemented with these instruments should be opposed to the classical view of power (soft/hard) and considered as a civilian power. In this case, Smith (2014) uses civilian power as a synonym for hard power with excluded military elements. Based on the previous discussion in this research it is evident, that this type, according to Nye, can be called inducements ("carrots"). Thus, the EU acts as a civilian power that uses law and legal norms. F. Duchêne coined the term "civilian power" to describe the ability of the European Community to exert its influence over its foreign policy allies by non-military, non-coercive means but by civilian means, calling for compliance with international obligations. Smith (ibid.) suggests that embargoes and sanctions are examples of civilian power. An example of it can be the reaction of the EU to the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation as it prohibited the import of any goods originating in the Crimea Region or Sevastopol into the EU. Therefore,

following the theoretical review, such an act can be called not only civilian power but visible power, and hard power. However, until the end of the Cold War and the escalation of rivalry in the political and economic spheres, the idea of civilian power remained uncontested in political science. Along with the acknowledgement of the EU's status as a "European civilian power" that predominantly uses economic rather than military methods, the normative aspect of the Union's power, which actively promotes accepted universal standards and ideals like human rights, democracy, sustainable development, etc., was also widely discussed.

Therefore, exists an opinion according to which the EU is not guided by hard or soft, but rather by normative power. The term Normative Power is now frequently employed in research on EU foreign policy. Ian Manners developed the concept of normative power in terms of the EU's role in international relations (Normative Power Europe, NPE). The essence of this concept lies in ideational character which derives from certain material incentives. According to Manners, a normative approach might have cosmopolitan interests. Thus, prevail five characteristics of this normative power: the power of ideas, i.e., normative justification, not just economic and military means; reliance on legitimate and reliable principles; influencing rather than coercion on others; the power's ability to socialize; and consequences for world politics as a whole, not simply for one state or one region.

According to Skolimowska (2015, p. 116), normative power "refers to the European Union's ability to spread the norms and standards of European integration into the international communities." This power is made up of minor norms including social cohesion, non-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance, as well as major ones like peace, freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights (Manners, 2002). The above-mentioned norms, on which the European Union is founded, were formed based on the unique experience of the EU, which stems from its history, polity and legal structure. Thus, the EU's prevalence on such a normative foundation, i.e., the treatment of these norms as universal, predisposes the EU to act normatively in world politics and to propagate their norms in its policies with third countries. In general, normative power can be seen as part of the soft power of a political actor because it is based on a mechanism which seeks to ensure attractiveness and stimulate the desire to imitate the ideals and norms transmitted by the EU. Six factors are distinguished in how normative power is diffused (Manners 2002, pp. 244-245, Skolimowska, 2015, p. 117-118):

- *Contagion* includes spontaneous diffusion. The EU's norms and ideas are shared with other countries without direct EU activities or intervention.
- *Informational diffusion* takes place when various communication strategies are implemented to transmit information, e.g., EU Commission's or Council's initiatives and new policy developments.
- *Procedural diffusion* involves "the institutionalisation of relations with the EU". An example of it can be the membership of the EU in the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
- *Transference* occurs when "the EU exchanges of goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means."
- *Overt diffusion*. It is the EU's actual physical presence in organisations and third-party states.

- Lastly, *cultural filter* focuses on the process of learning European norms, whether third parties accept or reject the applied norms.

In this situation, it is important to comprehend and distinguish between main categories in these factors, i.e., “the ability to do something” and “the ability to tell someone what to do,” “power as a means of achievement,” and “power as a goal”. These six ways contribute to the EU’s normative power which exerts its influence on external countries without deploying or threatening but rather by persuading using attractiveness. Based on the notion of normative power, one might conclude that Europe is not seeking dominance over others but rather a chance to act on its behalf and that of weaker players.

In general, the ability of the actor to influence and shape how the entire international community views the “norm” is the essence of the concept of “normative power,” but the methods used to affect attitude are also crucial. They should also be “normative,” based on the opinion of the concept’s proponents. The same channels of communication that are used for communication within the Union should also be used for communication with third countries, those should include as well integration, prevention, mediation, and persuasion. In general, the European Union dedicates enormous financial, human, and technological resources to the implementation of programs designed to promote human rights and democracy, programs for providing development aid, and structural reforms both inside and beyond the European Union. Furthermore, the EU’s current reputation allows it to mediate in conflict resolution and peace negotiations without direct intrusion into countries’ politics.

Therefore, by abstracting from the conventional categories of military power and geopolitics, seeing the European Union in terms of normative power enables us to understand its nature in a different way. Due to the breadth of its competencies being constrained and the necessity of coordinating the views of 27 states within its institutions and bodies, it must be acknowledged that the European Union is not currently a typical actor in international affairs. Setting and implementing foreign policy objectives as well as the process of developing a European identity depends heavily on the values of both the Europeans themselves and of the rest of the world.

The definition provided by Manners, mainly, indicates that a subject can be normative if it employs normative techniques to reach its objectives. However, there has been much discussion regarding this idea because it is now impossible to specify the methods that the European Union employs in its foreign policy towards conflicting countries. As one of the key problems here is, that the European Union’s decision-making process might be driven both by the norms and interests of the Union as a whole and of individual member states.

Notwithstanding that, it is evident that various scholars agree on the fact that the EU possess certain power, however, different scholars argue on different conceptions of it. For instance, after the end of the Cold War, when the Iron Curtain fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, many borders in Europe were reshaped as countries started declaring independence. The European Union guided countries that were willing to become Member States through the adaptation to independence and transformation in political systems, this way preparing them for membership in the EU. Thus, based on that some scholars developed the idea of the EU’s transformative power. However, Kutlay (2018, p. 10) states that transformative power extends beyond Europe into the Mediterranean region, the Middle East and North Africa. In general, Mark Leonard formulates transformative power as:

“A new kind of power has evolved which cannot be measured in terms of military budgets or smart missiles. It works according to a longer timescale, and it is about reshaping the world rather than getting your way on individual decisions. Europe’s power is ‘transformative’ – based on extrapolating from the idea that everyone wants to be rich and at peace.” (2005, p. 49)

Within the framework of this notion, the European Union not only spreads international norms but also stimulates a wide range of political, economic and legal reforms in third countries. The transformative changes in those countries can be aimed at democratization, the formation of the rule of law or the introduction of a market economy. Transformative power includes effective means and instruments of influence. Realists contend that by working with its neighbours, the EU aims to ensure energy security, secure its borders, and address the issues of immigration and terrorism, among other things. Local conflicts and economic catastrophes in third-world nations have a heavy financial impact on Europe, resulting in large-scale migration flows, disruptions in energy supply, and the spread of contagious illnesses. The advancement of democracy, human rights, and sustainable development, according to European elites, lessens the likelihood of outside shocks endangering the EU. Therefore, the role of the EU is particularly significant in this approach, as it communicates with those “transformed” countries on a wide range of issues. The propagation of democracy is regarded as being a significant component of the security policy meant to stabilize the areas surrounding the EU. To this day, transformative strategy is widely used by the European Union not only for its candidate countries that are willing to enter the EU but for other countries as well.

In general, the ability to influence other actors’ policies and achieve one’s aims in the international arena by the use of one’s attractiveness is referred to as having “soft power”. Since it is broader, the concept of soft power considers a variety of factors affecting the influence of the EU, including its cultural and economic attractiveness as well as the appeal of its principles, norms, and values. Thus, soft power encompasses all of an actor’s externally projectable qualities rather than just the dissemination of norms. Both normative and soft power can be directed towards any nation and both have a broad geographic reach. Nevertheless, once again prevails the idea that the EU does not seek to gain global dominance over the entire world and its resources; the EU shares other goals such as ensuring stability in the European landscape, as well as increasing the level of well-being of European citizens through successful economic policies. The use of the hard power of the EU is not offensive, but rather defensive. In other words, the EU is not interested in power for the sake of power, but more in the power necessary for the practical implementation of its goals. Therefore, such power possesses normative, economic and cultural character, as well as is realized by employing soft power. To attract, not to coerce, to interest, and not to force, this is the strategy followed by the European Union.

After the analysis of the key concepts and theoretical framework, it is significant to overview the methodology applied in the analysis. The following chapter discusses methods and the data characteristics which prevail in this research.

2. INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN EUROPEAN UNION AND CONFLICTING ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

The relationship between the EU and the conflicting countries (Israel and Palestine) is analysed in order to clarify the way how the EU interfere in their politics and performance and to define how and what type of power is exercised towards them. The starting point will be the research methodology and a reflection regarding the material that is used in the analysis. Thus, the chapter presents the methodological approach of this thesis and practical examples of policies implemented towards the selected countries.

The section below presents the methods which were applied and the material used in the conducted research.

2.1. Data and Methodology

The collected material of the current research was analysed in the theoretical framework of International Relations theory with the aim to identify the European Union's power through the implemented policies. The following subsection **2.1.1** overviews methods which were applied in the conducted research. The material has been chosen by following a criterion that is discussed in more detail in the subsection about material characteristics (**2.1.2**).

2.1.1. Methodology of the Analysis

Methodological techniques applied in the analysis are presented in the following section.

The current study was carried out by using a qualitative (content analysis) research design. By concentrating on specifics and contrasting them with other specific information, this type of research enables the analysis of various aspects of texts. A qualitative research approach allows the acquisition of a wider perspective on a given subject (Klopper, 2008). It focuses on the patterns and themes in the data, rather than statistical data. According to Thomson (2011, p. 80), "when dealing with issues that involve the human thought process that is affected by the beliefs and values of the individual" qualitative method allows one to interpret the situations differently based on the situation and helps to reveal the unknown truth. This form of research enables contextual interpretation of the data because the thesis deals with the notion of power, which after theoretical analysis appeared to be multifaceted and comprised of numerous conceptual values and beliefs such as democracy, peace, culture, etc. Thus, this type of design fits into the analysis of the thesis, as it aims to distinguish the way how the European Union, through what actions, exercises its power in a setting of conflict.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is also a historical process due to its length and the various stages it has gone through, in addition to its historical significance. Following this, the analysis involved the use of the general scientific methods of analysis, synthesis, generalization, systematization, and deduction. Additional empirical methods were also used, such as description, situational analysis, the historical method, and document analysis. Furthermore, texts on political and negotiation processes were examined using content analysis. Comparative analysis is used to identify the traits and differences between the European Union's main viewpoints on Israel and Palestine.

It is clear that the research material, which is presented in the next section is analysed with the reference to various research designs.

2.1.2. Characteristics of the Material

The material for the research was collected by the following two criteria:

- Period of time:

The timeline which sets the context of the research mainly covers the period from 1993 up to the present. The development of both European integration and the Conflict influences this decision. The Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union and laid the foundation for its modern framework for the development of its foreign policy and defence components of integration, entered into force in 1993. Thus, the context of the conflict changed in the 1990s, spearheaded by the Oslo Accords of 1993. Shortly afterwards, the Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation took place. Subsequently, the negotiation initiatives have changed over time, but the basic logic of the peace process has not changed. Nevertheless, the EU member states' shared stance on the conflict was formed long before that. Inevitably, attention is paid to the role of the European Economic Community after its establishment. As it is impossible to comprehend the realities of the conflict itself without periodically referring to individual historical aspects. Thus, this also enables a broader perspective and a wider timeline including the 70s and 80s.

- Topicality (Israel, Palestine and the European Union):

The sources are primary sources meaning that they are original documents made by different political actors and organisations. Most of the material is collected from the EU and primarily consists of documents and reports. As a result, the research is based on the documents created by the EU and its Member States. Fundamental Treaties, papers adopted by the ECC and the EU within the scope of European Political Cooperation, conclusions of the European Council, jointly developed documents by the European Commission, and documents of the European Parliament (EP) are among them. The agreements between the EU (or the European Communities), on the one hand, are made with Israel and on the other with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (or the Palestinian Authority (PA)). These are bilateral association agreements, and action plans within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and adopted in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The research also makes use of historical Israeli-Palestinian conflict papers. First, there are agreements between Israel and the PLO, as well as ratified United Nations (UN) resolutions and conflict resolution strategies. Government-produced books and informational materials from Israel, Palestine, and other countries. Various NGOs, civil initiatives, and political organizations' materials. Speeches, reports, articles, and books written by public figures and politicians from various nations, and the UN. Separately, reference materials, informational messages, and news announcements from the official websites of the EU provide information, including statistical, economic, and legal elements of cooperation. Lastly, it includes other sources (both theoretical and empirical) that are crucial for research.

The following section presents and discusses the research findings. The section's goal is to determine the EU's policies in order to find potential influences on how the EU works with and wields power on Israel and Palestine independently.

2.2. Policies Implemented by the EU towards Israel and Palestine

The policies of the EU in relation to the conflict are not limited only to participation in political-diplomatic initiatives for its resolution. Israel and Palestine are geographical neighbours of the EU; therefore, the EU builds relations with them in the same way as with most other partners in the southern Mediterranean. The basis of bilateral relations is formed on economic and social cooperation. Thus, when analysing the conflict scenario and its resolution, it is important to focus on a broader view of relationships. Therefore, this section will cover the multifaceted interaction between the EU and each of the conflicting parties, not only at the governmental level but also at the societal.

According to TEU (2012), the main goal of the European Union is the promotion of peace, security, respect for human rights, and, in general, democratic principles. These foundations are noted in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and, later, in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Therefore, when developing relationships with other countries, the EU should consider these stands. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict context is not an exception, the EU develops relations with conflict parties for the peace process based on the same principles. The Middle East is an important region for Europe, and the EU has a direct interest in maintaining peace and stability there. As a result, the EU seeks to ensure security using a variety of tools, from providing economic aid to organising help. The European Union operates independently through various partnership programs and with the help of other international actors. Thus, until now, through various means, the EU and both parties to the conflict have established a close relationship, which has become a powerful instrument influencing the general attitude towards the conflict.

2.2.1. Relationship between the EU and Palestine

Palestine, a small nation in the Middle East, is undergoing fluctuations in global relations and economic conditions brought on, first and foremost, by the unrest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, since the beginning of the Palestinian issue, efforts to end the violent conflict have received the majority of attention from the international community.

Prior to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the European Union sought to give the occupied territories direct aid. Even though economic aid to Palestinians was primarily provided by oil-producing Arab states during the 1970s and 1980s, the EU's role began to grow even then. The European Union's economic role in its relationship with Palestine predates the establishment of the EU. In 1986 the European Economic Community (EEC) launched a trade project that enabled Palestine "to benefit directly from the trade with the EEC" (UNCTAD, 1989, p. 97). The Community adopted trade arrangements that allowed the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) to import goods produced in that territory free of customs duties and quantitative restrictions. This stimulated further cooperation. At present, the EU's contractual relations with the parties of the conflict, as well as with other countries of the southern Mediterranean region (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership participants), are regulated by association agreements, which have certain characteristics based on each country.

The first attempt to address the EU's objectives in the framework of relations with Palestine was made by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)/Barcelona Process in 1995 (later it was relaunched in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)). Nsouli (2006) stated, that "the aims of the EMP extend well beyond economics, with broad goals including political stability, strengthening cultural ties, and protecting the environment." Thus, the decision to create a common

agreement expressed the desire for stability, peace, and prosperity in the region. The agreement (also called Declaration) was structured on three pillars (as shown in **Figure 6** below).



Figure 6. Pillars of the EMP

In an effort to create a community where peace and stability would be given priority in light of the current crisis, the EMP concentrated on political and security partnerships. Following this, participants in the EMP vowed to uphold the fundamental principles of international law, respect for human rights, equality, and territorial integrity (EMP, 1995). Secondly, the establishment of the free trade area and the liberalization of the economy were discussed as crucial components of the Mediterranean relationship. As well as, the EU's financial assistance to its partners. Finally, on a human, scientific, and technological level, the Social, Cultural, and Human Partnership encouraged the development of cultural contacts and the interchange of partner traditions. These pillars had to support the democratic view and the common relationship between the EU and neighbouring countries, including Palestine. Nonetheless, the EMP has drawbacks. According to Nsouli (2006), most EMP partners (including Palestine) were not prepared for such a partnership because they did not see immediate gains, did not see motivational incentives, and in general, the conditions were unfavourable.

Nevertheless, the Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation (IATE), which was signed by the EU and the Palestine Liberation Organization on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, became the other comparable legal basis for the EU's contacts with Palestine in 1997. As was previously noted, the EU is founded on democratic ideals, hence the settlement of the accord used democracy and human rights as its primary pillars (IATE, Article 2). According to the EU, the main objectives of this agreement are:

- To provide an appropriate framework for a comprehensive dialogue, allowing the development of close relations between the parties;
- To establish the conditions for the progressive liberalization of trade;
- To foster the development of balanced economic and social relations between the parties through dialogue and cooperation;
- To contribute to the social and economic development of the West Bank and Gaza Strip;
- To encourage regional cooperation with a view to the consolidation of peaceful coexistence and economic and political stability;
- To promote cooperation in other areas which are of reciprocal interest.”

In general, the basis of a political convention is a form of exchange. The European Union offers economic (financial help or trade privileges) or political (special status of ties) perks in return for adherence to democratic principles and respect for human rights.

Thus, it is evident, that the EU can impose requirements on recipient nations for various reasons. One of them is the pressure from the public or the Union’s member countries for withholding aid from particular regimes (e.g., in the case of HAMAS). The nation needs to react to such internal pressure in order to retain cooperation with the Union, as the final justification for keeping the relationship might include trade incentives and historical and energetic aspects. Another factor is the creation of incentives and rewards that would help in the implementation of reforms. The political convention often does not deter corrupt or manipulated elections or other human rights violations by authoritarian or terroristic regimes, but the European Union can influence to a certain amount the condemnation or support for a particular party.

The IATE has political conditions which include the violation of obligations under the agreement, or measures undertaken for national security. As in general, the Oslo II Accord prohibited the PLO from entering into international agreements on behalf of the PA if those accords contained political elements, hence, according to the UN General Assembly 51st session, the pact mostly focuses on economic issues. Nevertheless, the agreement is also limited considering a trade. The pact does, however, have some trade-related restrictions. Based on that, it allowed discussions regarding the gradual liberalization of commerce in agricultural and fish products, and duty-free access to the markets of the European Community for industrial items from the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). Such verdicts did not have a significant impact on Palestinian exports because there were also issues with Palestine’s membership in World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership. Palestine has not yet joined the WTO or been admitted as an observer. Only a few agreements regarding the liberalization of trade in fisheries and agricultural goods were later signed by the EU with Palestine. According to Khalil and Le Roux (2021, p. 2), Palestine is currently only a modest trading partner for the EU. As agricultural items and raw materials made up the majority of the approximately €26 million in imports from Palestine to the EU in 2020. While the EU sent €218 million worth of goods to Palestine in the same year, including industrial and transportation equipment, and chemicals, which included pharmaceuticals (see **Figure 7**).




Figure 7. Trade between Palestine and the EU

Despite this, the trade links between Palestine and the European Union are significant. The Middle East is a source of economic growth for one while serving as a means for the other to pursue its goals there. (Khalil and Le Roux, p. 3 in 2021).

Another crucial policy of the bilateral relationship between the EU and Palestine is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which has been implemented since 2004. This policy regulates the bilateral aspect of the EU's relations with neighbouring countries (except the Russian Federation) that do not have candidate (potential candidate) status for admission to the Union. According to Al-Fattal (2010, p. 46), the ENP was formed as a response to the failure of the EMP, however, it "does not replace the multilateral framework of the EMP, but instead it offers a second bilateral track and new financial instruments (ENPI, cross-border cooperation, south regional programmes, Neighbourhood investment facility, development cooperation instrument and TAIEX) that are expected to complement the Barcelona process." The European Neighbourhood Policy in this case seeks to intensify the relationship between its neighbours through mutual security interests, stability, development and a market economy.

At its core, the EU Neighbourhood Policy is similar to the development programs implemented by international organizations in developing countries: it defines a wide range of cooperation, declares the goal of improving the general level of well-being of citizens, and raises issues of peaceful conflict resolution. To solve these problems, the EU offers not specific anti-crisis tools, but the long-term building of market economy institutions and a stable political system. As a result, like other donor countries and organisations, the EU faces typical problems with the effectiveness of such programs. Primarily, the Neighbourhood Policy focuses on a wide thematic range and geographical interaction, but the mechanisms for implementing the program and the criteria for its effectiveness are not completely clear. Because potential bonuses from participation in the Neighbourhood Policy are vague, its success largely depends on the interest of the countries themselves in obtaining financial benefits for their economy or political advantage. However, these benefits are not always obvious and sufficient to motivate nations including Palestine.

Despite that, an action plan for the development of relations between the EU and the Palestinian Authority was adopted by both actors. The PA was among the first neighbouring states which joined the Plan. It envisioned the gradual integration of Palestine into the EU's Internal Market and various EU policies. It was confirmed that the relationship between the two parties will depend on their "commitment to universal values, international law, international human rights standards, democracy and the rule of law" (Action Plan, 2012). The new plan has become much more detailed and structured, it aims to develop a cooperation agreement between the EU and the future state of Palestine. Through the introduction of rules into many domains of activity of other states with the help of normative power, the EU aims to ensure that its civilized identity alone provokes awe and respect.

With the ENP, the EU's economic support for Palestine only grew. The EU's financial assistance was provided through various support programs. Due to cooperation with the EU, Palestine has also been able to participate in regional and cross-border Euro-Mediterranean partnership projects across the neighbouring region. In particular, it participated in the People-to-People program (1998-2001) and later, the Partnership for Peace (PfP, since 2002), which aims to promote civil society efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In general, due to ENP, the Neighbourhood and Development Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) came into force. It is the main instrument for the EU's cooperation

and development with the European neighbourhood partners. It provides support to different areas: the various components of the PEGASE programme, sustainable economic development, two major infrastructure projects in Gaza and EU commitment towards the gender-related issue.

Since the 70s the European Economic Community began transferring funds to the Palestinians through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In 1978 United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) funds flowing through UNRWA doubled. The strategic cooperation between the EEC, now the EU and the UNRWA promoted and continues to promote stability in the Middle East. The relationship is mainly based on the support of the humanitarian needs, and stimulation of the development of Palestinian refugees. Since 1980 EEC transferred aid to Palestinians living directly in OPT. And as of today, the EU has become "the largest multilateral provider of international assistance to Palestine refugees" (EC press release, 2021). Generally, the aid provided by the EU affects different areas which has an impact on the lives of Palestinians.

According to Al-Fattal, (2010, p. 4), the main aid by the EU is reflected in "fields such as health care, education, human rights and democracy building, peace building and culture." However, at the same time he argues, that the aid programmes based on their goals are separated, socioeconomic development is supported by the UNDP, assistance to refugees through the UNRWA, while European Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (DG-ECHO) separately manages humanitarian assistance to those in need. However, based on the UNRWA, the separation of aid based on goals does not prevail, as the final goal is supporting. In this case, the EU with its aid to the UNRWA helps to provide quality education, to better skills and increase livelihood opportunities, suggests high-standard healthcare and improves living conditions. According to the European Union, it should offer humanitarian aid to victims "without any discrimination based on race, nationality, religion, sex, age, or political opinion, and its provision should not be guided by or be a subject to political considerations."

From the discussion above it is evident, that the European Union's and Palestinian relationship is mainly based on the aid that the EU provided or provides throughout the years. The EU set several initiatives from the EMP to the ENP to help Palestine.

Some experts believe that the EU this way have even more sway over the Palestinians. It is evident based on the theoretical ideas discussed in the first chapter, that soft power is one of the main powers used by the EU, as implemented policies reflect the partnership and projection of values on others (the main elements of soft power). Nevertheless, although being intended to advance the peace process, the initiatives had no positive impact on its progress and did not affect Palestine's perception of the conflict. This might be because EU legislation, norms and rules are less close to the traditions of the Arab country. Furthermore, the Neighbourhood Policy's implementation frequently shows that the EU does not always uphold the image of normative power that it attributes to itself and occasionally adopts a "realistic" policy, which is related to self-preservation. As a result, it might be assumed, that the European Union is more concerned about creating a stable and secure zone around itself through the general integration with Palestine rather than it is concerned with steady and long-lasting prosperity as allocation of aid highly depends on the prevailing attitude of the governing powers in the region. However, using such methods it is impossible to resolve those problems that the European Union is officially concerned about in this region.

To sum up, the policies discussed in this case, those between the EU and Palestine, reflect the realist view of international relations i.e., a struggle for peace.

Following a policy-based study of the EU-Palestinian relationship, the connection between Israel and the EU is described in the contrast.

2.2.2. Connection between the EU and Israel

The development of both sides' domestic and foreign policies has always placed a special emphasis on the bilateral connections between the European Union and Israel. Increasing cooperation in all areas has led to a significant amount of interdependence, affecting not only regulatory and institutional factors, but economic ones as well. In many ways, Israeli identity is founded on standards set by the European Union. At the same time, Israel is unable to fully adopt the institutions and norms of the European Union. Their bilateral ties are conflicted as a result of these circumstances and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In particular, the EU and Israel share a long and close cooperation in the trade, economic, diplomatic and humanitarian fields. On May 14, 1948, Israel declared its independence. Following the conclusion of the "The War for Independence" in July 1949, Israel gained recognition as a state by the European countries. Immediately, the majority of European states established close commercial ties with Israel. Prior to the creation of the European Union in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, Israel and the European Economic Community formed diplomatic relations as early as 1959, two years after the EEC's founding. The original Free Trade Agreement was approved in 1975. Israeli import (customs) charges on industrial goods from the EU market were gradually reduced as a result of an agreement between Israel and the member states of the European Union (FICC, 2015). After the Agreement between the European Free Trade Association states and Israel (EFTA, 1993), Israeli exports to the Common Market countries significantly increased as a result of the establishment of a large free trade area on the European continent. In addition to the formation of a network of joint ventures and the bolstering of economic ties with the nations of the European Free Trade Association, numerous tax breaks and preferential terms have promoted the growth of close business ties between Israeli and European entrepreneurs and investors.

Following the adoption of the Oslo Accords in August 1993, relations between Israel and the European Union underwent a transformation. On the one hand, due to the EU's position on Palestine, Israel made an attempt throughout the process to minimize interaction with the delegation of EU representatives, thereby cutting the EU off from the discussion. But after the EU reached a deal with the Palestinian Authority, Israel decided to follow a fundamentally different strategy in its relations with the EU. The fundamental example of the new approach in relations between the EU and Israel was the declaration signed in 1995 (entered into force in 2000). Israel participated actively in the Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) at the time. The EMP, which superseded the economic free trade agreement, expanded Israel's economic preferences.

Additionally, it includes clauses on shared values (EMP, Article 2, 2000), the ability to take action in the event of infringement (Article 79), and a national security clause (Article 76). Similarly, to the Agreement with the PLO, the Agreement with Israel shares a significant resemblance: once more, it has little to do with political matters. The agreement focuses on economic issues and is highly apolitical. Furthermore, it affects Israel's interactions with other Mediterranean countries, demonstrating that this country is de facto an economic member of Europe. The European

Agreements that the EU made with the European nations before their entry in 2004 and 2007 in the Union are thus comparable to the Agreement with Israel. Thus, it is evident that the European Commission believed that Israel should have a special position in ties with the European Union based on mutual benefit and shared interests, among other things.

Subsequently, the EU entered into another series of legally binding agreements with Israel, which demonstrated the dynamic deepening of their bilateral relations in various areas not related to politics. According to, du Plessix (2011, p. 6), Israel is “the first Non-member State to sign an agreement with the EU in 1996, which allows its participation at the Fourth European Framework Program (FP 4), the European research platform.” It became a principal financial instrument used by the European Union to fund practically all scientific areas in research and development. Later it was renamed into Horizon Europe - Horizon 2020. Thus, more significantly Israel benefits from cooperation in scientific research. During its participation in the Seventh Framework Program (2007-2013) alone, Israel received funding of €634 million. Based on the European Commission’s statement¹, Horizon Europe is the primary EU funding program for research and innovation with a €95.5 billion budget; “it combats climate change, helps in the accomplishment of the Sustainable Development Goals set forth by the UN, and increases the EU’s competitiveness and growth.” In addition, in terms of overall participation in Horizon 2020 among the Associated Countries, Israel ranked third. Israel excelled in innovative manufacturing, biotechnology, food, and ICT as well as the environment and energy (DR-RTD, 2021). As a result, the platform promotes the creation and more efficient transmission of cutting-edge knowledge and technologies.

Among the other EU programmes, Israel is participating in the Twinning, TAIEX, EUREKA, Eurostars, the Erasmus Mundus and Tempus programs, and is a member of the European Organization for Nuclear Research, known as CERN. Israel actively participates in the “Twinning” project, which is used as the EU instrument in promoting the improvement and modernization of institutions in the partner country.² Thus, the EU provides financial support for Israel through personnel training counselling, as well as through assisting in the development of laws and rules modelled on a set of European rules. While TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange) program is concentrated on addressing certain development and integration issues. According to the EC, the program “supports public administrations concerning the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation as well as facilitating the sharing of EU best practices.” The needs-driven approach is implemented to share expert knowledge. Therefore, consultants from EU member states participating in the TAIEX program travel abroad as invited experts to provide specially prepared sessions on particular topics for the governmental level actors.

Israel joined the Euro-Mediterranean Youth Programme (Euromed), which has emerged as the region’s most successful and narrowly focused tool for fostering intercultural communication among young people (Salto-Youth Euromed resource centre, 2005). The Euromed Youth program, in general, coordinates and conducts the exchange of experience and examples of how to best involve young people in social processes and increase their motivation to actively participate in the life of non-profit organizations and educational projects. Similarly, the EU funded TEMPUS, Erasmus

¹ European Commission, (n.d). Horizon Europe. Retrieved in November, 2022 from https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en

² DG NEAR, (n.d). Twinning. Retrieved in November, 2022 from https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/funding-and-technical-assistance/twinning_en

Mundus and Erasmus + programs aimed at promoting international cooperation in higher education. According to European Commission's factsheet (2020), between 2015 and 2020, over 8,415 Israeli professors, university personnel, and students travelled to Europe through this initiative, while 6,582 of their European counterparts visited Israel. Generally, based on the Erasmus+ for higher education in Israel factsheet, it is clear that the percentage of students and staff from Israel moving to Europe for educational purposes grows by each year. Therefore, the EU's involvement in Israeli development is based on active engagement and encouragement to participate in the Union's political and social life. Israel also received funding from other regional and cross-border programs, and other instruments (including the European Initiative, then the Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights).

The aforementioned elements would not have been conceivable if the EMP and ENP had not been announced. As most of the instruments and programmes were introduced under the ENP.

Israel and Palestine have both been a component of the European Neighbourhood Policy since 2004. Israel and the EU signed the first action plan under the framework of the Neighbouring policy at the end of 2004. The action plan under the Partnership project lists potential future agreements in several sectors but does not include a broad discussion of the general agreements between the two parties. It shares the same overarching objective of improving relations with the EU and affirms a dedication to shared values, but it is much more thorough than the Palestinian Action Plan. At the same time, the EU has established a partnership with Israel in the fields of science, technology, and economics, which has grown to be crucial for this nation. Contrary to what was assumed about the Palestinian instance, the EU-Israel economic ties' content turned out to be focused on trade, with the EU aid for basic needs serving as purely symbolic support (Pardo, 2010). Israel received very little from EU economic aid programs due to the higher level of economic development than Palestine. However, Israel was able to gain from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), a financial tool that supports the European Neighbourhood policy through actual assistance initiatives. Following the signing of a financing agreement, the EU has still allotted a great amount of funding to various activities under the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan. Therefore, the EU Action Plan items stimulated further Israeli growth.

By increasing its involvement with EU countries, Israel gains access to a number of economic, cultural, scientific, and other preferences. Because they share comparable ideals, such as democracy, respect for individual freedoms, and the rule of law, the EU and Israel promote the development of international open economic systems based on free market principles. The most important economic factor in relations is bilateral trade. The EU is Israel's top trading partner. As stated by Harpaz (2017, p.394), it is due to Israel's geographical proximity to Europe and Israel's inability to trade with the neighbouring Arab states. Thereby, Israel's top ten trading partners in 2021 included EU members like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Ireland (Workman, 2022). Additionally, Israel has associate status with the European Union and is the second-largest economy in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (based on the Barcelona Process).

Between the EU and Israel, goods trade in 2020 totalled €31.0 billion (as seen in **Figure 8**). According to the EC, the EU imported commodities from Israel worth €11.5 billion, with chemicals, machinery, and transportation equipment leading the way. The majority of the €19.5 billion in exports from the EU to Israel was made up of chemicals, industrial and transportation equipment, agricultural and raw materials, and other manufactured commodities. Israel is a major supplier of high-tech products to




Figure 8. Trade between Israel and the EU

Europe, including the software and apps found in many PCs and smartphones in addition to drugs, chemicals, and medical equipment. It is evident that the EU-Israeli commercial relationship is more developed than the EU-Palestinian trade relationship compared to the previously discussed data in **Figure 7**. The reason for that, as discussed, is the Israeli development level.

Nevertheless, the EU also employs financial influence methods, regulating both direct cash infusions and project financing under the ENP, depending on the behaviour of the party. In fact, the EU takes advantage of the situation in which Israel's economy depends on having partners outside the region and negotiations outside the country. The EU market is significant due to its size and proximity to Israel, even if it cannot entirely replace that country's primary ally, the United States. Thus, the State of Israel currently depends more on the European Union as a result of this cooperation, particularly in the economic sphere. Moreover, engagement in joint interregional initiatives and intergovernmental organizations has improved ties between the EU and Israel and laid the groundwork for Israel's relations with other nations.

Generally, all of the aforementioned fits under the normative power paradigm. The Israeli - European Union's relationship focuses on the six factors distinguished in the theoretical part. This is a contagion, a diffusion of procedures and information, transference, an overall diffusion, and a diffusion filtered by culture. As a result, the EU norms are indirectly shared through the cooperation agreements that are created in accordance with the laws and principles that provide the framework for the EU's operation. The Twinning, TAIEX, EUREKA, Eurostars, Erasmus, and Tempus programs, among others, promote the allure of the "normality" the EU offers. Additionally, it may be claimed that all of the above-mentioned factors are indicators of the soft power that the EU projects through its efforts to impose its will through inducements, i.e., favourable results in Israel's development stage.

There are as well situations where the European Union does not view the negative outcomes of economic sanctions as an obstacle to achieving the ultimate goal, forcing someone to follow the

necessary norms. These situations are in addition dualities, such as with the EU stance towards Israel and Palestine, where regulatory and economic interests overlap and the EU must choose between one. As a result, soft power counteracts hard power, and smart power is used.

Therefore, at the same time, the EU attempts to avoid making new competitors in the global scene, and on the other hand, it tries to entice other interested parties to cooperate. For instance, the European Union claims to support democracy within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, while on the other hand, it backs authoritarian governments in the Arab states to prevent a significant influx of migrants and to ensure the supply of oil. It might be challenging to distinguish between a policy that is motivated by norms and one that is motivated by interests. Since these categories overlap in the European Union's foreign policy towards Israel and Palestine, thus, it is much more challenging to distinguish between them. Since neither of the EU's normative arguments is supported by any conclusive evidence, they may typically be substituted by interest-based arguments. The fundamental interest is the democratization of the partner nations. The EU continues to require the adoption of democratic reforms and the European political model as conditions for enhancing cooperation. In this sense, the EU's normative power serves as a relative category that is hard to attain in absolute terms, growing unevenly during the course of the EU's policies as a major global player and having a variety of effects depending on the application context. Nevertheless, it is evident, that as a normative power, the European Union carries out many activities to protect human rights and spread democracy in the world. However, the issue of whether or not Europe is the main normative power in its relationship with Israel and Palestine remains despite the EU's close interactions with both countries.

Generally, the EU's political stance on conflict and the conflict itself has influenced and mediated the course of the bilateral relations with Israel and Palestine. Thus, the final chapter analyses the prevailing conflict between Israel and Palestine and the reasons for its occurrence. As well as, it presents the discussion on the EU's involvement in the conflict between the selected countries and Union's influence on it.

3. EVALUATION OF THE EU'S INFLUENCE ON THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

To evaluate the involvement of the European Union in the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, it is important to know how the conflict between these two countries started and developed.

3.1. Conflict between Israel and Palestine: Background Information

In order to understand the events of recent years and the current crisis situation between Israel and Palestine, it is essential to know and analyse all the historical facts of this conflict that has been going on for decades. This part of the thesis will mainly deal with the historical events of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The conflict between Arabs and Jews started around the 11th century BC when the Hebrew tribes began to migrate into the territory of Palestine and establish their states of Israel and the Kingdom of Judah. Over the years, Palestine belonged to various states: the Achaemenids, Alexander the Great, the Ptolemies, and the Seleucids, it was even a province of Rome and Byzantium. Therefore, it experienced a great influx of new inhabitants. During this time, the area became overpopulated, people lacked free land and water resources, thus, conflicts between the Arabs who had settled there a thousand years ago and the incoming tribes were inevitable. Some believe that the conflict only erupted later, during the rule of the Ottoman Empire, when the Zionist movement developed, which encouraged people of Jewish nationality to emigrate to Palestine. (Pressman, 2005). Zionism, according to Halperin (2015), emerged through the rise of ethnic nationalism, which encouraged people to think about their roots. Thus, it supported the idea to return and claim back the so-called "Holy Land" in the east of the Mediterranean Sea as a national homeland. Zionists believed that the "Holy Land" is the same location indicated in the Bible, and the Abrahamic Covenant is believed to have happened in that territory; thus, it should belong to believers. Nevertheless, Arabs did not agree with that, as they believe that the land belongs to those who reside there throughout the years. The same dispute remained during the world wars, and the disagreement only escalated.

In the early 20th century, Palestine became the epicentre of various political interests. Even though the territory belonged to the Ottoman Empire, colonial Britain had its own opinion regarding that land. Britain played certain political games against the Ottoman Empire's leaders by using Arabs and by promising them the independence of the Arab state. However, when Britain took control of the territory from the Ottoman Empire after the World War, in 1917, the promises made for the Arabs were forgotten. The Balfour Declaration was issued, in this declaration, the British government expressed its desire and official support for the establishment of "a Jewish national home in Palestine" (Beinin and Hajjar, 2014, p. 10). This declaration encouraged Jewish immigration and created the basis for the creation of the State of Israel, but was opposed from the beginning by the Arab population of Palestine. Therefore, British policies played a major role in bringing about a conflict between Jews and Arabs. Despite this, both Jews and Arabs still expressed the desire to establish their nation-states, which led to inevitable tension. That is why throughout the British Mandate period of 1922-1948 clashes broke out constantly between two rivals in Palestine. The end of World War II did not bring any positive changes in Palestine. The whole situation worsened immediately after it. "The horrors of the Holocaust committed in Europe by Europeans led to another large wave of European Jewish immigration to Palestine" (Shlaim in Makdisi, 2018, p. 5). The situation of the increasing number of immigrants once again raised dissatisfaction, and, thus, the violence between Jews and

Arabs grew. Only the rather belated intervention of the British army, which acted harshly and decisively, minimised the unrest. The vast majority of those killed and wounded among the Arabs were victims of clashes with the army and police.

Britain was tired of the constant military clashes, therefore it decided to retreat from disputes over territorial divisions, by handing over control of the territory to the United Nations in 1947. Thus, the UN General Assembly decided to organise the first special session regarding the Palestinian question. According to Tessler (2020), during this session, the UN established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which had to examine all the issues related to Palestine and recommend solutions for solving them. Jewish organizations cooperated with the UNSCOP, while Palestinian leaders decided to distance themselves from this as the UN refused to consider Palestinian independence. The committee recommended that Palestine should be divided into Arab and Jewish states, that the city of Jerusalem should be given a special status, and that its governance should be entrusted to the UN. However, only in 1945 did the UN General Assembly vote to partition Palestine into two states, one Jewish and the other Arab. According to UN Resolution 181 (in Bein and Hajjar, 2014), the area delegated to the Jewish state had to be “slightly larger than the Palestinian state (56 per cent and 43 per cent of Palestine, respectively) on the assumption that increasing numbers of Jews would immigrate there” and the area of Jerusalem and Bethlehem was to become an international zone. The UN Security Council (UNSC) was obliged to supervise the implementation of this partition plan and take any necessary measures if needed. Although the Jewish side accepted such a plan, both sides still believed that they had received less of the territory than they actually owned. Therefore, this decision did not bring peace to the Middle East but aggravated the situation in the region even more. The territorial arrangement of the Arab and Jewish states based on the terms of Resolution 181 (II) was extremely unsuccessful. Each of the states was supposed to consist of several areas cut off from each other, and the infrastructure of Palestine turned out to be torn apart. Thus, it led to seeking solutions through armed conflict.

In May 1948, the Jewish communities founded the state of Israel, while the Arabs rebelled against it. After the declaration of Israel’s independence, the League of Arab States (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt) (LAS)) appeared and declared war on the newly created Jewish state. Thus, a year (between 1948 and 1949) was marked by the first Arab-Israeli War. Israel, supported by the Jews of the whole world, very quickly occupied over 77 per cent of the enemy’s territory (Bein and Hajjar, 2014, p. 14). The Palestinians were expelled from their lands. However, Jordan and Egypt became controlling entities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The war aggravated the long-lasting conflict that has not ended until now.

In 1948, the UN declared that the situation in Palestine posed a threat to peace and decided to take measures to ensure peace in the region. Therefore, the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Egypt, Libya, Jordan, and Lebanon was signed at the initiative of the United Nations, and the signing of the agreement was supposed to restore peace in Palestine. As a response to the Israeli-Arab fighting, the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) was constituted by the Assembly in accordance with Resolution 194 (III) of 1949 in order to assist the parties in reaching a binding agreement while reiterating the rights of Palestinian refugees to repatriation and restitution. Palestinians have cited this section as a reflection of their right to return. Other articles of the resolution referred to the protection and free access to the Holy Places and Jerusalem, which were under UN control. In general, the UNCCP was supposed to help both sides of the conflict reach a final peace agreement. The commission’s goal was to help solve questions about refugees, territory, and Jerusalem. However,

efforts to ensure the safe return of Palestinians and secure Jerusalem's status as an international city has failed. The agreement remained mainly an official document, as both parties did not implement all of the goals of the resolutions.

The Israeli-Palestinian problem remained unresolved. From 1950 until 1967, violence continued throughout the region. During this period, Israel occupied all the territories of the former British Mandate of Palestine. By this time, Israel was already a fully formed state with modern armed forces. Military conflicts started again in 1956. Israel joined France and the United Kingdom and began military action against Egypt. According to Beinun and Hajjar (2014, pp. 16-17), this was triggered by Egypt's stance in favour of nationalizing the Suez Canal, despite French and British opposition.

This crisis ended when the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) was deployed. It was withdrawn from Egypt and the Gaza Strip only in 1967. Since the end of the Suez Crisis, there have been repeated border incidents on Israel's border with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, including the infiltration of Palestinian guerrillas into Israeli territory and Israel Defence Forces (IDF) retaliatory operations using heavy equipment and aircraft. In the same year, tensions escalated again, and Israeli military forces occupied Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, including West Jerusalem, and part of the Syrian Golan Heights.

Throughout the years, the United Nations tried to settle the escalating conflict. The Security Council adopted Resolution 237 (1967), according to which Israel had to ensure the safety and well-being of the population in the occupied territories and accept returning refugees. For its part, the UN asked Israel not to take further steps that could change the United Nations' designation of Jerusalem as a city. Later in 1967, the UN Security Council, after long negotiations, unanimously adopted Resolution 242. It established the principles for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East: "the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied during the recent conflict, cessation of war, respect and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the area, and their right to live in peace with secure and recognized borders" (Resolutions 242, 1967, p.8). Nevertheless, referring to the Arab countries' refusal to recognize their right to existence, Israel refused to comply with the UN decisions. During that time, under the control of Israel, "Palestinians were denied many basic political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of political association" (Beinin and Hajjar 2014, p. 18). In general, everything related to Palestine or its support was considered a criminal activity and a direct threat to Israel's well-being. As a response to Israeli actions, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964. The Palestinian nationalist organisation strongly criticized this resolution, as the main idea of Palestinian independence was overshadowed by the problems of Jewish refugees.

A new attempt to reach peace between Israel and Palestine was made in 1978, after the wars between Israel and Egypt over the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula and between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights. The Camp David negotiations were organised by the United States. The negotiations had to bring peace between Egypt and Israel, as well as other Arab states. However, peace talks regarding autonomy did not convince other Arab countries and the Palestinians to join the process; therefore, the final results of Camp David did not shed any light on the prevailing issue. Israel violated the terms of the negotiation agreement regarding Palestinian territories and continued to attack Palestinian lands.

In the 1980s, Israel continued to adhere to a tough and irreconcilable course in relations with both Palestinian organizations and Arab countries (except Egypt). In the same year, Jerusalem was declared the capital of Israel, which greatly complicated the situation in the Middle East. The UN Security Council condemned Israel's actions toward Jerusalem, declaring them a violation of international law. The situation was as well condemned by the Palestinians, and many Palestinian organizations continued to practise terror. The point-turning event in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict happened in 1987. Palestinian spiritual leader and activist Ahmed Yassin founded the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Islamic Jihad, a violent branch of the Egyptian Muslim Society, whose main goal was to expel Israel from Palestine by any means possible. Hamas urged all Muslims to liberate the territory by using terror as the sole means of combating Israel. It helped to launch a massive and well-organized campaign of Palestinian civil disobedience in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - the so-called Intifada ("resistance"), which began on December 9, 1987. Beinun and Hajjar (2014, p. 21-22) state, that during the intifada, which was attended by representatives of all segments of Palestinian society, mass demonstrations and strikes were held, and economic boycotts and resistance to tax collection were organized. In general, the intifada was a protest against Israeli repression. Subsequently, further clashes began between Israeli troops and Palestinians.

The Persian Gulf War in 1991 also influenced the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This war stimulated the Madrid Conference. After the war, "the US sought to stabilize its position in the Middle East by promoting a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict" (Beinun and Hajjar, 2014, p. 23). Both the United States and the Soviet Union together initiated the Madrid Conference, which included delegates from Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine. The peace conference established a framework for multilateral talks among delegates as well as bilateral talks between Israel and the other half of the delegates. Once again, the talks did not bring any progress in the peace process. As the PLO was excluded from the conference, Hamas' attacks on Israel and Islamic Jihad have continued to maintain and tensions even increased. Therefore, as the popularity of these Islamist organizations grew and became a challenge to the moderation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas began to promote the integration of Islam into political affairs, thus creating an alternative to the secular nationalism of the PLO. Eventually, Hamas, Jihad, and other Islamist movements posed a greater threat to Israel than the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In 1993, there were secret talks between representatives of Israel and the PLO leaders in London and Oslo. The "Declaration of Principles on Interim Measures for Self-Government" (Oslo-I), which was based on the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO, was signed. It was signed by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The declaration transferred the control of the Gaza Strip and the area around the city of Jericho on the West Bank of the Jordan River to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), as well as declaring that Israeli troops were supposed to leave the mentioned territory. A five-year transitional period was set during which Israel and the Palestinians would have to come to a permanent status agreement. In addition, the Declaration supported the idea of holding the Palestinian Authority elections for a temporary body of Palestinian self-government, which would govern the territory during the transitional period. The "Declaration of Principles" had historic significance, paving the way for Palestinian self-government and the start of a negotiation process that would eventually lead to a solution to the question of the permanent status of Palestine. The UN and the West declared their full support for the Declaration; however, it caused a strong negative reaction in the Middle East. Since 1994, the peace process in the Middle

East has been overshadowed by a series of terrorist attacks against Israel by Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations. The tension escalated after Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister of Israel in 1996. This fact continued terror and harmed the dynamics of the Middle East peace process, as the position of Netanyahu was supported by these theses: 1) the creation of an independent Palestine is impossible; 2) Jerusalem is the only capital of Israel; 3) the Golan Heights must remain under Israeli control; 4) it is necessary to continue the construction of Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories (Newman, 1999). As a result, negotiations between the two states broke down.

However, the West still tried to settle down the escalated conflict. In 2003, a peace process known as the “Roadmap” plan was launched, the main idea of which was to create a detailed plan outlining the conditions, events, and implementation period that would help end the conflict between Palestine and Israel. The project encouraged Palestine to carry out reforms and abandon terrorist measures in exchange for the eviction of Israeli settlements from the Palestinian territory and the creation of a Palestinian state. In 2006, Israel began a unilateral eviction of its residents from the Gaza Strip. Some residents accepted government compensation and voluntarily left Gaza, while others were forcibly evicted by the Israel Defence Forces. Such a move was made to reduce the number of attacks on Israel, but it did not help, and Israel received rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. Palestinians feared that Israel could isolate Gaza and tighten its control over the West Bank. In the same year, Hamas won the Palestinian parliament elections, which caused the US, EU and other international donors to stop aid to the Palestinian Authority. The vote also divided Palestine between Yasir Arafat’s Fatah movement, represented by Mahmoud Abbas, and Hamas, which controlled the Palestinian government and parliament. Therefore, neither the calls of the international community nor the agreements reached by the parties to end the clashes succeeded in stopping the deterioration of the situation in the Palestinian territories.

Israel’s border cities became targets, which were constantly affected by the cruelty of the terrorist Hamas groups. In 2008, despite continuing peace talks, the city of Sderot, located in the south of Israel, was rocketed by the Palestinians. As a response to rocket attacks, Israel decided to conduct a military operation. It aimed to hit the infrastructure of terrorists. The operation started on December 27, 2008, with Israel launching air strikes (Zanotti et al 2009, p. 2). Once again, the UN, the United States, and other countries attempted to solve the conflict. There have been no serious changes in Israel’s or Palestine’s politics; thus, the following years were marked by the same clashes between Israel and Palestine.

The foreign intervention with Trump’s statements in 2017 prompted different reactions and, once again, unrest. In his speech, Trump declared, that “the United States recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel and that the United States Embassy to Israel will be relocated [from Tel Aviv] to Jerusalem as soon as practicable” (Zanotti, 2017). Therefore, as the territorial question is crucial in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the recognition of Jerusalem as a part of Israel provoked Gaza border protests followed by bloodshed. The situation remained unchanged following the Trump administration’s peace plans for 2020. As of 2022, the problem did not diminish, and, according to Tor Wennesland, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (2022) “after decades of persistent violence, illegal settlement expansion, dormant negotiations, and deepening occupation, the conflict is again reaching a boiling point.” Perhaps the Palestinian-Israeli conflict belongs to that category of conflicts when an absolute peaceful settlement cannot be achieved, and any settlement leads to the emergence of new problems.

It is evident that the Israeli-Palestinian problem is still far from its solution. However, despite the regularly arising difficulties and contradictions, the parties have common ideas about the principle of conflict regulation and its foundations. The latter implies the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories with insignificant border changes, the exchange of territories, the division of Jerusalem, the return of most of the refugees to the Palestinian state, and the provision of compensation to those who do not return.

The chronological overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict presented the important stages of the conflict; the following section will take a look at how the EU intervened in the conflict during its existence.

3.2. EU's Actions on Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

These days the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has reached its peak. The more than 60-year-old conflict is today affecting not just the interests of the conflicting parties but also the interests of the whole world. The international community has made numerous attempts to resolve the conflict in order to bring peace to the Middle East region. In turn, external actors who are acting as a third party in the dispute have a significant impact on it. In this regard, the European Union has special relevance. Thus, the chapter aims to analyse the strategies used by the EU to resolve the issue between the aforementioned nations based on the timeline of important actions and events.

The EU's position on the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict has been slowly evolving since the 1990s. However, several positions were taken years before the EU was created. Generally, based on International Human Rights Laws, the European Union should support the right of the Israeli and Palestinian nations to self-determination, by establishing a functioning Palestinian state, upholding human rights, and adhering to international law. It employed a variety of methods, associated with the so-called "soft power" strategy or normative power stands, to achieve these objectives. However, it must be acknowledged that internal disputes within the EU significantly limit its capacity to handle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a result, the EU's strategy in direct conflict solutions sometimes contradicts the ideas of two states and infringes on respect for human rights, and international law. Nevertheless, in order to understand its stand, it is crucial to overlook the main events associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the European Union.

The initial stage was between the 1970s - 1980s. After the formation of the EEC, the member nations' position was developed based on a common strategy for solving the Middle East problem. In the wake of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the first world oil crisis, the European Communities together addressed the subject of resolving the conflict between Palestine and Israel for the first time with the help of the already-established system of European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Khader, 2013). A unified European viewpoint on the Middle East was presented in the developed Declaration. The communities held the opinion that Israel should leave the Palestinian territories and acknowledge their autonomy, and that the Arab nations should admit Israel as a sovereign state. The position of the EU on this issue tends to be more pro-Palestinian, which cannot serve as a positive factor in relations with Israel. The proclamation acknowledged the illegality of land confiscation by force from the outset and urged Israel to stop occupying Arab lands.

Later, the European Communities presented their proposal for resolving the Middle East problem in 1977 at the 47th London Summit (1977), which called for the establishment of two states for two peoples.³

The United States served as the mediator in the bilateral discussions between Egypt and Israel the following year during Camp David I (Dieckhoff, 2005, p. 53). It meant that the European Communities did not participate in the signing of a peace treaty between the two nations. Notwithstanding, Dieckhoff (ibid) states, that “the EU played a more modest role, developing guidelines for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East (“land for peace”, the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, and Israel’s right to security) and supporting diplomatic initiatives (mainly, but not exclusively, by providing financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority).” Thus, the EU proposed an important initiative, but the Palestinian issue has not been settled.

This stimulated the adoption of the Declaration of the Venice Summit by nine countries of the European Economic Community in 1980 and provided the groundwork for the creation of a coordinated European strategy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict even before the European Union was fully formed (Venice Declaration, 1980). According to the declaration (1980), two factors - the tight relations between Europe and the Middle East and the desire to ensure adherence to UN resolutions - were used by the EEC members to justify their participation in it. The EU has often reaffirmed its commitment to the idea of resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict on the basis of the right to self-determination of the two peoples while protecting human rights and international law. To achieve these objectives, the EU uses a range of diplomatic and economic instruments, but most crucially, treaty connections with Israel and Palestine. Generally, discussion and discourse (sometimes referred to as soft instruments) should be the primary normative power instruments. However, there are many circumstances in which it is other strategies like economic coercion is employed, which can also run counter to the principles being spread.

The Treaty on the European Union, program documents, and agreements with other nations; all demonstrate that the value component is crucial to the European Union’s foreign policy. In spite of this, there have been numerous discussions on the normativity of both goals and methods for accomplishing them as they have come up during the implementation of foreign policy. Whether the EU actually upholds standards or merely touts them to advance its own economic and political goals.

While the EU started regularly advancing democracy and human rights in the 1990s, using both the previously developed and newly created tools of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The conflict questions pertaining to the settlement were on a passive stage during the subsequent stage (1980–2002), despite considerable EU involvement in its relationship with Palestine and Israel. The EU reiterated its prior stance, but no point-turning declarations or actions were taken. However, the conference took place in Madrid in 1991 following, as points Tessler (2020, p. 112), joint Soviet-American consultations. Despite that, the participation of the EU in dispute resolutions was limited to the working group on regional economic development (Dieckhoff, 2005, p. 5). The United States, which has long opposed the EU’s participation in Middle East peace talks, at the time was the region’s most active participant in the solution, with the EU playing only a supportive, secondary role. Despite

³ European Council Meeting “Presidency Conclusions “. Retrieved in November, 2022 from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20785/london_june_1977__eng_.pdf

no agreements being proposed, the fact that Israeli and Arab representatives were meeting and discussing preliminary concerns was nonetheless a significant development.

In general, the EU foreign policy has an indirect connection to the conflict. It takes a basis from agreements with Israel and Palestine. As it is already known, the European Union at first developed the EMP, later the ENP. Thus, as states Carmora, Jongberg, and Trapouzanlis (2022) these policies were directed toward strengthening the relationship between the two nations, and generally, addressing political discourse, unrestricted commerce in manufactured goods and agricultural products, free capital movement, harmonization of the legal system, and cultural co-operation. Additional agreements between Israel and the EU were also signed based on scientific and technical cooperation. It is clear that both sides of the conflict are interconnected with the ENP. Therefore, such EU activities may have had a greater impact on the conflict, although they are not directly related to it. This occurs as a result of the achievement of more encounters between the opposing parties in circumstances where they are forced to express their interests in novel ways based on their needs (Voltolini, 2012). As a result, the EU's efforts to engage with the Palestinians are met with Israeli resistance. The country does not recognize the EU-Palestinian agreements. In such context, the action program of the EU and Palestine for the implementation of the ENP mainly remained as a theoretical approach based on the actions undertaken during the later years. Thus, it should be noted that the tools used by the EU and their potential effect could not prevent the dramatic developments in the region in the 2000s.

The European Union was involved in the Quartet on Middle East Settlement from 2002 to 2009. At the time, the US acknowledged the EU as a member of the Quartet on the Middle East settlement notwithstanding the differences that still existed. One of the most crucial elements was that, despite individual disagreements, different parties' objectives regarding a peaceful resolution to the Middle East conflict coincided. With the end of the Oslo process, the US attempted to promote greater internationalization of mediation. The US and the EU have established diplomatic relations with both sides, and the recognition of the EU as a separate actor recognizing and supporting Palestine made it possible to achieve a certain balance in the negotiations (Voltolini, 2012). As a result, the EU is frequently viewed as the peace process's economic model. Since there is a certain balancing of the views of the parties in the negotiations, the EU's participation in them was crucial for the Palestinian side while the US for Israel. However, there has been no change in the Quartet, and US dominance continues regardless of American actions.

Later, the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), CFSP, and the EU ESDP missions have all contributed to certain successes. Among these were the EU's engagement in border control in Rafah between November 2005 and June 2007 and its support of intra-Palestinian ceasefire talks in 2001–2003 (CSDF, 2009). However, these EU initiatives did not significantly mediate the conflict as a whole. The Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, launched in 2007, has caused a humanitarian crisis. Respect for human rights and international humanitarian law are significant parts of EU diplomacy regarding regional crisis zones. Therefore, the EU statement on this subject denounced Israeli settlement development (that violates the Fourth Geneva Convention), Israeli military intervention operations, and the construction of a wall on the West Bank of Jordan (Tocci, 2009). It also condemned Palestinian violence and terrorism. Thus, the EU devoted close attention to concerns relating to Palestinian Authority governance between 2001 and 2007.

Generally, law enforcement missions, or rule of law missions, are a significant part of the European Union's foreign policy. According to European Commission, they are intended to support the governments of the nations involved in reforming the law enforcement agencies and institutions of state authority, as well as the judicial and legal system in order to establish and develop democratic and legal norms in the state. To achieve the goals and objectives of civilian missions in the field of maintaining the rule of law, special police units of the participating countries, specialists in the field of justice, security, and administrative management, as well as international observers are involved. Many civilian missions are combined with military ones, as police missions are usually carried out simultaneously with or after crisis management operations. As a result, to encourage the establishment of police organizations within Palestinian Authority territory, an EU police mission was established in November 2005. Israeli-Palestinian relations subsequently underwent some normalization. The goal of the European Union was to assist with this procedure. The EU mission had a number of experts working on it. Norway and Canada were also taking part in the mission, alongside the EU nations. The mission's focus was a large range of issues about the advancement of Palestinian justice, in addition to the structure of the police force. The mission's work should have helped the Palestinian civilian police become more professional. However, the latter is merely a component of a complicated and divisive Palestinian security system which still needs advancement.

But it's important to understand that the European Union can only support domestic reform efforts, it cannot impose reforms on another country. If there is a desire to enhance the legal system, the aid offered will be helpful, but it is constrained by a lack of tools and knowledge of the other party. Perhaps as Palestine's political landscape evolves, the stance of Palestinians will also develop over time.

The difficulties of another EU operation are also linked to the ascendancy of the Hamas organization. After Israeli forces and settlers left the Gaza Strip in late 2005, a mission was created at the Rafah border crossing, which served as the only formal crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The mission's activities included keeping an eye on what was happening at the crossing, teaching local border and customs authorities, and providing equipment for the crossing's setup. The mission was formally terminated (but not finished) in June 2007, a year after Egypt closed the Rafah crossing as a result of Hamas' triumph, however, the aggravated situation prevails to this day. The crossing only occasionally functioned between June 2006 and June 2007, and Israeli authorities frequently barred EU monitors' access to the crossing because of security concerns. The worries seem to have been justified. Thus, in December 2006, the mission was forced to leave Rafah point at the moment when riots broke out there between supporters of rival political forces of Palestine. The mission is currently based in the Israeli Mediterranean city of Ashkelon. The rejection of the complete curtailment of the mission was supposed to symbolize that the EU continues to hope for a future reduction in the political contradictions that led to the suspension of its activities.

However, Israel's position on the mission remained unclear. In reality, the Israeli leadership supported its establishment and deployment on Israeli lands because they wanted to ensure an international presence at the Rafah crossing and because they saw a softer EU criticism of Israeli policies at the time. However, they did not support or obstruct the mission's work during that time despite having doubts about its sincerity.

Between 2009 and 2017, there was a significant shift in the EU's internal and external policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Lisbon Treaty, in addition to other updates and

enhancements, according to Pavy (2022) gave the European Union greater choices for action in the areas of common foreign, security, and military policy because new institutions were created under the treaty on December 1, 2009. As a result, it became a more streamlined and cogent structure for the foreign policy of the European Union.

The position of the European Union specifically the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 2009-2017 was a continuation of its policies developed earlier. Despite the fact, that in 2012, due to the hopelessness of achieving statehood through negotiations with Israel, the Palestinian Authority petitioned the UN General Assembly to recognize Palestine as a non-member state. The conflicting views among EU member states on this matter lessened the influence of Israel's stand on the question. However, as a response, Israel expanded settlement plans in east Jerusalem, though, it resulted in unwavering unison against Israeli policy. As a result, the EU Foreign Affairs Council insisted that all agreements with Israel explicitly state that they are "not applicable to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967." In 2013, in response to pressure from the European Parliament, the European Commission also issued a directive that made it clear that EU grants cannot be given to Israelis living in the occupied territories. This development became one of the differentiations⁴ policy's cornerstones. Israeli officials responded negatively despite the fact that the practical effects were minimal. Israel limited the EU's operations in the West Bank by temporarily ceasing cooperation. Israel was almost prevented from joining the Horizon 2020 research funding program because of the necessity for a territorial clause to exclude the West Bank from the deal, which threatened to lose millions of euros in funding for Israelis. This was just one of the most blatant instances of the European Union using its normative power to pressure Israel into dividing the territories in an effort to put pressure on Israel to stop settlement growth and maintain the viability of the two-state solution for the two nations.

Concerning the Palestinian Authority, the Islamist movement Hamas, the disastrous situation in Gaza, and Israel's de facto annexation of the West Bank, the violence that tore through Israel and Palestine in April and May 2021 put to the test the established European approach to the conflict. The 2021 events demonstrated that, despite the European Union and its member states' declared interest in achieving a two-state solution, its policies actually work against rather than in favour of that goal.

In general, the European Union to this day takes an active part in the negotiations on a Middle East peace process. There has been a strengthening of the member countries' positions and the emergence of a shared viewpoint on the Middle East with the commencement of the construction of institutions for political cooperation and a unified foreign and security strategy. The EU makes a huge financial contribution to the conflict's resolution. However, the position of the EU is less stable than, for example, the position of the United States, which is evident due to the difficulty of harmonizing the positions of 27 member countries. In this case, the European Union's common foreign policy seems to consist of the coordinated foreign policies of its member states, but considering a normative power, it makes sense that any actions taken within the scope of the authorized authority should have a sizable impact on the foreign policies of the member states individually. Therefore, the current situation in politics expressed by the Union is based on the interaction between the standards established by the European Union and the interests promoted by its nations.

⁴ "Refers to particular EU member states being able to opt out of specific EU policies or being excluded from them until they have met certain minimum conditions." (Kröger, S and Loughran, T. (n.d.). The benefits and risks for the EU of 'differentiated integration'. [Viewed 2 November 2022]. Retrieved from: <https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-benefits-and-risks-for-the-eu-of-differentiated-integration/>

Three more implicit interests lie behind the EU's stated objectives in its dealings with Israel and Palestine; as a result, the EU's regional strategy becomes highly consistent. First, the EU prioritizes improving ties with Israel, based on political, historical, and economic factors. Second, the EU views regional stability as a political objective, which, if one adopts a realistic interpretation of this word, may be seen as both an interest and a standard. Long-term stability involves the establishment of peace, the defence of human rights, and adherence to international law. Generally, peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are the most crucial principles. These identity-related elements also have an impact on how the EU conducts its international relations. Formally, each of these standards serves as the foundation for the EU's approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

However, restrictive and repressive security measures, which on the other hand, result in abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, can be used to create some stability in the short- to medium term. Thus, the interests of the highest order are put ahead of EU policy in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Despite that, the identification of the guiding principles required to end the conflict between Israel and Palestine must involve the entire international community.

All in all, the EU can position itself as any "power" it wishes, but the extent of its effect on the international environment will rely on how many other subjects of international relations share this perception.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the European Union's influence in the context of the conflict between Israel and Palestine has led to the following conclusions:

1. The theoretical overview of power in International Relations (in realism, constructivism and liberalism), variations of power and the essence of European power revealed that it is challenging to provide a clear definition of power because academics frequently disagree on what exactly it means and offer several terminologies. Nevertheless, it is demonstrated in the routine operations and relationships of governments and organizations. It has been noted that power can either be viewed as a component of International Relations or as the foundation upon which it is based. It has been determined that power reflects in situations when countries change the preferences and general characteristics of other countries based on the formula where A causes a change in the preferences of B to the extent that B acts as A specifies. Therefore, there exist variations of power. One of the mostly applied is soft and hard power, this idea is based on an actor's capacity to achieve the desired outcome either employing or without any sanctions or rewards against another player, while establishing his preferences. As a result, the European Union focuses more intently on the role of power in foreign policy, trying to balance hard and soft power while applying smart power.

However, more importantly, in response to attempts to define precisely what the power of the European Union is and how to interpret it, new theories explaining the position of the European Union on the global stage and its possibilities in the future have emerged. The notion of European Normative Power was one of these theories, and it has grown in popularity among scientists and policymakers. According to this theory, the European Union is capable of developing notions about what constitutes a norm, mostly as a result of its allure and the consequent globalization of ideals like democracy, human rights, freedom, and the rule of law. This is why ethical and cultural considerations, alongside economic or military, and political principles, dominate the political positioning of the EU.

2. The research was conducted on the European Union's policies and activities toward Israel and Palestine. It was inferred that the EU uses the ENP as its primary tool of influence in its interactions with Palestine. Through it, in exchange for adherence to democratic ideals and respect for human rights, Palestine receives political or economic benefits from the European Union. As a result, trade agreements with the EU are crucial for Palestinian economic growth. As well as the country's social growth, as a significant donor, the EU stipulates integration, modernization, and adaptation to all humanitarian needs. While the European Union's objective to stop the migration issues is dependent on the regional policies that have been put in place.

Similarly, it was determined that the Israeli and the EU's relationship is mainly built on the ENP. The ENP evolved into the primary financial tool the European Union uses to finance essentially all scientific fields in Israeli research and development. The EU and Israel entered into agreements that appear to be legally binding with regard to their bilateral relations in a variety of non-political fields. The EU employs financial influence techniques, monitoring both direct cash injections and project financing that is covered under the ENP. Israel's top trading partner, as a result, is the EU, while Israel is the top trading partner of the EU in the

Mediterranean region. Israel's economy heavily relies on having partners outside of the area, thus the EU gains in terms of trade, health, innovation, culture, and educational opportunities.

It is important to highlight that the connection between the EU and Israel and Palestine has spanned a wide range of relationship-related issues. Since the formation of these nations, the EU has firmly assumed the role of a major regional actor, forging diplomatic, political, and economic ties with the neighbours while also creating the tone for discussions of national interests, principles, and development strategies. The European Union has developed new sources of influence over other Israel and Palestine as a result of the historical experience of these countries and dedicated special attention to conveying its own values to the conflicting sides.

3. The resolution of conflicts cannot be heavily influenced by the EU. Despite this, the EU has consistently asserted its role as a peacekeeping power in the Israeli-Palestinian region threatening nations with reputational damage, exclusion from the European community, and cancellation of advantages from cooperation. The EU encourages the leaders of countries to adhere to these values and norms, even in situations where the ruling elites have shown mistrust or chosen to be less involved in the partnership with the EU. The EU uses these declarations of values and norms as a formal criterion for the progress of countries in achieving partnership goals. Through this, the EU seems to have a very significant impact on the conflict. The EU, it might be said, is one of the main protections for maintaining the minimal status quo; otherwise, the dispute would have long ago taken a very different turn. On the other hand, the peace process, which has been supported by the EU and other actors for more than twenty years, has not led to a resolution, but rather to a worsening of the conflict by escalating tensions between Israeli and Palestinian nations, which has not stopped thousands of deaths and has raised ever-increasing concerns about changing the paradigm of the pursuit of peace itself.

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